852.00/8353: Telegram
The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 15—1:15 p.m.]
1022. 1. Military maneuvers. Major military developments since the last report of this series has been the successful Government offensive across the Ebro and the resultant paralyzation of the rebel drive on Sagunto. Rebel attempts to force the Loyalists to recross the river which are expected to be intensified have thus far failed and Government officials believe that they will not succeed. In the meantime every effort is being made to strengthen defenses in the Sagunto area.
A less spectacular but potentially important military activity is the current rebel offensive in Extremadura. The Government is despatching reenforcements and capable leaders to this front in an effort to save the Almaden Mercury Mines and to prevent a general disruption of its lines there. Government offensives near Teruel and across Segre are apparently of no significance.
2. Political. The “crisis” mentioned in my 1019, August 10, 9 a.m.86 appears to have been provoked by the Socialist Party (possibly at the instigation of Prieto) and to have been based on the fear that Negrín has been too complacent with respect to the absorptive tendency of the Communist and is prolonging an unsuccessful war which should be brought to an end. Negrín subsequently appeared before the National Committee of the Socialist Party and evidently convinced it of the wisdom in the practicability of his course in general and received assurances of its support. The Communist factor appears to have been disposed of by the publication of some of the minutes of the committee expressing disapproval of the “tendency toward exclusivism” of the Communist Party. I am assured by Zugazagoitia and Del Vayo that the incident has been settled.
[Page 234]A second “crisis” however has arisen as a result of the recent militarization of all war industries. This deprives the Generalidad of control over important Catalan industries (which the Government claims were failing to meet war requirements) and has succeeded in impaired relations between the government and the Generalidad. An immediate consequence has been the resignation of Señor Aguade (Catalan left republican) as Minister of Labor and the resignation of Senor Irujo (Basque nationalist) as Minister without Portfolio as an act of solidarity on an issue involving regional autonomy. Action on these resignations had not been taken when I spoke with Government officials last evening.87
3. International. The official viewpoint would [apparent omission] the attitude of cooperation in the interests of international peace maintained throughout the present conflict by the Spanish Government now entitles it in view of Franco’s attitude regarding the nonintervention plan to demand reconsideration by foreign powers of the Spanish problem. Senor Del Vayo has already spoken in this sense to the British and French Embassies here and he informed me yesterday that if the situation does not change he may address formal petitions to the British and French Governments—which I inferred would demand that the nonintervention plan be modified and that the French frontier be opened.
4. Prospects. Negrín’s exposition before the National Committee of the Socialist Party as described to me by Zugazagoitia was designed to show that the Government can hold its present positions, has funds sufficient to conduct the war for two more years if necessary and that disruptive tendencies in the rebel camp together with the trend of events abroad counsel the continuance of the war. It also appears that he feels that the Loyalist rear guard is sound and that the food problem can be solved. Armament is being manufactured (30 to 40 planes per month) and acquired abroad (Zugazagoitia said yesterday that 70 planes have just been received) and the restored Republican army is expected to be prepared for major offensive operations by next spring.
The soundness of these calculations is open to doubt although the recovery since last March is proof of the strength and spirit that can be mustered and the attitude and possible influence of Azana and Prieto must also be taken into account.