894.02/19
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 5.]
Sir: Compromising on the divergent plans submitted by the Legislative Bureau and the Foreign Office for the establishment of machinery to govern China affairs, the Japanese Government decided on March 15 to create the China Economic Affairs Bureau under the direction of the Cabinet.
[Page 128]Originally, the Legislative Bureau proposed the establishment of an organ under the Premier to be called the Cabinet China Affairs Board and to be entrusted with political, economic, and cultural matters relating to China, independently of the Foreign Office. Opposing this plan, Mr. Hirota and the Foreign Office stood out for the establishment of a bureau under the direction of the Minister for Foreign Affairs but not necessarily an integral part of the Foreign Office, to handle economic exploitation of China but without any authority to deal with political or cultural matters, which would be controlled as hitherto by the Foreign Office. According to the Japanese press, the Minister for Foreign Affairs insisted that Japan’s policy toward China was entirely different from that toward Manchuria, that the political, economic, and cultural body projected by the Legislative Bureau would possibly be accused of infringing upon China’s sovereignty and would hence be displeasing to third countries, and that, aside from relations with the Powers, for technical reasons alone administrative affairs relating to China should be left to the Foreign Office.
Apparently unable to reconcile the conflicting points of view between the Legislative Bureau and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet arrived at the compromise plan mentioned above, namely, to create the China Economic Affairs Bureau which would have no voice in diplomatic matters and whose principal duty would be to supervise the North China Development Company and the Central China Rehabilitation Company. It is understood that there will also be set up a provisional body to be called the China Economic Inquiry Commission, headed by the Premier, composed of members chosen from the Cabinet, the Cabinet’s Advisory Counsel, and financial circles, and entrusted with examination of matters relating to economic exploitation of China.
There may be a substantial amount of truth in the report that Mr. Hirota opposed the establishment of a political, economic, and cultural board to control China affairs on the ground that such a step would unnecessarily antagonize countries possessed of treaty rights with China and would lay Japan open to the accusation that it contemplated a definite infringement of China’s sovereignty and administrative integrity. While the respect by Japan of China’s sovereignty and administrative integrity is only a fiction advanced by the Japanese Government, the placing of China affairs under an organization akin to the Manchurian Affairs Bureau would undoubtedly hamper Japan’s well-known dialectics on its actions in China.
It has been remarked by observers in Tokyo that Mr. Hirota’s antagonism toward the setting up of a body, distinct from the Foreign Office, to deal with Chinese matters was due to a desire to check the ambitions of the militarists and of the more nationalistic members [Page 129] of the Cabinet. However, it is more likely that the Minister for Foreign Affairs is loath to relinquish a power which he has wielded firmly and is unwilling to turn over the direction of China affairs to a group of men who might take a more moderate view toward the Chinese than that assumed by the Foreign Office itself.
In this connection the Department’s attention is invited to my telegram No. 100 of February 12, 1938, in which it was stated that reports had come both to the British Ambassador and to me that it was Mr. Hirota rather than Admiral Suetsugu, the Home Minister, who led the ultra-chauvinistic element in the Government. Likewise pertinent is a despatch to me from Mr. William T. Turner, Consul at Dairen, a copy of which he sent to the Department,5 in which is reported a conversation between Mr. Turner and a Japanese official (presumably Mr. Okazaki, Japanese Consul-General-at-large for China). The Japanese official in question said that the Japanese military were taking a more moderate position toward China than the Cabinet, that Admiral Suetsugu was about the most moderate man in the Cabinet as regards China policies, that Mr. Hirota and Prince Konoye were the leaders of those advocating a strong hand in China, and that it was the civilians who were “pressing hard for a fundamental solution of the issue with Chiang Kai-shek.”
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩