740.0011 European War 1939/1396

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)

The British Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. He stated that he had been away from Washington for a day and a half and was anxious to get from me such information as I might care to give him with regard to the action which the newspapers asserted the 21 American Republics are going to take in protesting to Great Britain and to Germany with regard to the recent violations of the neutrality zone.

I gave the Ambassador a summary of the situation, advising him of the nature of the protest which would be made, and making it clear that the precise steps which will be taken by the American Republics [Page 118] in implementation of the Declaration of Panama would only be determined after consultation between them, and that this consultation presumably would be held as rapidly as possible after the protest was delivered.

I discussed with the Ambassador in some detail the nature of some of the steps which might be taken, indicating that this Government would support the taking of such measures as the refusal on the part of all of the American Republics of fuel or provisions, or any other facilities to any belligerent warship which violated the terms of the Declaration of Panama, and to any belligerent merchant vessel which might act as an auxiliary through the furnishing of fuel and provisions obtained in an American port to a warship at sea. I said that it was probable that other further steps would be taken up for consideration but that I felt quite sure that the steps I had mentioned would in any event be taken up in the proposed consultation.

The Ambassador asked me a good many hypothetical questions which I told him I would undertake to answer, not in any official manner, but merely in order to let the Ambassador know how our minds in this Government were running at this juncture. A great majority of these questions, as I reminded the Ambassador, had already been dealt with in my previous conversations with him on this question.

At this juncture the Ambassador said that under international law British warships had a complete right to undertake any belligerent activities they pleased outside of the three-mile limit of the American coastline. I replied by saying that I was not prepared at this juncture to discuss the application of international law to the question at issue, and I added that I should be glad to know whether the Ambassador desired to raise for discussion the application of international law to the recent British Order-in-Council39 asserting the right of the British Government to seize all German exports carried in neutral vessels, destined for neutral countries. The Ambassador replied that he did not.

I went on to say that public opinion in this country recognized that Great Britain was waging a war of a very grave character and had not up to now demanded of this Government that we insist upon the determination of the questions raised by the British Order-in-Council in accordance with generally accepted international law. At the same time, I said that British Government should realize that the Government of the United States as well as the other American Republics felt entirely warranted in asserting their legitimate right of self-protection and their right to secure their non-involvment in the European war, and that it was for that reason as a practical measure [Page 119] that the Declaration of Panama had been proclaimed. I said, moreover, that I thought the Ambassador would realize that public opinion in this country was more and more interested in the preservation of the neutral zone determined by the Declaration of Panama and that unquestionably a great deal of feeling had been created by the alleged violation by British warships of the terms of the Declaration, particularly within the past few days.

I then said that I should like for a moment to drop any official character and speak to the Ambassador quite informally. I said that it seemed to me that the British Government had been singularly stupid, immediately after the occurrence of the Graf Spee incident in which it had been clear that the German Government had taken the lead in the violation of the neutrality zone, in permitting British vessels on the Pacific to seize a German steamer only 30 miles off the Chilean coast and to follow that up by firing shots across the bow of a German freighter almost within the territorial waters of Florida, as well as shots across the bow of the Columbus within the neutral zone. The Ambassador at once replied that he completely agreed with me, that he had two days ago telegraphed his Government in that sense, and that he had only this morning received a reply from his Government stating that they coincided in his opinion and had issued orders to the British destroyer Orion to leave the waters of the neutral zone. I said I was glad to hear it.

The Ambassador reiterated emphatically that the British Government would agree to respect the neutral zone provided Germany agreed to respect it, and that its one chief objective was to avoid any disagreement between the British and the United States Governments on this issue from being so protracted as to involve recrimination and acrimony on both sides. I said I heartily shared this view, and that it seemed to me that a very helpful step in that sense would be for the British Government officially and publicly to announce that it intended to respect the zone provided it was respected by the other belligerents.

Before he left the Ambassador said that if the American Republics determined, as an implementation of the Declaration of Panama, to decree the internment of any British warship that might visit an American port after violating the zone, a very serious question would arise. I merely remarked that it seemed to me altogether premature to discuss what the American Republics might or might not determine, and that while such a course might eventually be determined upon, it seemed to me more likely that the first steps to be agreed upon would be limited to the refusal of fuel and provisions. I emphasized, however, that from all information reaching me, public opinion throughout the continent was becoming more and more determined that every practical means should be found to obtain respect for the zone.

[Page 120]

The Ambassador handed me a copy of an affidavit made by the late master of the British motor tanker Africa who was a prisoner aboard the Graf Spee in which the Commander of the Graf Spee is stated to have said that the Graf Spee fired the first shot in the naval engagement off the coast of Uruguay. A copy of this affidavit is attached.40

S[umner] W[elles]
  1. Of November 28. See telegram No. 2481, November 29, 3 p.m., from the Ambassador in the United Kingdom, vol. i, p. 783.
  2. Not printed.