816.00/1010
The Minister in El Salvador (Corrigan) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 9.]
Sir: I have the honor to submit the following additional data concerning the actual political situation as regards the next Presidential period.
President Martínez’ quiet efforts to sound out public opinion and enlist support for his program of “constitutional reform”, which really means extension of his period in the office of President, have become a matter of general knowledge. There has been no press publicity but the news has spread by word of mouth and public opinion is being formed. This opinion is divided, but the trend seems to be adverse to the proposal. The wealthiest Salvadorans and leaders of the foreign groups as well as the political job-holders encourage the continuance in office of President Martínez. The foreign businessmen and wealthier Salvadorans are inspired by fear of the menace of “communism” and remember his record in that regard. They feel that he can suppress any efforts of radical elements to assume control. They are ruled by fear rather than love.
Desire to retain their present positions is the guiding motive of the group in Government service who favor the continuance. The present Government officials are by no means united in this regard. I should say that two cabinet ministers favor continuance, one is neutral, and one has told me that he would resign rather than support the proposal. [Page 523] A large part of the population is voiceless, but nearly all elements of the country intelligent enough to have an opinion resent the idea of “continuismo”, the word commonly used to express the idea of continuance in office by a President beyond his legal term.
I have a number of close contacts among physicians who look upon me as a medical colleague and are wont to discuss freely in my presence the things that interest them. They come in contact with all elements, and their conversations are illuminating as to the ebb and flow of public opinion. Continuation in office of General Martínez has now become a matter of general discussion. Censorship of the press is rigid, but freedom of verbal expression can not be suppressed in Salvador. At social gatherings, groups of intimates collect and political discussion begins. Up to the present they have been conducted without heat, but signs are plentiful that this matter of “continuismo” will become a burning question long before the date of the next election.
Powerful elements in the Martínez administration oppose the program. As reported above, one cabinet minister … told me he would resign if Martínez persisted in his efforts to prolong his period beyond the time for which he was elected, and he has been one of Martínez’ steadiest supporters. Two other cabinet ministers … are using their powerful influence in favor of prolongation of the Presidential period. Their influence and the apparent desire of the Executive seem to be dominant at present. … maintains a neutral attitude.
Indications are plentiful that there will be fierce and determined opposition from important sections of the Army as well as the general public. If the characteristic stubbornness of the Executive manifests itself in a determination to force the issue, even in the face of an adverse public opinion, there is likely to be a reaction fraught with troublesome possibilities. Disturbance of public order may well occur.
Motivated by the belief that its influence as representing the Government of the United States could be a determining factor in the controversy, various efforts have been made by both of the opposing camps to sound out or influence the attitude of the Legation.
Some of these efforts have been referred to in previous despatches (No. 1033 of May 25, 1937, and No. 1054 of June 30, 19372).
In conformity with the Department’s policy as set forth in confidential instruction No. 216 of April 30, 1936,3 the Legation’s attitude in the face of these efforts has been completely “hands off”, that is to say, unequivocally non-committal.
[Page 524]Consideration of the Department is now invited to the probability that maintenance of this completely negative attitude will weigh heavily in favor of the program of constitutional “reform” and “continuismo” by giving it tacit approval. It is bound to be so construed. I trust that I have correctly interpreted the Department’s policy, but as the responsibility is very grave and since the instruction referred to was a general one, I would appreciate instructions applying to the case in point for further guidance of the Legation’s attitude as the situation becomes more acute.
So that the Department may be fully informed in the premises, I hope that I may be pardoned for expressing a personal viewpoint which, of course, in no way affects my official actions as directed by the Department’s instructions. There arises in this instance the old question of reconciliation of the completely cold “hands off” interpretation as against the warmer implications which seem to me to be inherent in the “Good Neighbor” policy. I am heartily in accord with the policy of non-interference in Salvadoran affairs. Forcible intervention in America properly belongs to an age that is past. However, the moral influences of this and other missions in the American republics continues to be a potent factor which can be utilized for good ends. I am sure no American would wish these missions to lose prestige so long as that prestige is based on good will and fair dealing. It would be premature to try to set forth at once the policies that should be adopted so as to best utilize this power for good. Emphasis up to the present has been placed upon the negative, or “hands off” phase of our continental policy. The present situation in El Salvador shows clearly that a negative attitude may have a positive result, and perhaps one not to our liking. The actual replacement of democratic institutions by dictatorial or Fascist régimes in many Latin American countries, and the imminence of its happening here, brings up the question of whether there is not a moral responsibility implicit in the interpretation of the “Good Neighbor” policy. The simile of a fire in the neighbor’s barn is here in point.
The Department has, in one instance, (Instruction No. 78 of May 21, 1937 [1934]4 in reply to Minister Lane’s No. 192 of May 4,5 in Nicaragua) approved of assumption of responsibility of the “Good Neighbor” by expressing views, preferably as the personal views of the diplomatic representative which might serve to maintain the peace of the country and consequently avoid bloodshed and disorder. (The above paragraph is a paraphrase of the Despatch in reference.) Opposition or adverse criticism, informally expressed, as the personal views of the Minister might in this instance be a determining factor [Page 525] in halting the beginning of a Dictatorship and the preservation of legal and constitutional commitments in El Salvador. The elements favoring continuance are not yet quite sure of their ground. An unofficial frown at this juncture might have a decisive influence.
A dictatorship here, on account of the spirit of the people, would have to be maintained by oppressive measures.
It seems likely, therefore, and would be useful to this Mission to have the Department’s instructions upon the local situation with relation to the deeper and more positive implications of our established continental policy of the “Good Neighbor”.
Respectfully,
- Neither printed.↩
- The same as instruction No. 103, April 30, 1936, to the Minister in Honduras, Foreign Relations, 1936, vol. v, p. 134.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. v, p. 554.↩
- ibid., p. 552.↩