760F.62/482: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 8:30 p.m.]
1125. I discussed with Bonnet this afternoon the Czechoslovak situation and the exchange of letters between Daladier and Chamberlain.
Bonnet said that the letters had been relatively unimportant as they had added nothing new to understandings already reached. They [Page 533] had been exchanged merely because of the impending visit of the King and Queen.
In his letter Daladier had set forth French policy vis-à-vis the situation in Czechoslovakia and had made it clear that if the German Army should cross the frontier of Czechoslovakia France would march. He had then asked if he could count on England maintaining the same position that Chamberlain had indicated England would maintain on April 2875 and had maintained in practice on May 20. Chamberlain had replied that England would continue to maintain this position “which” said Bonnet “means that England will march with us.”
Bonnet added that in spite of the visit of the French Minister in Praha who was here last week end he had not much new light on the situation. The French Minister believed that Beneš would go far in his concessions of local administrative autonomy and expected the Czechoslovak Government to have its proposals in final form on July 22nd.
Bonnet said that he had other information which indicated that the concessions which would be offered by the Czechoslovak Government would be altogether insufficient to appease even temporarily the Sudeten and that their publication might result in serious disturbances among the Sudeten population. He feared that the Czechs would put down such disturbances by force, that many Sudeten would be killed and that Hitler would march across the frontier.
Bonnet added that he had instructed the French Minister to say to Beneš immediately on his return to Praha that he hoped Beneš realized fully that the one country which could gain nothing from general European war at the present time was Czechoslovakia since whichever side might win no statesman would ever again be so idiotic as to put together a state even faintly resembling Czechoslovakia in its present form.
Walter Lippmann76 who has just returned from Praha where he had a conversation of 2 hours with Beneš is most pessimistic. He is inclined to believe that the dispute is unsolvable since the Czechs will not offer the Sudeten anything but a permanent status as an inferior minority and the Sudeten will not accept any such status.
Lippmann said that Beneš seemed fully prepared to face the eventuality of war and had stated he was certain the Soviet Union would enter the war at once, bombard German cities and march an army to Czechoslovakia across Rumania. (Incidentally Bonnet said to me today that he was not at all certain that Russia would march or even send airplanes).
[Page 534]Lippmann said that Beneš had indicated that if the Sudeten should reject the Czechoslovak proposals and should start physical manifestations they would be put down by force. Lippmann also asserted that Beneš had said that under these circumstances German troops probably would cross the frontier and occupy the Sudeten portions of Czechoslovakia and then propose peace.
As I indicated to the Department in my 1104 July 13, 4 p.m., the feverish preparations which the Germans are making to develop a line of fortifications from the North Sea to the Swiss border which includes a development in depth of the present Siegfried Line continue to increase apprehension in the French Government and Army that Hitler will use any large incident in the Sudeten regions as the signal for crossing the Czechoslovakia border.