793.94 Conference/151: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Davies) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 31—9:40 p.m.]
284. On the eve of Litvinov’s departure I found occasion to have another and extended conference with him and believing that the information might be of some value to the American delegation at Brussels I have decided to cable report as follows.
Litvinov does not expect to stay for the entire Conference. He definitely leaves this evening for Brussels. He expressed the positive opinion that China would not accept a peace through mediation if it involved the relinquishment of the northern provinces to Japan. In reply to my inquiry as to how China could carry on without supplies he rejoined that China could conduct a [resistance?] indefinitely and that adequate supplies for this character of warfare could be procured despite the blockade and despite possible difficulties in shipments via Indo-China. The implication was that supplies would go overland. In connection with Germany’s refusal to attend the Brussels Conference he stated that Germany had submitted to Hirota the question of whether Germany should participate and that the reply had been in the negative; that Japan did not wish any of its friends by attendance to seem to countenance the implied violation of the Washington [Page 130] Treaty; that subsequently Japanese Ambassadors in Western Europe had strongly urged that Germany should attend but that Hirota again rejected the proposal. As to Italy, Japan took the position that it offered no objection to its participation. This in the opinion of Litvinov was solely for the purpose of having a friend who was able to report from the inside upon the facts for Japan’s information and guidance. He purported to know that some time before the Conference was called Japan had informally advised Britain of its desire for mediation; that the British Foreign Office was deeply disappointed with Japan’s refusal to attend and had brought pressure to bear in the hope that mediation could be negotiated forthwith at this Conference. He stated that there was conflict in Germany between the financial and commercial German interests in China and the political obligations of the German Government. In reply to my query as to whether Germany through Ribbentrop’s visit to Rome had brought Italy into the Japanese-German Anti-Communist Pact46 he answered in the affirmative. In reply to my question as to whether in his opinion this amounted to an offensive and defensive military alliance he answered in the negative but qualified it with the statement that under modern conditions when wars existed without formal declaration it was not necessary that obligations of a military nature should be formally and expressly declared as between the parties. He was definitely pessimistic as to any substantial accomplishment of a realistic character at Brussels.
In the assessment of the attitude of the Soviet Government in this situation you may find the following statement which he made to be illuminating.
Maiski47 in the Non-Intervention Committee had taken the position that the Soviet Union would not assume any responsibility in connection with the British-French plan but stated that the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics would not embarrass any peaceful efforts of the others and would abstain from voting; that Italy had refused to accept that attitude. In reply to my query as to whether the Soviet Government would proceed firmly to that position he stated that it would. He added that France and England had brought their strongest pressure to bear upon his Government to alter its position and to go along with them; and that the French and English Ambassadors had urged upon him here that his Government should cooperate in this situation as to do otherwise would be to place the Soviet Government before the world in the intransigent attitude of blocking the possibility of peace and would “isolate the Soviet Union”. He stated that his reply was that it was better to be isolated and to be [Page 131] right than to be associated and be ethically wrong as well as to be intellectually misled as to the means of effecting peace. He stated definitely to them that the Soviet Union was prepared “to be isolated”. This confirms a statement which was made to me by a high Commissar here last July indicating the indifference of his Government to the attitude of the outside world, including both France and England, and which was to the effect that the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics would proceed along lines of its own policy in supreme confidence in its ability to withstand enemies from without. In reply to my query as to whether the Government could rely upon the loyalty of the army after the shooting of the Red Army generals and in the face of the present purge Litvinov replied “the army is devoted to the principles of ‘the cause’ and is loyal not to the generals but to the Government”.
In any assessment of this Government as a factor in the international situation in my opinion it would be a mistake to underestimate the strength of the Government here. In my opinion, corroborated by the judgment of many of the conservative members of the Diplomatic Corps, this Government has the army well in hand, and barring some accident is firmly entrenched. A large section of heavy industry has been placed under the direct administration of army control and discipline. The Government is now engaged in negotiations for the procurement of war materials, trucks, et cetera, with indications of somewhat feverish activity. This Government undoubtedly feels very confident of its ability to defend itself against military attack from either East or West or from both simultaneously. The masses seem to be conscious of the menace of war and the effects of this extensive and terrible purge seem to be largely offset among the masses by that fact.
Not repeated to Brussels due to the code.
- See vol. i, pp. 605 ff.↩
- Ivan Maisky, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom.↩