Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, Volume I

741.61/755: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

Paris, July 5, 1939—1 p.m.
[Received July 5—11:20 a.m.]

1253. I talked with Daladier this morning. He had just conferred with Blum¹⁹ on the subject of the latest Soviet reply to the French and British. He said that Blum agreed with him that the Soviet Union’s latest proposal was totally inacceptable because the Soviet Union had repeated to the French and British the definition of aggression which had been contained in the Soviet Union’s note to Estonia, reported in my No. 1071 of June 5, 7 p.m.

Daladier went on to say that the Soviet Union’s demand amounted to this: If there should be a change of Government or any other event displeasing to the Soviet Union in any one of the Baltic States the Soviet Union should have carte blanche in advance to invade any one of those states with the full support of France and England. He would never agree to such a demand.

Daladier added that although he had no specific information with regard to negotiations between the Germans and the Russians he feared that they might be most serious.

(When I was in Washington recently I found that our Government was far better informed on this subject than the French or British Governments. I should be greatly obliged if you could give me any information you have with regard to the negotiations between Germany and the Soviet Union which have taken place since the return of Count Schulenburg the German Ambassador to Moscow).²⁰

Daladier went on to say that he was pessimistic about the possibility of preserving peace. He was certain that Hitler would not stop his efforts to get Danzig unless he should be confronted by an absolute determination of England, France and the Soviet Union to fight at once in case the Poles should take up arms in defense of their vital interests.

In addition the action of the House of Representatives with regard to the Neutrality Act²¹ had encouraged Hitler to believe that France and England would receive no arms and ammunition from the United States.

It was clear that if France, England and Poland should come into war with Germany and Italy—and the Soviet Union should remain neutral—and the United States should refuse to supply arms and ammunition, the prospects of victory for France and England would be much worse than in 1914. Indeed the prospects indicated that France and England would be defeated.

In 1914 Germany with the support of Austria-Hungary had stood against England, France and Russia with the later assistance of Italy. At the present time Germany had all that part of Austria-Hungary which was a source of strength and in addition had Italy and might have Japan; France and England might not have Russia.

Under the circumstances the fight for England, France and Poland would be a desperate one. Nevertheless it would be made. If the Poles should fight—and they would—France and England would fight at once.

He felt that Hitler would certainly decide to make war unless the Soviet Union should agree in the immediate future to an alliance with France and England and unless our Neutrality Act should be changed to permit the export of arms and munitions.

Bullitt

19. Léon Blum, Socialist member of the French Chamber of Deputies, formerly President of the Council of Ministers.
20. In its telegraphic reply No. 501, July 7, the Department stated: “We have not been informed of any developments of importance.”
21. In his statement of July 1, the Secretary of State expressed his regret that his proposals of May 27 for a revision of the Neutrality Act had failed to pass the House of Representatives by a narrow margin; Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1939, p. 4.