893.0146/725

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on Political Relations (Hornbeck)

Lord Lothian called on me immediately after having called on the Secretary,80 and he handed me a copy of the British Embassy’s aide-mémoire of October 20, the ribbon copy of which he had handed to the Secretary.81 He said that his Government wished to be informed of the Department’s reaction to the communication made to us.

I read the aide-mémoire. I then asked Lord Lothian what the Secretary had said. Lord Lothian replied that the Secretary had said that he could not give the British Government advice, that this [Page 293] Government would of course regret withdrawal by the British Government of its forces as indicated, but that this Government, as already stated to the British Government, intended to keep its forces where they are. I then said to Lord Lothian that were I the Secretary and were I commenting officially I would say exactly the same things. Lord Lothian wished to know whether there was any comment that I would care to add. I said that, by way of giving further information regarding this Government’s decision than had been already given, and speaking informally and unofficially, I might say that, in the course of arriving at our decision to keep our forces where they are, we had given consideration to the history of relations of this and other Governments with the Chinese Government, of the establishing of the diplomatic missions and later the placing of foreign armed forces in north China, the responsibilities and obligations which had developed, the treaty provisions, the interests and needs of our nationals, political factors and psychological factors, features of the present situation, possible reactions of peoples of other countries, etc., etc. I mentioned the readjustments which we had made in the disposal of our armed forces at Tientsin and Peiping in 1938—with our reasoning in connection with the decisions made at that time. I mentioned the services which our armed forces have performed especially during the period of the current hostilities between Japan and China, and I emphasized the feature of maintaining an uninterrupted line and channel of communication. And I said that we had decided that we needed certain armed forces at the points under reference and we intended to keep our flag flying. Lord Lothian mentioned reasoning of the British Government as indicated in the aide-mémoire. I said that there were two points in the aide-mémoire upon which I would take the liberty of making comments. I said that the British Government affirmed that it thought it could withdraw its armed forces now without loss of prestige, and I said that personally I doubted whether this estimate was correct. I called attention to the statement that the British Government appreciated that the American and other Governments are maintaining armed forces for the purpose of protecting their rights, and I said that, so far as this Government is concerned, we are maintaining our landed armed forces in China for the purpose of contributing to the protection of the lives and persons of American nationals and the rendering of certain services of a comparatively essential, useful and non-military character, but not for the purpose of enforcing rights in general.

Lord Lothian said that the British Government had not decided conclusively that it definitely would withdraw its forces. He wanted to know what I would think of the idea of their maintaining very small forces, a “corporal’s guard” at each of the two points indicated. [Page 294] He made the observation that, if they withdrew some forces on a temporary basis, it would be easier to send forces back if they maintain some forces on the spot in the interval than if they had made a clean sweep. I replied that we had been wondering what they intended to do with their valuable plant in the Legation Quarter at Peiping; did they intend to vacate it and bar the gates and let it stand empty or did they intend to employ a corps of watchmen, or what? Lord Lothian did not know, but he felt personally that they ought to keep a guard and ought to keep their flag flying. I asked whether they would leave their Consulate at Tientsin with no guard. Lord Lothian asked whether a guard could be attached to a consulate. I said that I thought such things had been done at some points in the world and in some periods. Lord Lothian asked whether our force at Tientsin is attached to the Consulate. I replied in the negative. Lord Lothian asked whether a concession “falls” with the removal of the armed forces of the concessionaire country. I replied that as I understand it a concession exists by virtue of certain grants made by the sovereign authority to a foreign government; that it involves the rights and obligations of some administrative performance on the part of the concessionaire; that whether a necessary adjunct of administrative performance is or is not the maintenance of some kind of a police force is, I would assume, a matter between the grantor and the grantee; but that I would surmise that, if the local Chinese authorities, actuated and controlled by Japanese authorities, had to assume the responsibility of policing the concession, it might not be long before those same Chinese authorities, with the same actuation and control, would be declaring the rights of the concessionaire null and void. I then went on to say that, as Lord Lothian well knew, there has appeared from time to time an indication of a hope on the part of British and French authorities and nationals, and even on the part of some American nationals, that the Government of the United States would take upon itself some new and special responsibilities for the defense of so-called “common interests” of Great Britain and France and the United States in the Far East and especially in China. I said that it may be all right for some people to wish that but that people who hope, and still more, any people who may think, that there is going to be such a development are in my opinion ignorant of or unwilling to give adequate consideration to the realities of the situation. I said that, the world situation and the situation in this country being what they are, and public opinion in this country being what it is, I thought that there existed no chance whatever that the American Government would assume any responsibility regarding, for instance, the British and the French Concessions at Tientsin. I said that we have no thought whatever of undertaking to police such areas, either for protection of [Page 295] persons or for protection of property. I said that it stood to reason that, if British or French nationals fleeing from great personal danger came into areas where American armed forces were in position, the American forces might reasonably be expected to afford such protection as might be possible to such alien persons along with American nationals, but that that would be on a basis of humanity rather than on a basis of political objectives or legal commitments or obligations. Lord Lothian said that he understood the realities of the situation.

Lord Lothian said that he was going to urge upon his Government that it not make a complete withdrawal of its forces. I said that I would suggest and request that, in reporting to his Government on his conversations with the Secretary and with me, he make it clear that we were not endeavoring to advise or to influence the British Government. He said that he would do so. I said that I would further suggest that he suggest to his Government that they should not say that they had asked our opinion or had been in consultation with us; I said that we had reached our decision by ourselves and that the British and the French Governments ought to reach their decisions on the basis of their own estimate of their own interests. Lord Lothian said that he would make this suggestion. I asked what the French Government was saying or had decided. Lord Lothian said that he did not know. I adverted to the fact that in previous approaches the British Government had told us of the upshot of exchanges of views between themselves and the French Government. Lord Lothian said that in this instance his Government had not informed him of any new developments as regarded the French.

Stanley K. Hornbeck
  1. See memorandum by the Secretary of State, p. 289.
  2. Supra.