760F.62/1125: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 26—6:25 p.m.]
1601. I have just talked with Bonnet. He said that the conversations with the British had been most satisfactory. The French had taken the line that if German troops should cross the Czechoslovak border France would fulfill her obligations. The British had not attempted to combat this position and had indicated that they would support France immediately with their fleet and air force.
The British, however, had expressed a reluctance to introduce conscription even in case of a war in which they were involved. I expressed the opinion that there were depths to which even English gentlemen could not descend and that I did not believe the British could take the position for more than 24 hours that they would leave the French to die alone in the trenches.
Bonnet then said that the communication that I had made to Léger yesterday with regard to my conversation with the Polish Ambassador in Paris reported in my No. 1580, September 25, 2 p.m. had been most important and asked me if I had had any further conversations with the Polish Ambassador. I repeated to him the conversation which I had had today with the Polish Ambassador reported in my No. 1595, September 26, 6 p.m. To my amazement when I referred to the Polish Ambassador’s statement that closing of the Czechoslovak frontiers had placed Czechoslovakia in a bottle in which she would be asphyxiated, since neither Germany, Poland, nor Hungary would open [Page 667] the frontier until Czechoslovakia should agree to the demands of all the three countries, Bonnet replied “that would be perhaps the best solution. It would not entail war”. We then discussed the position of Hungary with which Bonnet expressed sympathy.
I then asked Bonnet what actual business had been done in London. He said that aside from general discussions of the situation and discussion of military collaboration in case of war there had been little concrete result.
I asked if the French Ministers and the British Cabinet had agreed to make counterproposals to Hitler. Bonnet replied that a most peculiar thing had happened in this regard. Chamberlain had said to the French Ministers that he desired to send a personal communication to Hitler suggesting alterations in the demands contained in the note which Hitler had presented to him at Godesberg. He requested permission of the French Government to send this letter as a personal message to Hitler without revealing its contents to the French Ministers. Bonnet asserted that he and Daladier had agreed to this procedure. Three times I returned to this point and each time Bonnet insisted that he had no knowledge whatsoever of the actual contents of the personal letter which Chamberlain had sent by the hand of Horace Wilson today to Hitler. He said that Chamberlain had felt that he had established a personal relationship with Hitler and it would be better for all concerned if he should continue to handle the matter on the basis of personal and confidential communications and the French Government had accepted blindly Chamberlain’s leadership.
In conclusion, Bonnet said to me that in spite of the firmness of feeling in the French population he had just received the visit of one hundred Deputies of the Center parties who had asserted that they did not wish France to go to war. I ventured to doubt the accuracy of this statement.
Bonnet in spite of the firm line which he has been compelled to take by Daladier is rodently [ardently?] for peace at any price.