740.0011 European War 1039/1366: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received December 29—7:12 p.m.]
2749. My 2697, December 21.42 While no one in the Foreign Office has made any comment relative to possible implementation of the American 300-mile neutrality zone, staff officers of the Admiralty who have been working on the problem have taken occasion to express to the Naval Attaché serious concern over the unhealthy effects of certain implementing measures reported to be under consideration.
These officers indicated that the British Government had received a definite impression from the highest quarters in Washington that the neutrality zone policy would not be applied in such a way as to hinder the protection of trade. Although the policy had been viewed here with concern from the outset it had been decided on the basis of this impression not to force the issue. The nature of the implementing measures understood to be contemplated however now forced reconsideration of this attitude.
From the practical point of view of naval operations, prohibition upon hitherto legitimate fueling in South American ports or from tankers within the 300-mile limit would force British vessels patrolling the South Atlantic to proceed Capetown, Freetown, Trinidad or the Falkland Islands at frequent intervals. Likewise the [denial of] use of South American ports to vessels which had engaged in hostilities within the 300-mile limit would require a continuous reshuffling of naval forces over very long distances.
It was stated that passing consideration had been given to possible retaliatory measures such as declaring a naval zone around British possessions in the Americas or economic pressure upon South American states but that their government had discarded all idea of retaliation and would be very loath to take any steps which might react unfavorably upon United States public opinion. These officers intimated that the British Government’s reply to the note of the American Republics might indicate willingness not to make an issue of the zone provided assurances were given that Germany would be effectively prevented from commerce raiding within the zone. They indicated, however, that any further German raiding within it would force the end of whatever British acquiescence there might be to the policy. They also referred to the possibility that establishment of the principle of a 300-mile zone might at some future time prove embarrassing to the United States Navy.
[Page 127]The concern with which implementation of the policy is regarded here is indicated in articles appearing yesterday in the Daily Herald and the Manchester Guardian. Under the headline “Britain will reject United States protest” the diplomatic correspondent of the Herald predicts that the reply will be polite but firm. He continues:
“It will no doubt point out that the existence of a ‘neutrality belt’ for 300 miles of the American Continent has no warrant of International law, that it has not been recognized by this country, that we have never even been invited to recognize it.
“It will no doubt further point out that unless and until the American States are able and willing to give absolute guarantee of the safety of merchant shipping within such a zone, British warships will necessarily continue to fulfill their duty of protecting British shipping there as elsewhere on the high seas, and of fighting any enemy raiders they may find there.
“As to the threat that British warships engaged in commerce protection may be refused the right—recognized by International Law—of obtaining supplies or repairing damage in American ports, that is the affair of the American States.
“If they choose to do this, and by doing so to help German commerce raiders, they have the right to do so.
“In any case, and whatever they may see fit to do, we shall continue to protect our shipping.”
The Manchester Gruardian states editorially:
“The protest is clear enough, but it makes no clearer the means for enforcing the observance of the security zone or, indeed, the legal basis of its existence. There is the breath or a possible sanction in the proposal, as yet undecided, to prevent ships which have committed warlike acts in the area ‘from supplying themselves and repairing damages in American ports.’ This would come near to ignoring International Law for the sake of a new declaration which has not been internationally accepted. The right of warships to enter neutral ports through stress of weather or damage has long been admitted, and it was confirmed in The Hague Convention of 1907. Internment has been ordered only when warships sought to refit themselves not for sailing but for fighting.
“Nothing in law prevents belligerents engaging each other more than 3 miles from American coasts and, if afterwards they entered an American port in a damaged state, the law would be set aside if they were immediately interned.
“Britain and France well understand the American wish to keep this war, which we deplore as much as they, far from their shores. The safety of the seas anywhere is in our interest, but only when it is assured can we be at ease.”
- Not printed.↩