740.00/2106: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State
[Received 5:30 p.m.]
1543. Daladier said to me this afternoon that the action of the Soviet Government in signing a non-aggression pact with Germany,44 the secret clauses of which were unknown, placed France in a most tragic and terrible situation.
[Page 302]He said that he could not understand how the French diplomats and negotiators could have been so deceived by the Russians. He reminded me that at least six times since last January I had warned him that most serious negotiations were under way between the Germans and the Russians and said that he had told all the French Government services to attempt to verify my statements to him but had been reassured that there were no negotiations other than the commercial negotiations in progress between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The entire diplomatic structure which he had attempted to build up had been destroyed by this act of the Russians. Turkey had made it clear that unless an alliance should be signed between the Soviet Union, France and England, Turkey could not give military assistance to Rumania. Rumania deprived of both Russian and Turkish support was bound to fall without resistance into the arms of Germany. Poland could not be supplied with arms and ammunition except by way of Russia and the agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany would mean that the Poles would have to fight their battle against the Germans alone except for the support the French could give by engaging a number of German divisions on the French-German frontier.
He believed that in spite of their courage the Poles could not hold out against the German armies for more than 2 months. Thereafter the entire brunt of the war on land against Germany and Italy would fall on the French Army. The British could not have a serious army ready for another 2 years.
Furthermore he believed that as soon as England and France should become engaged in Europe, Japan would begin taking over French, British and Dutch possessions in the Pacific.
Under the circumstances he was faced with the alternative of sacrificing the lives of all able-bodied men in France in a war, the outcome of which would be to say the least doubtful; or the worse alternative of abandoning the commitments of France to support Poland which would be a horrible moral blow to the French people and would result in Germany swallowing one after another, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. In the end Germany would turn on France and England with all the economic resources of these countries at her disposal.
The decision which he faced was therefore one of the most profound gravity.
He felt that the Poles had been guilty of criminal folly in not replying in the affirmative to the Russians’ proposal for active assistance to Poland. This morning Beck had received the French Ambassador to Warsaw and had pretended to be delighted that the Russians had now made their position clear. Beck had stated to the French Ambassador [Page 303] that Poland would light the moment Hitler should make any move against Danzig. Daladier said he believed this was true.
Finally he said that he realized that the Russians had hoodwinked the French and British completely and that possibly even though the Poles had agreed to accept Russian assistance the Russians would have found an excuse not to conclude their negotiations with France and England and to conclude the agreement with Germany.
Daladier said that he had not yet decided to order general mobilization; but believed he would issue the order tomorrow morning. Later in my presence he repeated this statement to General Gamelin45 and ordered Gamelin today to mobilize further reserves and advance certain troops to the German frontier.
Later I asked General Gamelin if he was not also mobilizing reserves on the Italian frontier. He replied that he was not since the French Government did not desire at the present moment to excite the Italians.
Daladier, also in my presence, ordered Admiral Darlan46 to keep the fleet in immediate readiness for action. Darlan stated to me that the fleet was already on a war footing and prepared to act at once.
I discussed the general situation at great length with Léger at the Foreign Office. He blamed the Poles for the failure of the negotiations of the French and British with the Soviet Union. He said that it was on Sunday, August 20, that Beck had rejected the proposal to permit the Soviet Army to enter Polish soil to support the Polish Army.
Throughout our conversation politicians kept calling him on the telephone urging that it would be folly to go to war in support of Poland in view of the agreement between the Soviet Union and Germany. Léger replied to them as he did to me that France must fight since if Poland should be abandoned the whole of Eastern and Southeastern Europe would fall without a struggle into Hitler’s hands and with the resources of this vast area behind him Hitler would be able to overwhelm France and England.
I asked Léger what he thought the result of war would be in case it should begin. He said that obviously a war now would begin at an exceedingly bad moment for France and England. If the Germans should attack and conquer Poland, they could then receive supplies of all sorts from the Soviet Union and Rumania. It was exceedingly doubtful, to put it mildly, that France and England would be able to win the war. Nevertheless the chance must be taken since the chance would be even less if France should permit Poland to be destroyed. [Page 304] He added the nebulous hope that if Poland, recognizing the seriousness of the situation, should begin to try to work intimately with the Bolsheviks, the Soviet Union might turn around and abandon the agreement it had entered into with Germany.
Both Léger and Daladier said to me that they were not sure that Italy would decide to enter war on the side of Germany immediately.
The stupefaction of the French Foreign Office which has been most optimistic with regard to the conclusion of the agreement between the Soviet Union, France and England is so great that no constructive ideas have yet been evolved.
The British Government has not yet communicated to the French Government its opinions on the present situation.
In brief the opinion of Daladier, Gamelin, Darlan, Léger, Guy La Chambre47 and other Ministers with whom I have talked today is that Hitler is not likely to lose his present opportunity to strike with hope of success, that France must support Poland even though the successful issue of a war thus engaged may be most doubtful since the abandonment of Poland would mean that France and England would have to fight somewhat later in an even worse position and that they would lose their moral standing in the world.
Daladier said to me that his guess was that as soon as Ribbentrop should have signed in Moscow the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union and should have returned to Germany, Hitler would launch his attack against Poland.
- For text of the treaty, together with the secret additional protocol, signed at Moscow on August 23, 1939, see Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1989–1941 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 76.↩
- Gen. Maurice Gustave Gamelin, Vice President of the French Supreme War Council.↩
- Vice Admiral Jean François Darlan, Chief of Staff of the French Navy.↩
- French Minister for Air.↩