893.24/929
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
The Australian Minister asked me if I could perhaps see him this evening, and I accordingly called by his house on my way home. He wanted to discuss, unofficially, the situation created by the [Page 157] German-Japanese-Italian accord.4 He said that the question was now up as to whether they would open the Burma Road. He did not ask me to comment, but he wondered whether it might not be assumed that in the event that war resulted, we would immediately assist by going to war with Japan. He said he had been talking to Dr. Horn-beck, who was, as he put it, “belligerent”; and that Lord Lothian was in favor of opening the Burma Road at once and taking a strong line. This of course implied that if war resulted, we would be in it.
I said since he had released me from commenting, I would not comment. Factually, however, I permitted myself the suggestion that the British might themselves have in mind the possible effect of such a situation on Atlantic affairs, including supplies which they themselves were pressing us for.
Mr. Casey then observed that he had cabled his government about the possibility of supplying some arms to Indo-China, but they had replied that they could not, because they needed all they had for themselves. I said that there always was a difficulty presented in these cases: Is the greatest usefulness obtained by keeping arms close to home, or by letting them go elsewhere, so as to prevent the conflict from coming nearer home? Mr. Casey observed that the British had found it useful to keep theirs close to home, as, for instance, the decision not to use the Royal Air Force in extended operations in France. I confined myself to commenting that the policy urged on us seemed frequently to be a different one; but that the difficulties involved in making a decision either way were of course very great.
As I left, Mr. Casey returned once more to the question of whether it might not reasonably be assumed that in the event of any British or Empire step which led to a declaration of war or actual hostilities by Japan against them, we would promptly come to their assistance.
I again said I could not comment, but in leaving I did not want to have any misunderstanding. There would be, I thought, very great reluctance to become involved in hostilities in the Far East until defenses in the Atlantic were considered entirely safe. This, of course, was a purely personal opinion.
- For summary of pact signed at Berlin September 27, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 165; see also Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, section entitled “Relations of Japan With the Axis Powers and With the Soviet Union.”↩