[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Second
Secretary of Embassy in Turkey (Brent)
Istanbul, August 3,
1939.
Subject: Regularization of the Status of
Naturalized American Citizens, former Ottoman subjects of Syrian
Origin who failed to Opt under the Provisions of the Treaty of
Lausanne.
| Participants: |
Bay Cevat Açikalin, Chief of
First Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; |
|
Bay Nedim Veysel, Chief of Syrian
Section of First Department, Ministry for Foreign
Affairs; and |
|
Joseph L. Brent, Second Secretary
of Embassy. |
I called on the Messrs. Açikalin and Veysel at the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs yesterday and, in separate conversations,
informed
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them that the
Department had expressed the hope that the notes to be exchanged
would provide for the simplest possible process of obtaining the
release from Turkish nationality of the American citizens
involved. I remarked in this respect that the Turkish Ambassador
in Washington had recently informed the Department that he still
had some hope that blanket action might be taken by the Turkish
Government.
Cevat Bey replied that he did not believe that Münir Bey11 was completely au
courant with regard to the complexities of the Turkish
laws involved since no full instructions on the matter had been
sent him for some time. He added, however, that it was also the
wish of the Turkish Government to formulate a plan which would
be not only as simple as possible but also as expeditious as
possible in attaining the desired end. He said that during his
absence in the Hatay the matter had been handled by Veysel Bey
under Zeki Bey’s supervision, and that it was his understanding
that sufficient progress had been made to permit of an informal
proposal being sent us within the next few days. He would lose
no time in studying the matter.
Veysel Bey, in an earlier conversation, said that his Section and
the Office of the Legal Adviser had finally worked out a plan
which had received the oral approval of the Minister of the
Interior, and that when Cevat Bey had had an opportunity of
studying and approving it, this plan would be communicated in
writing to the Minister of Interior with a view to obtaining his
formal approval. This step would, however, he thought, be merely
a matter of routine and should not cause any further delays such
as have been occasioned by the absence of Cevat Bey in the
Hatay, of the Minister of the Interior on inspection tours, and
of the Foreign Minister on official business. Cevat Bey later
confirmed this remark and said that the matter was one of
considerable urgency to the Turkish Government since it was
closely related to similar nationality questions arising from
the cession of the Hatay to Turkey, and would be pushed as hard
as he could push it.
As summarized by Veysel Bey, the Turks will propose an agreement
along the following lines: an article of a general nature
conforming as closely as possible to our proposal providing for
the release from Turkish nationality of the American citizens
involved; a second article of a more specific and definitive
nature covering the pertinent points of Turkish law; a third
article providing that the status of wives and minor children of
the persons affected shall follow that of the persons
themselves; and a fourth article referring in general terms to
such procedure as is to be followed in the United States. He
said that this procedure might be specifically defined in an
exchange of notes to be annexed to the agreement and could be
decided upon, in detail, in conversations to take place after
the draft proposal had been
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transmitted to us. He emphasized that no
reasonable proposal would be refused consideration. He added
that the most difficult phase of the matter had already been
disposed of by working out with the Ministry of the Interior a
plan whereby the citizenship of whole lists of persons could
automatically be cancelled by the Ministry of the Interior,
rather than by the Council of Ministers, upon the proposal of
the Minister of the Interior, in individual cases. He did not
anticipate that the formulation of the lists themselves would
involve any greater difficulties, and seemed disposed to believe
that the system followed in the United States under the
Franco-Turkish Option Agreement of May, 1937, might prove as
acceptable as any other procedure.
