852.00/7254: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 6:40 p.m.]
135. In the course of our conversation last night, Delbos8 said there was one welcomed step toward peace in which he hoped the United States might now be ready to participate.
It was evident today that the war in Spain would go on for a long time. The Government was stronger than it had ever been. Franco was also strong. In addition, there had been an intensely interesting development on the government side. Communist influence had diminished enormously and at the moment the Spanish Government, while radical, was by no means Communist and was definitely hostile to Moscow.
In view of the probability that the war would drag on for an indefinite period with increasing destruction and suffering throughout Spain and in view of the fact that neither Franco nor the Government had any hope of a speedy victory, he believed that the time had come when mediation might be acceptable to both sides.
There was only one form of mediation, however, which he believed might be effective. That would be an appeal to both sides issued either simultaneously or jointly by the President of the United States and the Pope. He recalled that he had spoken to me in this sense many months ago (see my telegram No. 1080, July 30, 1 p.m., 19379). At that time the situation had not been nearly so favorable to mediation as it was today. He was certain the Pope would be ready to offer mediation at any minute and he would like to know whether or not the President might consider simultaneous or joint action with the Pope.
He added that simultaneous appeals from the President and the Pope would be splendid but that a joint appeal would be much more powerful.
[Page 153]Delbos said that he was confident that the French Government had sufficient influence to persuade the Barcelona Government to accept mediation and added that he believed the British Government had sufficient influence with Franco to persuade him to accept mediation.
Delbos asked if I could ascertain from my Government if there were any possibility that the President might be disposed to take action along this line. I said that I would ask for instructions but requested Delbos to refrain from discussing this matter with anyone except Chautemps10 and to refrain from sending telegrams on this subject in any direction. He agreed that this was wise, added that Mussolini certainly had the French codes and might act to forestall any such action if one contemplated and the matter must not become the subject of gossip in the French Government or the Quai d’Orsay. He added that he felt that if the President should be interested in exploring the idea further he could arrange with the Papal Nuncio in Paris to have any communications to and from Rome handled not by telegraph but by courier.
I should be glad to have your views with regard to this matter tomorrow if possible as Chautemps is to lunch with me on Thursday January 27 and may wish to discuss the question.
- Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs.↩
- Foreign Relations, 1937, vol. i, p. 367.↩
- Camille Chautemps, Prime Minister of France.↩