793.94 Conference/313
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton)
Mr. Suma, Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called at his request.
He said that Mr. Hirota very much appreciated the Secretary’s message as communicated to Mr. Hirota by Ambassador Grew.
Mr. Suma said that stories had come to the attention of the Japanese Government from both Brussels and Shanghai, principally from Shanghai, to the effect that the American delegation at Brussels had indicated to the Chinese delegation there that China might expect some sort of practical assistance from the United States in the way of supplying materials or something which would help the Chinese to carry on their fighting against the Japanese. Mr. Suma said that his Government did not place too much credence in these reports but that it was somewhat perturbed thereby. Mr. Suma said that reports of this nature did not seem to be entirely in line with the Secretary’s message to Mr. Hirota. I said that I could make no comment in regard to the reports to which Mr. Suma referred; that Mr. Grew had stated to Mr. Hirota the general position of the American Government; and that the attitude and policy of the American Government were well known and had been made clear through various public statements and addresses.
Mr. Suma said that their information was to the effect that some definite step would be taken by the Brussels Conference on Monday. He asked whether our information was to that effect. I said that we understood that the Conference would convene again on Monday and I commented with a smile that Monday was only a short time away so that it would not be long until we had information in regard to such action as might be taken by the Conference.
Mr. Suma said that their information in regard to the military situation was that the Japanese had obtained control of Soochow and that a decisive phase in the operations had been reached. He said also that according to their reports Chinese governmental leaders had left Nanking. He said that this was very unfortunate. He then referred again to the Brussels Conference and said that if the Brussels Conference did not adopt a common attitude which would serve to encourage the Chinese and thereby cause them to prolong the fighting, he thought that very soon possibly an emissary from Chiang Kaishek might go to General Matsui5 with a view to negotiating terms. He said also that it would be helpful if any common attitude taken by [Page 217] the Brussels Conference should not be of such a nature as to operate against a government possibly serving by means of its good offices in assisting in bringing together the Chinese and the Japanese into direct negotiations. He said that prolongation of the conflict would be unfortunate, both for Japan and China, but particularly for China. I said that Mr. Hirota had made comments along this line to Mr. Grew. Mr. Suma referred again to his belief that the taking by the Brussels Conference of action which would serve to encourage the Chinese would operate to make the situation worse. He said that he knew definitely that the convening of the Brussels Conference had caused the Japanese to redouble their military operations. I said that I could make no comment in regard to this other than to refer him to what I had previously said: that the general attitude and policy of the United States had been made known repeatedly and were a matter of public record.
- Gen. Iwane Matsui, Japanese military commander in chief in Central China.↩