893.0146/721
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at his own request and handed to me the accompanying aide-mémoire78 relative to the removal of the British guards from Tientsin and Peking. He then proceeded to say that his Government would be interested to know how this Government feels in regard to this proposal.
I replied that while it was not in any remote sense the function of this Government to offer advice to his Government in regard to this particular matter, especially in view of the very unusual circumstances existing both in Europe and in Asia, I might say that my Government does not undertake to maintain an inflexible policy in the Japanese-Chinese situation, in view of the state of flux existing in China, as it does in Europe. I stated that I could, however, sum up for him our course and attitude up to this time. From the beginning, I said, this Government has not yielded in any sense on the fundamentals of its policies in Asia; it has continued to reiterate the principles on which its rights and privileges and interests are understood to rest; it has at the same time complained and protested to the Government [Page 290] of Japan and made all appropriate reservations; as a part of this program we have kept our guards at Shanghai, Peking and Tientsin, and, in any event, our present plan is to retain them in each of these three cities no matter what may take place in other respects; this was true regardless of the possible course of other governments of removing their guards. I told the Ambassador that in determining our own policy in regard to our guards in China, I had said to my associates that if we should remove them it would have a depressing effect on China, an encouraging effect on Japan, and to some extent a depressing effect on Britain and France, likewise parties to the Nine-Power Treaty having interests in the Far East.
I remarked that Ambassador Grew’s rather blunt speech at Tokyo last evening79 was the latest summing up and the latest utterance on the part of this Government in support of its policies in China.
I then inquired of the Ambassador whether his Government had made a check-up to ascertain whether Japan is abandoning or has really abandoned her request of several weeks ago to the British and French to take their guards out of China. He replied, in effect, that as a matter of fact, his Government had never intended as a policy to keep guards in China in time of an important war in Europe, and that, furthermore, to take the guards out now would save the face, so to speak, of his Government, since the Japanese Government is not immediately persisting in its original request. I said, “Well, I have been under the slightly different impression that the British would ordinarily retain their guards.” I then added that the general public everywhere would in their minds connect the withdrawal of the British guards with the Japanese request of some weeks ago and there would be but little saving of prestige. I stated that again I was not undertaking to offer advice. The Ambassador said his Government would be in an embarrassing situation if Japan’s request should be made a demand.
He inquired what I thought the effect would be if his Government should leave a symbol in the form of a very few guards at each of the aforementioned cities and withdraw the others. I replied that that might mitigate the loss of prestige to a small extent, but only to a small extent, although, I said, that in such case the British Government, I assumed, would in some definite way proclaim its purpose to maintain its rights and interests in China in the future.
The Ambassador seemed a little disturbed about the more recent attitude of his Government to the effect that it would have taken its guards out of China in any event and that its only concern now is to get them out without appearing to be doing so under Japanese pressure. I commented generally that foreign officers elsewhere and the [Page 291] general public everywhere knew Great Britain was seriously and wholly preoccupied with the European war and they would most likely relate any evacuation of British guards from China to this preoccupation which the Japanese Government was taking advantage of in making its request.
I then stated that my Government might make further purchases of commodities from China by establishing credits here through the Export-Import Bank, and added that this Government is discouraging private capital and private business in this country from cooperating with Japanese interests, both public and private. I said I hoped the British Government was doing likewise as to its citizens.
The Ambassador stated that the Burma road was open and would be kept open by his Government.