741.61/799: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State

1415. Léger said to me this afternoon that no progress had been made in Moscow yesterday with regard to agreement on a definition of “indirect aggression”. It would not be possible, therefore, for Chamberlain to make any very definite statement in the House of Commons.

The French and British negotiators for the military agreement would not reach Moscow for another 8 or 10 days. It would, therefore, be impossible to expect any binding agreement with the Soviet Union before the latter part of August. Léger added that neither the French nor the British representatives in Moscow had any doubt that an agreement finally would be concluded.

In spite of the delay in the Moscow negotiations Léger expressed the opinion that both Hitler and Mussolini had become most hesitant to begin the war for which they had so carefully prepared.

It was obvious to both Hitler and Mussolini that France and England would fight and were well prepared to fight. It was obvious also that Poland would fight; that the Soviet Union would probably support Poland; that Japan in view of the attitude taken by the United States could not be counted on to attack the Soviet Union or the British and French possessions in the Far East; and that Franco would give no military help to Italy and Germany. Hitler and Mussolini were therefore in the position of horses that wanted to jump a fence but were afraid to jump because it seemed too high.

He thought that Hitler’s continued concentration of troops in Danzig and other activities in Danzig might bring on war for the simple reason that one of these acts finally would be the straw that would break the camel’s back of Poland’s patience. Any act which should infringe on Poland’s rights with regard to the Westerplatte, the port, the customs, or the railroad might constitute a last straw.

If Hitler should continue to encourage the present Nazi activities in Danzig a moment would come therefore when the Poles would be obliged to act. The Polish Government would not talk but would order troops to enter Danzig. The German troops in Danzig would resist and it would be almost impossible for Hitler not to support them by making war on Poland—which would automatically produce a general European conflict.

Bullitt