893.24/771: Telegram
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:15 a.m.]
544. Our 542, July 5, 6 p.m.,73 paragraph No. 3. As the question of the taking by Japan of military initiative against Great Britain in the event of British refusal to close the Burma route is not being discussed in the press and as there is no other forum for the ventilation of thought on this and similar questions, one’s views with regard to the possibility of Japan’s readiness to risk a war with the British Empire over a matter of comparatively small practical importance depends to a large degree on one’s personal contacts with Japanese individuals. Craigie has recently been under strong pressure from his Japanese friends and acquaintances. I happen to know that one Japanese who had excellent contacts and had been friendly and helpful to Craigie sent Craigie a few days ago a scathing attack on British policy. Craigie’s opinion that refusal to close the Burma route would be [Page 41] certain to bring about war between Great Britain and Japan may prove to be a correct assessment, but it needs to be remembered that the circumstances in which he is placed do not favor his correctly weighing certain considerations both pro and con as follows:
(a) There is always present in situations such as the present the possibility that the Japanese Army may take matters into its own hands.
Cutting off supplies to China from Burma is daily being featured in the press, but whether this press agitation is designed to impress the British or to prepare the Japanese public for military action against the British Empire is a matter for speculation only.
(b) The Japanese are well aware that Great Britain is now impotent in the Far East.
(c) The prospects of Great Britain’s escaping defeat at the hands of Germany are regarded by the Japanese as remote.
(d) It follows from (b) and (c) that the blandishments of Germany are becoming increasingly effective with the masses in this country.
As against these considerations, I would present (1st) the fact that an act of war by Japan against Great Britain would align Japan conclusively with the Axis and would be a powerful stimulant for the entry of the United States into the war; (2d) the quantity of arms transported over the Burma route even if the exaggerated Japanese estimate of 5000 tons per month were correct is trivial and Japanese officialdom is aware that the approaching rainy season will make the road impassable for the next several months; (3d) the Japanese [apparent omission] by force and cannot offer the Soviet Union sufficient inducement to stop the third and by far the most abundant source of military supplies to China. These facts would seem to indicate that the principal purpose of the Japanese move is to strike at Chinese morale and question arises whether a project so speculative in aim would warrant the heavy risks of a war with the British Empire.
As indicated in my various telegrams of the past few weeks, recent events in Europe are having their inevitable repercussions in this country and some clarification of Japanese policy perhaps with the gravest consequences is capable of taking place at any time. After weighing all considerations involved, the view would seem to be warranted on balance that if an act of war is committed by Japan against the British Empire it would be the signal for the downfall of the present Cabinet. The fact that the Cabinet is still able to withstand attack is, I believe, an indication that no decision of a drastic character has as yet been taken.
- Not printed.↩