793.94 Conference/133
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Ballantine) of a Conversation With the First Secretary of the Japanese Embassy (Sakamoto)
Mr. Sakamoto called this afternoon in connection with a routine matter, which having been disposed of Mr. Ballantine took this opportunity to ask Mr. Sakamoto whether he had any information about the political situation in the Far East. Mr. Sakamoto then made the following comments.
The Japanese Government was unlikely to hold a special meeting of the Cabinet to consider the Belgian Government’s invitation and therefore the reply would probably be delayed until after the regular Cabinet meeting on October 26. The decision reached by the Cabinet would of course then have to be submitted to the Emperor for his approval. Mr. Sakamoto felt that it was over ninety per cent certain that the Japanese Government’s decision would be against accepting the invitation; that if it had not been for the League’s condemnation of Japan and the President’s Chicago speech of October 5 a favorable decision might have been easier to reach. He felt also that it was premature at the present time to discuss peace until the Japanese forces had attained a decisive victory in the south as assent on the part of Japan to discuss peace would be interpreted by the Chinese as a Chinese victory and any peace reached on this basis would fail to result in any alleviation of the anti-Japanese activities of the Chinese Government. There was also, he thought, a psychological factor involved which might make it difficult for the Army to yield; that is to say, there was an element of rivalry between the Japanese forces in the north, which had won substantial victories, and the forces in the Shanghai area, which had not yet made any decisive gains. This, of course, he explained, was a minor point but it nevertheless entered into the situation. He said that even though Hirota and the civilian authorities might be willing to consider peace at this time, the Government [Page 106] had to contend with the Army which would undoubtedly hold out against such a move at this time.
Mr. Ballantine remarked that it was to be hoped that Japan might in some way or other find it possible to accept the invitation. Mr. Sakamoto said that he felt that in the opinion of the Embassy here it was much more important that Japan reach an early decision with regard to its peace terms, which could be explained to the American and British Governments, than to attend the Brussels Conference.
Mr. Sakamoto’s observations tended to strengthen Mr. Ballantine’s previous feeling that objections in Japan to accepting the invitation were not confined, as stated by Mr. Yoshizawa in his conversation with Mr. Dooman, to the failure of the invitation to specify that the conference did not arise from the League resolution and from the Secretary’s statement of October 6.