Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The Far East, Volume IV

893.24/782: Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 9, 1940—6 p.m.
[Received 9:25 p.m.]

555. Our 549, July 8, 8 p.m.⁷⁵

(1) My British colleague has made available to me the series of telegrams which he sent to his Government reporting in detail his interview with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday. The following is a résumé of the salient points in these telegrams.

(2) At the end of the interview which lasted some 2 hours it was agreed that no communiqué should be issued but that the press should be told that Craigie had communicated to the Japanese Government the British Government’s reply to the question concerning shipments of materials through Hong Kong and Burma;⁷⁶ that in respect of Hong Kong the British Government considered the Japanese requirements had already been met as no war materials were in fact crossing the frontier; that as regards Burma, the British Government had drawn to the attention of the Japanese Government the difficulties which existed in complying with the latter’s request especially with regard to Yesoma [Burma] and India whose legitimate interests would suffer if the trade were prohibited; and that the Japanese Government were disappointed in the British reply and invited a reconsideration. [It would be] made clear that discussions would go on.

(3) The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed keen disappointment at the nature of the reply. He inquired whether the British reference to the Hong Kong frontier had reference only to the land frontier and whether the export of war material by junk was to be permitted in which case it would be incorrect to assume that the Japanese requirements had been met. Craigie replied on his own initiative that he took the word frontier to include both sea and land frontiers but added that he would refer the matter to London. In doing so Craigie reported that he had felt it essential to assure the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Japanese requirements at Hong Kong were being met especially in view of the bad impression caused by the British reply in the Burma question and he recommended to London that if in fact materials were being permitted to leave for Chinese ports by sea, these exports be stopped.

(4) With reference to the Burma Road, the Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that the British reply did not provide an answer to the Japanese contention that Indochina traffic would probably be diverted to the Burma route. Craigie stated that experience had shown that there was practically no chance for such a diversion during the rainy season. Referring to the British statement that the quantity of war material over the Burma route from the United Kingdom was “insignificant” and would be likely to remain so, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked whether “war material” included trucks, fuel, et cetera, and upon receiving an affirmative reply he inquired whether the Japanese might take the assurance that these exports from the United Kingdom would remain insignificant. The British Ambassador said that he could not go beyond the statement that it was “likely to remain so”.

(5) The Minister for Foreign Affairs inquired whether the American Government had been consulted on the point contained in the concluding passage of the British reply in regard to the desirability of early conclusion of a just and equitable peace between Japan and China. The British Ambassador replied that the American Government had not been consulted with regard to the terms of the reply on the Burma Road question but that there had been unofficial exchanges of views from time to time and that Mr. Arita might assume that the British Government would not have expressed the views under reference if it had felt that they would have been unacceptable to the American Government.

(6) With regard to the concluding passage in the British reply in our immediately following telegram 556 July 9, 7 p.m.,⁷⁷ a paraphrase of Craigie’s separate telegram bearing on this subject [apparent omission].

(7) The Minister for Foreign Affairs added the following general observations in the course of his conversation with Craigie:

(a) It was Arita’s firm belief that the Chiang regime was about to collapse and he strongly doubted whether it was advisable for the British to continue to give that regime assistance, thus steadily arousing growing Japanese animosity.

(b) He deprecated any arguments based on normal conceptions of neutrality in view of the fact that in the world today “strict neutrality” had ceased to exist as most states were busily engaged in assisting one or the other of the belligerents.

(c) While appreciating the difficulties facing the British and the Japanese Governments, he wished to make a practical suggestion, namely, that the Burma Government “for reasons of public order” impose a temporary ban on transit of war materials. He suggested that this might mean a ban for a month or two to be prolonged as necessary. He pointed as an analogy to the evacuation of women and children from Hong Kong for purposes of public order.

(8) Craigie did not report his replies on the foregoing points but stated that he would refer suggestion (c) to London, pointing out the difficulties involved.

(9) The Minister for Foreign Affairs in conclusion again expressed his keen disappointment at the British “refusal” of the Japanese request. Sir Robert rejoined that he had not noticed the use of the word “refusal” in the document, that it was a friendly explanation of the difficulties with which they were faced and that he felt the proper course would be to discuss the whole question of these difficulties on a broader basis, [dispassionately?] and constructively as in the case of the Asama Maru.⁷⁸ Arita replied that the Japanese people were in no mood to put up with “procrastination”. Craigie took exception to such a characterization of the British attitude which was genuinely anxious to reach an early and friendly settlement of the whole question.

(10) The Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that he was being widely attacked as pro-British and pro-American; that he was ready to continue discussions but that the Japanese were determined to put an end to the Burma traffic and he feared that a very serious anti-British outburst would be provoked if the conversations went on for more than a week or 10 days; he therefore hoped that serious consideration would be given to his suggestion under (7) (c) above.

Grew

75. Not printed.
76. A copy of the British reply to Japan, supplied by the British Foreign Office, was transmitted by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom in his telegram No. 2033, July 6, 8 p.m. (893.24/772).
77. Post, p. 395.
78. See British Cmd. 6166, Japan No. 1 (1940): Correspondence Between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Japanese Government Regarding the Removal of German Citizens From the Japanese Ship “Asama Maru”.