740.0011 Pacific War/1994A

The Under Secretary of State (Welles) to the President

My Dear Mr. President: The Minister of the Netherlands1 has just called to see me.

He has received instructions from his Government reprimanding him severely because his Government was not afforded the opportunity of passing upon the text of the statement given out by the White House on Saturday regarding the joint command in the Pacific.2

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He has received further instructions to inform you that his Government approves in general lines secret document No. 1 (instructions to General Wavell), together with Annex 1 to that document.3 His Government desires, however, to request modifications of Annex 2 to that document.4 These modifications are contained in the first of the documents enclosed herewith.

With reference to the text of the “agreement” handed by you to the Minister on December 29,5 the Minister has received observations thereto from the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies under date of January 2. These observations are likewise attached herewith.

The Minister has likewise received from the Commander-in-Chief of the Netherlands naval forces certain information, together with observations, concerning the activities of the American naval forces under the command of Admiral Hart. The information and observations are likewise enclosed herewith.

The Minister has likewise received from his Government in London an instruction stating that the Netherlands Government requests the United States to send troops to Curaçao under the same conditions as the British troops which have previously been defending the islands.6 In essence this implies that the cost of our troops are to be borne by the United States and that our troops are to be under the command of the Dutch Government and military commander in the islands. The Dutch Government will later communicate with you with regard to the number of the American troops to be sent.

The Dutch Government likewise requests that when an announcement is made by the White House covering the dispatch of our troops to the Netherlands West Indies the statement make it clear that the troops are to be there only temporarily and will be withdrawn upon the conclusion of hostilities. The Dutch Government is very anxious to avoid any implication of “an occupation” by United States military forces. The Minister has asked that he be informed twenty-four hours before any statement is issued by the White House in order that he may have the opportunity of explaining to American press correspondents the nature of the assistance which we are giving the Dutch Government in the Netherlands Indies and why the term “occupation” should not be used by the press.

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The Minister has asked me to request that you receive him at your earliest convenience in order that he may be advised by you of your decisions with regard to the various questions raised by his Government in the documents which I am transmitting herewith.

May I let him know that the White House will inform him when you are able to receive him?7

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles
[Enclosure 1]
Amendments Proposed by the Netherlands Government

The Netherlands Government in London requests the insertion of the following additions in annex 2 of U.S. ABC/4/5:

1.
par. 1 after the word “British” the words “and Dutch”.
2.
in same paragraph, after the words “Minister of Defense”: “acting together on behalf of the ABDA Governments”.
3.
in par. 2 b, after the words “in London”: “having consulted the Dutch staff”.
4.
in same paragraph, after the word “representative”: “and the Dutch representative”.
5.
in par. 2 c after the word “British”: “and Dutch”.
6.
in par. 4 after the words “in the name of” replace last 3 words or paragraph by the following:

“the ABDA Governments and the respective Governments will be informed”.

[Enclosure 2]
Netherlands Legation Memorandum

Information was received from the Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Naval Forces, Admiral Helfrich, that important Japanese forces and troopships are being gathered on the south coast of Holo and Davao. Because of lack of sufficient Netherlands fighter planes it is for the time being impossible to attack these objectives with our bombers. Some American fighting [flying?] fortresses have arrived in Malang and Adm. Helfrich hopes that they will as soon as possible participate in bombing operations. The attitude of the American-Asiatic fleet remained unchanged. Adm. Helfrich will urgently ask Adm. Hart for more activity and to make a more intensive use of American submarines operating from Sourabaya. At present an [Page 309] American submarine tender is already located in Port Darwin as are all American auxiliary vessels, some American submarines, however, are now on their way to Sourabaya.

The greatest need is for fighter planes, anti-aircraft guns, class A cruisers, aircraft carriers, not to speak of capital ships. Admiral Helfrich is strongly convinced that more success can be obtained even with the combined forces at present in that area, if they could all be put under our own command for offensive action.

Admiral H. expressed once more the hope that the American authorities will fully realize that also for the general war operations it is of the greatest importance that a strong stand should be made, not only in the mainland (Java, Sumatra, etc.) of the Netherlands Indies, but that also the oilfields in Borneo and elsewhere should be strongly defended considering that when these oilfields should be lost the use of Australia as basis would encounter very great difficulties in view of the fact that then all oil supplies would have to be shipped to Australia via a long and very hazardous searoute.

(These observations were made by Admiral Helfrich on January third, 1942.)

[Enclosure 3]
Netherlands Legation Memorandum

Memorandum

The Governor General8 has raised the following questions.

Why has a General been appointed supreme Commander and not an Admiral[?] Does this mean that no important fleet including battleships will be sent[?] Because if the latter would be the case the fleet would come to the forefront. A large fleet is of the greatest importance. The three most important functions are being held by British and American officers which is only comprehensible if the United States and Great Britain have the intention to send considerable armed forces of their own to this theatre of war. If they, however, would not have such intention the geographical situation and local knowledge of the theatre of war which to a great extent lies within the boundaries of the Netherlands Indies, would lead to expect that one of three commandants [commands] would be given to a Netherlands officer.

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The best line of action would be to make the supreme commander responsible to an appropriate joint body in which all participants are directly represented.

In view of the fact that the Netherlands Indies constitute a very great part of the operational area in which the allied forces are under the command of the supreme commander, the Netherlands would desire to have a more direct part in the command, whilst naturally the United States maintains the exclusive command in the Pacific and Great Britain in the Indian Ocean.

If the arrangements were made for a more extensive operational area the Netherlands would be willing to content itself with a less important part in the high command, but in this arrangement which covers a restricted area it seems that the local knowledge of Netherlands Indies commanders has not been taken into account sufficiently.

It is not clear whether in point F operational control is meant. The Netherlands would like this to be so as in this way cooperation with local authorities would be easier.

In the Netherlands Indies the Governor General is the Commander in Chief. However, it is not possible for the Governor General to be under command of the Supreme Commander. It is therefore suggested that in the place of [“]Commander in Chief of the Netherlands Indies[”] should be mentioned the “Commanders in Chief of the Netherlands Navy and the Netherlands Indies Army.”

(These observations were made by the Governor General on January second, 1942.)

  1. Alexander Loudon.
  2. The reference is to the White House Press Release of January 3, 1942, ante, p. 147.
  3. ABC–4/5, WW–3 (Final), ante, p. 297.
  4. Annex 2 was the memorandum of December 30, 1941, entitled “Higher Direction of War in the ABDA Area,” ante, p. 288.
  5. From the comments made by the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies (enclosure 3 infra), it appears that the “agreement” under reference may have been a copy of Churchill’s telegram of December 28, 1941, to the Lord Privy Seal, ante, p. 277.
  6. For documentation on the sending of American troops to Curaçao and Aruba, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 4977.
  7. Marginal note in Roosevelt’s handwriting at head of first sheet, to Hopkins: “Harry Talk to me about soon FDR”.
  8. A.W.L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer.