Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1939, General, Volume I

740.00/548: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State

London, January 24, 1939—9 p.m.
[Received 9:08 p.m.]

94. Personal for the Secretary and Under Secretary. Following is text of telegram being sent tonight to British Chargé d’Affaires in Washington which Sir Alexander Cadogan⁷ thinks is doubtful can be received and deciphered in Washington before sometime tomorrow. With his permission I am therefore sending the exact text in non-confidential code over our direct wire. Mallett will be instructed to communicate it to the Department for the “personal and secret information of the President”.

• “1. I have received a large number of reports from various reliable sources which throw a most disquieting light on Hitler’s mood and intentions. According to these reports Hitler is bitterly resentful at the Munich Agreement⁸ which baulked him of a localized war against Czechoslovakia and demonstrated the will to peace of the German masses in opposition to the warmongering of the Nazi Party. He feels personally humiliated by this demonstration. He regards Great Britain as primarily responsible for this humiliation and his rage is therefore directed principally against this country which he holds to be the chief obstacle now to the fulfillment of his further ambitions.
• 2. As early as November there were indications which gradually became more definite that Hitler was planning a further foreign adventure for the spring of 1939. At first it appeared—and this was confirmed by persons in Hitler’s entourage—that he was thinking of expansion in the east and in December the prospect of establishing an independent Ukraine under German vassalage was freely spoken of in Germany.
• 3. Since then reports indicate that Hitler, encouraged by Ribbentrop, Himmler⁹ and others, is considering an attack on the Western powers as a preliminary to subsequent action in the east. Some of these reports emanate from highly placed Germans of undoubted sincerity who are anxious to prevent this crime; others come from foreigners, hitherto Germans, who are in close touch with leading German personalities. They have received some confirmation in the reassurance which Hitler appears to have given to Monsieur Beck concerning his plans in the east, as well as in the support which Germany has recently given to Italy’s claims against France.
• 4. There is as yet no reason to suppose that Hitler has made up his mind on any particular plan. Our reports show that he may:
  • (First) Push Italy to advance her claims by force and use his obligations to Italy as a pretext for embarking on war. This course would have the advantage of ensuring the participation of Italy from the outset.
  • (Second) Begin by launching an attack on Holland. The President will have noticed the recent deterioration of German-Dutch relations and the critical tone adopted towards Holland by the German press. Once in command of Holland and the Dutch coast, Germany would aspire to dictate terms to us and paralyze France. She might at the same time bribe Poland and perhaps other countries with promises of colonial loot; in that event the Dutch East Indies might be allocated to Japan.
  • (Third) Put forward impossible colonial demands in his speech of January 30th in the form of an ultimatum. This seems the least likely hypothesis.
  • (Fourth) Make a sudden air attack without pretext on England and follow up this initial surprise by land and sea operations against the western powers. We have received definite information from a highly placed German that preparations for such a coup are now being made. He has, however, no information to show that Hitler has yet made up his mind to execute this plan.
• 5. In the last few days we have received reliable information to the effect that the German Government are pressing for the conversion of the Anti-Comintern Pact¹⁰ into a pact pledging the signatories to give each other military assistance against unprovoked attack by a third power, that the Italian Government have agreed, and that the Japanese Government are considering the matter. Our information is that the German Government wish this pact to be concluded in time for it to be announced by Herr Hitler in the speech he is expected to make on January 30.
• 6. All the reports are agreed in forecasting that the danger period will begin towards the end of February. This is borne out by independent reports to the effect that orders have been issued for mobilization about the middle of February. We have already received news of preliminary mobilization measures, and the formation of a reserve regiment composed of time-expired conscripts has been recently established in Bavaria. Moreover the economic and financial crisis with which Germany is now faced might well compel Hitler to take some action, and the choice before him is either to slow down his rearmament and to abandon his policy of expansion, or else to launch into some foreign adventure in the hope that it will both distract attention from domestic difficulties and supply him with the material resources which the country urgently requires and can no longer buy abroad. There can be little doubt that a man of Hitler’s temperament may be tempted to choose the second alternative. Another motive for his doing so might be that he was not sure of the loyalty of his army, and might feel that the surest way for a dictator to deal with a doubtful army was to give it occupation.
• 7. It may seem fanciful and even fantastic to attribute such designs to Hitler and it is as yet impossible to speak of them with certainty. His Majesty’s Government have no wish to be alarmist, but today, as in July, August and September of last year, it is remarkable that there is one general tendency running through all the reports, and it is impossible to ignore them, particularly in view of the character and proved reliability of many of the informants. Moreover, Hitler’s mental condition, his insensate rage against Great Britain and his megalomania, which are alarming the moderates around him, are entirely consistent with the execution of a desperate coup against the Western powers. The removal of moderates such as Schacht¹¹ and Wiedemann¹² is symptomatic. It has been suggested in some quarters that the German people would not follow Hitler on such a course and that a revolt would ensue. We have examined this aspect, but the authorities on Germany whom we have consulted including anti-Nazi Germans of sound judgment are agreed that Hitler’s orders would be carried out and that no revolt can be anticipated at all events during the initial stages of a war.
• 8. His Majesty’s Government have carefully considered the situation in the light of these reports and have decided to accelerate as far as possible the preparation of their defensive and counter-offensive measures. In the meantime they are employing such methods as are available to them for bringing home to the German people the wantonness and folly of embarking on aggressive military adventures. They will lay such public emphasis as they can on the point, in the hope of deterring Herr Hitler from committing himself to something irrevocable in the speech which he is expected to make on January 30th.
• 9. Finally, in the event of Germany picking a quarrel with Holland, His Majesty’s Government are considering the desirability as a matter of tactics and precaution of being ready at once with a proposal to both Governments for the selection by neutral governments of a board of three arbitrators. Such a proposal might not prove effective, but if arbitration were rejected or over-ridden by Germany, the issue would be clear and His Majesty’s Government would have locus standi for appropriate action.
• 10. In the next few days His Majesty’s Government will be considering carefully what further steps they might take to avert or to meet a situation such as they have cause to apprehend, and I will of course keep the President informed of any decision taken.
• 11. In view of the relations of confidence which exist between our two Governments and the degree to which we have exchanged information hitherto, His Majesty’s Government feel bound to state frankly their apprehensions as to the future and to indicate what measures they feel able to take. It would, of course, be a great help to them if the President had any further suggestions to make.
• 12. It is impossible as yet for the Prime Minister¹³ to decide whether he will himself utter any public warning to Germany before Hitler makes his speech on January 30th. The Prime Minister is due to speak at Birmingham on January 28th and, if possible, I would let the President know beforehand what line the Prime Minister would propose to take. If the President were disposed to take an occasion for any public announcement, it might be the more valuable if he were to do so before January 30th.”

When the Under Secretary, who sent for me at 7 o’clock tonight, handed me a copy of this message he said that the statement was a synthesis of all the information they have from their most confidential and reliable sources. The text was prepared in the Foreign Office but it has undergone careful scrutiny today by the Prime Minister, and approved by him for transmission to Washington, at a meeting with his special advisers in the Cabinet. It is therefore to be regarded not merely as a statement of Foreign Office views but as a statement of the views of the Government.

The Under Secretary said that he could, of course, no more produce concrete proof now to substantiate this report than when he talked to me on January 6th (my telegram No. 27, January 27 [7], 2 p.m.¹⁴ penultimate paragraph) but he said that the situation was so serious that his Government had to be prepared for any eventuality and he indicated that they have full confidence in the reliability of the sources of this information. They will keep our Government fully and currently advised of any additional information which comes to them and in regard to their own policy.

Referring specifically to numbered paragraph 5 on the Anti-Comintern Pact he said that information had only come to him yesterday and that the Japanese, contrary to their previous stand, were now the ones holding out against the signature of a military pact.

He referred to the Prime Minister’s scheduled speech at Birmingham on January 28th and said that the Prime Minister has not yet decided whether he will then make any public warning to Germany. Anything he says on Saturday will have to be correlated with what must be said before Parliament on January 31st. The opening of Parliament, however, takes place the day after Hitler is scheduled to make a speech before the Reichstag.

In my personal opinion the grave anxiety so graphically set forth in this message may be attributed, more than to any other factor, to the acute consciousness that British and French armed forces combined are not equal today to the combined armed forces of Germany and Italy. Moreover anxiety regarding the efficiency of the rearmament program is spreading among all sections of the public and outspoken criticisms are by no means confined to the Government’s opponents. The attacks indicate lack of confidence that there is any driving force to spread and coordinate effort, and the Government will have this issue to meet when Parliament reassembles.

Johnson

7. British Permanent Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
8. See Foreign Relations, 1938, vol. i, pp. 707 ff.; for text of the Munich Agreement, signed September 29, 1938, see Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, Series D, vol. ii, p. 1014.
9. Heinrich Himmler, Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police with rank of State Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior.
10. Signed by Italy, Germany, and Japan, November 6, 1937; for text, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 159.
11. Hjalmar Schacht, former President of the Reichsbank, who had been dismissed on January 21, 1939.
12. Capt. Fritz Wiedemann (ret), former personal aide-de-camp to Adolf Hitler.
13. Neville Chamberlain.
14. Not printed.