852.00/8125
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 20.]
Sir: I have the honor to report that in the course of a conversation regarding the recent statements in the press that the British Government [Page 212] was considering mediation in Spain with a view to an armistice, a Foreign Office official said that even if a genuine agreement could be reached on the British plan for the withdrawal of auxiliaries, it would take considerable time before the Italian troops could leave Spain. The continuation of the civil war and the delay in reaching an agreement on the British plan made it impossible to put the Anglo-Italian agreement into effect. This was holding up appeasement among the Mediterranean Powers generally and in turn retarding any progress towards a wider European settlement.
With this in mind, the British Government had been casting about for some other scheme which might hasten a settlement and relieve the present tension, and had decided to attempt to bring about an armistice in Spain. Merely to approach the two factions and ask them to stop fighting would, of course, be futile, no matter how tired of war the Spanish people may be. If, however, Italy and France could be induced to bring pressure on General Franco and the Spanish Government, respectively, there might be some prospect of success.
Accordingly, an intimation was given to the Press that the British Government was willing to use its influence in bringing about a truce in the Civil War. As was expected, the consensus of foreign press opinion was that there was little or no likelihood that such a plan could succeed.
The Foreign Office official said that the British Government intended, nevertheless, to take up the matter beginning at Paris. It believed that the principal obstacle in the way of persuading Italy to consider such a proposal, and in fact, the stumbling block to progress with the British Non-Intervention plan as well as the cause for the break in the Franco-Italian conversations, was the recent increase in arms shipments over the French frontier. Therefore, the first step towards an armistice would be to obtain an undertaking from France not to permit such shipments, (to which she is in fact already committed but is flagrantly violating) and to agree to bring pressure on the Spanish Government to consider an armistice. If the French Government consents, the British then propose to take the matter up in Rome and endeavor to persuade Mussolini to stop Italian shipments of arms and agree to bring pressure on General Franco to consider an armistice.
Asked whether he thought there was any likelihood of such a plan succeeding, the Foreign Office official would only say that his Government felt it could do no harm and that even if it fails completely, bringing the idea of mediation before world opinion might do some good. He pointed out that in any event there was no intention of abandoning their efforts to put the British Non-intervention plan into effect.
[Page 213]The Embassy finds it difficult to say what, if anything, is behind this new move, especially since there is little or no prospect of achieving concrete results. Reports of mediation may, of course, have been circulated simply with a view to counteracting criticism that the British Government is not making active endeavors to bring about a solution of the Spanish problem; and though these reports were received without any optimism they were welcomed in the press. In any event the recent intensification of aerial bombing both of British shipping and of the civil population has made the Spanish question increasingly embarrassing to the British Government.
One point in the Spanish problem does seem to stand out and that is that of the four great Powers principally concerned Germany has now become the one having a clear interest in prolonging the civil war and thus preventing the Franco-Italian rapprochement negotiations and postponing the coming into effect of the Anglo-Italian agreements.
Respectfully yours,
Counselor of Embassy