711.93/456: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 22—7:20 a.m.]
579. (1) In pursuance of the directions contained in the Department’s 192, November 18, noon,80 I called on Chiang Kai-shek this morning and orally communicated to him the message contained therein.
2. General Chiang said that he wished to send a reply the gist of which is as follows: he is fully aware of the American Government’s policy of not entering into alliances and that in submitting his plan he wished to make it clear (1) that the United States need not join in an alliance, and (2) that the United States could retain its independence of action in respect of the joint announcement of principles mentioned in his plan. He then asserted that he is not concerned with methods but with the question of how to carry out the principles. The General then declared that he wished to say something concerning Japanese activities and Japan’s relations with Germany. He continued by saying that recently Japan had been spreading rumors of preparations to recognize the Wang Ching-wei regime and at the same time of an endeavor to come to terms with Chungking. Hitherto, he said, little attention had been paid by the Chinese Government [Page 440] to Japanese propaganda and that was still the case; but in this particular instance there is more than a 50 percent probability of Japan’s recognizing the Wang regime at an early date for want of a suitable alternative. He went on to say that it is immaterial to the Chinese Government whether Japan recognizes Wang but he averred that China had to consider the internal and external repercussions. He declared that there would be no effect on “Chungking” but the people of the occupied areas, especially in North China, would be affected to a great extent and as a result China’s economic and military situation would likewise be affected; externally he feared that Italy and Germany will also recognize the Wang organization. He then interpreted Ribbentrop’s conversation with the press in Berlin which he described as set forth in my 577, November 20, 9 a.m., with the additional significant statement that the German Foreign Minister’s conversation with the Chinese Ambassador was held after the departure of Molotov from Berlin for Moscow. He then stated he still had no information in regard to Molotov’s conversations in Berlin but he showed that they must have touched on China. He felt that Russia would not recognize the Wang regime but he thought that through your attitude the Chinese Government might become “cooler”. If the Axis Powers should recognize Wang and Russia should adopt a cool attitude toward Chungking, he asserted, these actions would shake the confidence of the Chinese people. Therefore, he said, the United States and Great Britain should, before the recognition of Wang becomes a reality, “take steps to prevent this action from affecting China’s ability to continue resistance”. He went on to say that “if at that time America does not show a positive attitude and give positive assistance, our war of resistance will be gravely imperiled. Only America can turn the tide and keep up the morale of the Chinese people.” He then expressed the view that the remedies are (1) that the United States definitely express to Japan before the latter takes steps to recognize Wang its disapproval of that course of action and (2) that prior to the Japanese recognition of Wang the United States and Great Britain express publicly their adherence to the principles outlined in his plan. He went on to emphasize that action along the foregoing lines before Japan effects recognition of the Wang regime would be of great assistance to China’s war of resistance. I assured General Chiang that I would transmit his views to the American authorities at Washington.
3. In reply to my inquiry General Chiang said that he had not yet replied to the proposals advanced by Ribbentrop. In reply to a further question he said he would pay no attention to Ribbentrop’s statements.
[Page 441]4. In reply to another inquiry the General affirmed that he had communicated information of Ribbentrop’s approach to my British colleague.
5. I also questioned the Generalissimo in regard to reported Japanese peace overtures having in mind Matsuoka’s statements to Mr. Grew on this subject. He replied that Matsuoka had not yet approached him and he went on to express the opinion that the Japanese peace terms were in Ribbentrop’s pocket at the time that the latter held his conversation with the Chinese Ambassador; he felt that the German Foreign Minister was withholding the Japanese terms until he received a reply from Chungking.
6. The conversation then concluded.
7. It seems to me that it would be desirable when a favorable opportunity occurs to reaffirm our adherence to the principles as set forth in Chiang’s “plan”.81 Although this action itself may have no appreciable influence in curbing Japanese activities in the Far East, it may, as the Generalissimo said, have a heartening effect on the morale of the Chinese people.
Repeated to Department only.