793.94 Conference/157: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

508. We feel that background material as presented hereunder51 may be helpful to the Department at this time especially in connection with the subject of the Department’s 277, October 31, 2 p.m., to which we are replying in a separate telegram.

1.
The Department has probably noticed a press despatch from Hedges52 on a resolution adopted on Saturday53 by a group of members of Parliament denouncing Great Britain for attempting to form a common front against Japan and advocating that diplomatic relations with Great Britain be broken off. The previous night a “delegation” visited the British Embassy to protest against the supplying of British arms to China. The press is again referring in heated terms to the “unfriendly attitude” of the British forces at Shanghai charging inter alia that British troops supplied food to Chinese troops beleaguered in Chapei and facilitated their escape into the International Settlement, that British warships have been giving range and direction signals to Chinese artillery units and that without making investigation the British accused the Japanese of firing the shell which killed or wounded four British soldiers. The incidents above cited, in our opinion, are not intrinsically important but they are symptomatic and not [un]reflective of the intense dislike and suspicion of the British which prevail among all classes as expressed in the resolution above mentioned.
2.
Although there is in our opinion no evidence that the Japanese Government contemplates translating that feeling into any action directed against Great Britain alone, the British Ambassador in conversations with me last Saturday seemed concerned, if not alarmed, over the hostility of the Japanese Navy toward Great Britain. (He believed that the army’s attitude is relatively moderate.) He referred to the recent action by France in stopping the sending of arms and munitions to China through Indo-China and he said that as Hong Kong is now the principal place of entry into China for war supplies the animus of the Japanese is now concentrated on the British. He thought that the formation of a new Japanese naval unit designated as the Fourth Fleet which is operating in South China waters along with other recent developments pointed to plans to “cut off Hong Kong”.
3.
We do not share Craigie’s fears with regard to this last point but we believe that plans are on foot for the taking of further drastic measures by Japan pari passu with future political and military developments.
(a)
Political: Frequent references are made in the press and in private conversations to possible withdrawal by Japan from the Nine Power Treaty. The principal reason for Japan’s not already having withdrawn at any one of various times during the past 6 years is probably that it would vitiate the Japanese argument that the military actions of Japan do not come within the purview of that Treaty. But if the Brussels Conference should find that Japan has transgressed the Treaty there would probably be agitation for withdrawal.
(b)
Military: It seems unlikely that Japan would blockade Hong Kong, which would inevitably lead to war with Great Britain, before resorting to the device of declaring war on China and thus acquiring a legal right to search vessels bound for Hong Kong. The possibility of stopping ingress into China through Hong Kong of war supplies is as the Department might well suppose being given serious attention by the Japanese. In this connection a retired admiral who still enjoys strong influence in navy circles informed a member of my staff that Japan might have to inaugurate in the South China Sea a second “Kirkwall”. This statement and other pieces of evidence, such as the release of the naval landing force from further operations at Shanghai, suggest that far-reaching plans might be put into effect if the military situation is not well in hand in the near future, say by the end of the year. One possibility which seems likely is that war would be declared against China, a formal and effective blockade instituted, and a naval landing party sent to occupy Hainan or some other point which could be conveniently used as a place to inspect neutral shipping.
4.
The attitude of the United States is being presented by press despatches from the United States as one of moderation. Those published today include an extensive summarization of an article by Lippmann54 carried by the New York Herald Tribune on October 30 and others which stress that the United States will endeavor to avoid being faced by a choice between “drastic alternative”.

Repeated to Nanking.

Grew
  1. See also telegram No. 509, November 2, 2 p.m., from the Ambassador in Japan, vol. iii, p. 652.
  2. Frank H. Hedges, American correspondent at Tokyo.
  3. October 30.
  4. Walter Lippmann, newspaper columnist.