762.9411/81½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
The British Ambassador called at his request. He invited my comment regarding the significance and probable effect of the recently announced German-Italian-Japanese alliance. I replied that I could better deal with the matter by referring to the views of capable analysts than by expressing an individual opinion. I went on to say that it came about primarily due to Hitler’s effort to divert attention from his failure to invade Great Britain and to preserve his prestige by a sensational announcement of something that already existed. Then I merely recited the facts as to the true situation since 1937, up to and including my public statement following the announcement of the German-Japanese-Italian alliance last week. I could best illustrate this analysis of the matter by referring to what we have often said about the certainty that Japan would, as a most ordinary precaution, find it necessary to assume that whether or not the United States and Great Britain have express or definite agreements in regard to naval and air bases across the Pacific to and including Singapore, the special relations between these two countries are such that they could overnight easily establish cooperative relations for the mutual use of all of these bases; that, therefore, the relations between Germany, Italy and Japan, each having a common objective of conquering certain areas of the world and each pursuing identical policies of force, devastation and seizure, have been during recent years on a basis of complete understanding and of mutual cooperation for all purposes mutually desirable and reasonably practicable, with the result that the recent announcement was part and parcel of the chain of related events. The Ambassador said that this was the view of himself and his Government.
I said that I would be interested to inquire whether and to what extent British and Dominion business men are carrying on normal financial and commercial relations with Japan. The Ambassador said that he made inquiry of his Government some time ago when I brought this same matter to his attention, but that he had thus far received no reply.6
[Page 160]I then added that I would be interested to make another inquiry, and that is whether and to what extent the British and Dutch Governments and peoples, especially in the South Pacific area, have conferred relative to pooling their defense forces in case of threatened danger from elsewhere, and if so, what are the facts as to the size of such pooled forces, and what size fleet would be necessary to overcome and capture them and the countries they represent. It appeared that this was a matter of first impression to the Ambassador, but he readily remarked that that was a very important point for thought and attention, and that he would give me any information available very soon.
The Ambassador said that his Government would be interested to know the view of this Government about a British announcement now to the effect that the Burma Road would be reopened on the seventeenth of October. I replied that I could not undertake to express an opinion on that question as to the effect of such an announcement; that I doubted, however, if it would change any of the plans of Japan, except that the Japanese might say something or do something that they had already decided to say or do; that the matter of what the British would say on the seventeenth of October about reopening the road so far as its effect on Japan might be concerned is another question. I then proceeded to say that this Government has pursued a definite and somewhat progressive line of acts and utterances in resisting Japanese aggression and treaty violations during recent years; that these acts and utterances have comprised repeated aid to China, successive moral embargoes, abandonment of the commercial treaty, actual embargoes under law, the sending of our Navy to Hawaii, together with appropriate statements and notes of strong remonstrance against Japanese steps of aggression and constant repetition of the basic principles of world order under law. I added that I did not undertake to predict, much less to make commitments, as to how fast and how far this Government may go in following up the various acts and utterances in which it has been indulging; that, of course, the special desire of this Government is to see Great Britain succeed in the war and that its acts and utterances with respect to the Pacific area would be more or less affected as to time and extent by the question of what course would, on the part of this Government, most effectively and legitimately aid Great Britain in winning the war. I finally added that this general statement, coupled with the repeated statement of my Government that it was opposed to the closing of the Burma Road for considerations of international commerce, et cetera, is self-explanatory.
The Ambassador indicated that his Government would contemplate letting the road be open after October 17th.
- On November 11 the British Embassy supplied information on this subject to the Department and, summarizing, stated that no unsecured credit facilities in London at that time were enjoyed by Japanese banks and merchants, while the Dominion Governments had been requested to consider acting similarly (694.1115/32).↩