840.48 Refugees/811: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Kennedy) to the Secretary of State

1162. For the Secretary and Under Secretary. From Rublee. Embassy’s telegram No. 1126 of October 5, 5 p.m. reported the views of the British with regard to the procedure which should be adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee in its contact with the German Government at this time. My information which comes from a most authoritative source is that the President’s message has not caused them [Page 797] to modify their views. They are still of the opinion that the work of the Intergovermental Committee should be subordinated to high policy and they are therefore not really anxious that I should go to Berlin where my conversations with the German authorities even though of a preliminary character might have some repercussion on other developments to which they attach importance.

Since the work of the Intergovernmental Committee is in consequence at a dramatical stage I believe that I should in all frankness give you my views. I do not believe that we should agree to half measures. I believe that the suggestion that Pell should go Berlin to be available to the American and British Embassies for consultation is a half measure which provides a useful method for avoiding the necessity of a formal request to the German Government that I be received. Pell could lose much time in answering the questions of the German authorities but this would not advance the formal negotiations with the German Government. Either the German authorities will receive me or they will not. This is the fundamental question of some doubt which the Germans alone can answer. The sooner the question is put to them the sooner we shall know where we stand. Until we know where we stand it will be difficult if not impossible to formulate definite recommendations as to the course which the Committee should take.

Meanwhile I am not in a position to make effective progress in negotiations with British representative of refuge and final settlement. I have explored the situation with the representatives of these countries sufficiently to realize that they are not disposed to write a blank check. They will not commit themselves to receive even a small number of involuntary emigrants unless they are assured that these persons will not be refugees in the full sense of the word, that is destitute persons who will become burdens on the communities which receive them. Only when they are assured that the German Government will cooperate to the extent of permitting envoy of [involuntary?] emigrants to take with them immediately a reasonable minimum of their property will the countries of settlement open their doors. Similar objections are raised by countries of refuge. Until they are assured that the Germans will substitute orderly emigration for the existing disorderly exodus, which has become so acute that they have been forced to close their frontiers, they will not commit themselves to make a substantial contribution in the way of re-training. I had been hopeful that before I went to Berlin I could, with the support of our Ambassadors in London and Paris, persuade the British and French to come forward with definite statement as to the numbers which they would be willing to receive. I have some information that the French have been holding back awaiting a British lead. The [Page 798] British for their part have prepared a statement, which they have shown me in confidence. It is wholly unsatisfactory in that it indicates no real effort to open up their colonies or to use their influence with their Dominions to take involuntary emigrants and I am hopeful that my report to Winterton will convince him of the necessity of making a greater contribution but I do not anticipate that I will have a satisfactory commitment from them in the immediate future.

Under the circumstances, the negotiation with Germany is the key to the situation. If the Germans are willing to talk I can make progress with the countries of refuge and settlement. If the Germans are unwilling to talk the problem becomes one of organization and relief with which this office is not equipped to deal. I am not as yet convinced that the Germans will refuse to talk. In fact, I have received communications through various intermediaries indicating that some German authorities at least have been giving serious consideration to the problem and have gone so far as to formulate concrete proposals which they are said to be prepared to discuss.

To put the situation bluntly, I have no indication that the Germans are reluctant to talk. It is apparent to me, however, that the British are reluctant to have me talk with the Germans. They have not concealed their view that they would prefer to have me spend my time in general conversations with the representative of the countries of settlement in London. There is a limit, however, to the time which I can spend in this way. I am very much afraid that unless some move is made in the immediate future to approach the German Government the criticism of the Intergovernmental Committee, and in particular of our Government as sponsor of the Committee, which is mounting in circles in close touch with the refugee situation, will become outspoken. It will be said, indeed it is being said already, that the Intergovernmental Committee has been in existence for several months and has accomplished virtually nothing, that, in fact, it has provided an incentive to the Governments of refuge and settlement to increase their restrictions and hamper the effects of the private organizations and the League Commissioner on the ground that they can do nothing pending the outcome of my negotiation with the German Government.

These, among other considerations, lead me to the conclusion that without further delay the request should be addressed formally to the German Government to receive me. If the answer is in the affirmative I shall be prepared to go immediately to Berlin. If the answer is in the negative the problem will become one of organizing the relief of the refugees who have already left Germany which will require a wholly new and different approach. [Rublee.]

Kennedy