852.00/7671: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 4—12:59 a.m.]
929. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Alvarez del Vayo37 called on me this evening apparently at the request of Premier Negrín for the purpose of conveying the following message:
It has been reported to the Spanish Government by way of [apparent omission] that the President is favorably disposed toward the movement now under way in the United States for the abolition of our neutrality law and that the Secretary also is favorably disposed but feels that as a practical matter any change in our policy at this time is inadvisable since the Government cause is now nearly lost. It is understood that a discussion of this matter will take place Tuesday. As the Spanish Government feels that a policy founded upon [Page 172] the belief that any action of the kind described would be too late is not warranted by the facts it desires to submit its views for consideration at the impending conference.
Alvarez del Vayo stated that, while what is tantamount to a collapse occurred on the Eastern Front due to incompetence and treason, the situation has been remedied and the Loyalist forces are now fighting effectively. As a result of the reorganization of the higher army commands and the mobilization of new resources this resistance is expected to be maintained, although it is conceded the Rebel forces probably will succeed within the next few days in cutting through to the sea at Tortosa and in capturing and progressing beyond Lerida. Notwithstanding his apprehension the Government can continue its resistance for at least 3 or 4 months (within which it is still apparent the Government expects European developments to bring relief) even though Barcelona should be cut off from the French border or, he said, itself be captured.
In anticipation of the Rebel advance to the sea, a directive organization has been established in the southern part of Loyalist Spain which will begin to function immediately upon its isolation from Barcelona. Military supplies and foodstuffs have been stored there sufficient for a period of several months including food for Madrid for 1 year. A survey has been made at all major centers such as Albacite, Ciudad Real, Valencia and Madrid which has shown that the officers and troops in that area are enthusiastic and determined to continue the war. As to Catalonia, he affirms that Company’s38 exhortations have stimulated the Catalonians and that they are putting all energies into the struggle.
With respect to the Government, Del Vayo informed me that he had “heard” (identical rumors are on the street) that it is to be reorganized. Among the changes said to be contemplated are the transfer to Negrín of the Ministry of War, with Prieto remaining in the Cabinet as minister without portfolio; the retirement of one of the two Communist Ministers; and Alvarez del Vayo’s own return to the Ministry of State.
I told Del Vayo that I would, of course, report his statements.
While I am disposed to credit Señor del Vayo and the Government with the determination to continue the war that is implicit in the foregoing statements I am not convinced that in the absence of new factors not at the moment visible the Loyalist forces are likely to withstand the pressure of the efficient and abundantly equipped Rebel military machine with any measurably greater success in the future than they have during the past 3 weeks. I have discussed this point tonight with the Military Attaché who is of the same opinion and [Page 173] believes that the Rebel advances are now virtually irresistible and that unless the Rebels themselves slacken their operations their final triumph in this area is but a matter of weeks. Other factors such as the food situation and widespread rear guard disaffection (despite recent reorganization of the Popular Front to include the CNT, UGT and FAI39) are adverse, and I doubt that the reorganization of the Government itself will be especially helpful.
I do not, of course, know what considerations of major policy may be before you at this time. Should we abandon our present position of neutrality, however, the fact alone (apart from the flow of war material) would unquestionably have an incalculable psychological effect here and might affect the outcome of the war. It would at the same time, however, in all probability be generally construed as an act tantamount to intervention in the Spanish conflict with the obvious reaction in Germany, Italy and Nationalist Spain and perhaps affect (in the event of a Rebel victory) our large investments, frozen exchange accounts and trade in Spain.