J. C. S. Files
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes
Admiral King informed the President that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been attempting to obtain the British Chiefs of Staff’s concept as to how the war should be won. He said that the British have definite ideas as to what the next operation should be but do not seem to have an overall plan for the conduct of the war.
General Marshall stated that the planners are making a study of what is required in the Pacific in order to maintain constant pressure [Page 595] on the Japanese and keep the initiative in that theatre.2 The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been particularly concerned with the strategic concept for 1943. They have had discussions on the Burma operations and also whether an immediate operation should be planned for the Mediterranean or for the Continent or both. He stated that the planners had been instructed to estimate the earliest possible date that an operation against Sicily could be mounted in order that the Chiefs of Staff could determine what residue of force would be available for operations on the Continent and if such operations would be advisable this year.
General Marshall stated that the most critical factors in the coming operations are the availability of landing craft, the time necessary for amphibious training, and the availability of escort vessels.
He stated that there will be excess troops available in North Africa when the Axis powers have been expelled from North Africa and that this is one of the chief reasons why Operation Husky appears to be attractive.
The British have estimated that the operations against Sicily cannot be mounted prior to August but feel that there is a possibility of moving this date up to some time in July.
General Marshall said that the question being determined is whether we can undertake an operation against the continent together with Operation Husky or separately and at a later date. The British maintain a spearhead in the United Kingdom for an operation against the continent in the event of a crack in German morale. This includes enough landing craft to move four brigade groups and, additionally, the British are putting motors in approximately 1,000 barges which they will use, together with other small craft to bring in troops following the spearhead.
The President asked how many troops were in England at this time, to which General Marshall replied that there was one trained division and about 140,000 to 150,000 men. He said that by next summer we can have six to nine divisions in the United Kingdom, and the British will have thirteen.
General Marshall quoted Sir Charles Portal as saying a crack in Axis morale may come at any time because of the explosive elements existing in the populations of the occupied countries. Sir Charles Portal feels that if such an explosion comes, it will start in the interior of Germany but will finally reach the front line troops who will desire to return to their families. In this case, an occupation of the continent [Page 596] would be comparatively simple.
General Marshall said that training for amphibious operations is the most critical factor which we have to face. The training must be of much higher quality than that given for Torch. He quoted General Eisenhower as saying that he believed that there must be an invasion on the continent but that it would require a minimum of 12 divisions, which is double previous estimates. General Eisenhower also feels that there is a need for more training. Other limiting factors to any proposed operation are the necessities of combating the submarine menace and for the delivery of supplies to Russia.
An operation against Sardinia can be accomplished about six weeks earlier than one against Sicily, but the results will have little effect in improving the shipping situation through the Mediterranean. The only positive result to be received from the capture of Sardinia would be the ability to bomb Italy and perhaps the southern coast of France.
General Arnold pointed out that there would be much better air coverage for Operation Husky than could be given to Operation Brimstone. The President asked where the Germans had the best defence.
General Marshall replied that their defence in Sicily was better than that in Sardinia and that by summer it might be expected that the Germans would have 6 to 8 divisions there. General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were all agreed on the necessity of placing adequate troops in rear of Turkey to be prepared to reinforce her for a resistance to Axis invasion.
The President remarked that Turkey’s entry into the war was a diplomatic question, to which General Marshall replied that he felt that the concentration should be made regardless of whether Turkey came into the war or not.
Admiral King said that in our endeavors to obtain a definite strategic concept from the British Chiefs of Staff it had become apparent that they intended using the geographic and manpower position of Russia to the maximum. This necessitates making every effort to maintain the flow of supplies to Russia and also to divert German air and ground troops from the Russian front. He added that the British make no mention of where or when a second front on the continent should be established. The President said that we now have a protocol with the Russians which involves a certain delivery of munitions to them and that this shall probably be continued on the same scale when the present protocol expires.3
[Page 597]Admiral King stated that British convoys by the northern route are set up for 30 ships every 42 days. With an additional 12 destroyers this could be improved to a rate of 30 ships each 27 days. He stated that he did not believe we should base our plans too largely on a contemplated German crack-up. It now appeared that a real Round-Up operation is not feasible before April, 1944 because of British lack of enthusiasm.
General Marshall said that British would undertake an operation Sledgehammer if they saw signs of a break in German morale. This would be followed by a makeshift Round-Up operation. He said the British feel that they cannot gather the means for a real thrust against the continent in 1943, and that Admiral Pound states that no operation should be undertaken after August. It is apparent that British cooperation cannot be obtained unless there are indications of the Germans weakening.
Admiral King stated that if the operations on the Mediterranean and on the Russian front caused the Germans to withdraw their forces from France, the British would be willing to seize this opportunity to invade the continent.
General Marshall informed the President that the British were not interested in occupying Italy, inasmuch as this would add to our burdens without commensurate returns.
The President expressed his agreement with this view.
General Marshall stated that in his opinion we may be able to obtain a decision from the Combined Chiefs of Staff concerning the operations in the Pacific by January 17th and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had come to the conclusion that Operation Husky should be undertaken, but they had not yet informed the British to this effect.
The President stated that from the political point of view he thought it would be extremely wise to send more airplanes to China. He felt that they could be used to great advantage there and if periodic bombing raids over Japan could be undertaken they would have a tremendous morale effect on the Chinese people. General Arnold stated that he agreed with this view but wished to see for himself whether or not an increased air force in China could be supplied.
The President then stated that he thought it was desirable to set up additional transport planes to insure a supply of a larger air force in China.
General Marshall said that transport planes now allocated to China are sufficient and that we must be extremely careful about making additional allocations. He pointed out that, in addition to China, we would receive demands for transport planes from Russia. We would need a considerable number for the Operation Husky and also for General MacArthur’s forces in the Pacific.
[Page 598]The President suggested the possibility of preparing two or three plans and making all preparations to carry them out, but leaving the decision as to the objective until a later date.
Admiral Cooke pointed out that if planes [plans?] were made for Operation Husky the objective could readily be changed to either the Dodecanese, Crete or Sardinia.
The President said he would like to have some flexibility to the plans in case it became apparent that Turkey might enter the war. In that case we could then adopt the objective which would fit in best with this development.
General Marshall stated he did not feel that the Operation Husky would interfere with Turkey’s entering into the war, but rather that a success in Sicily might be an added inducement to her to join with us.
The President then directed the discussion to Russia. He said that he had received information that the Russians did not desire any of our personnel and also indicated that they would not welcome General Bradley’s mission to make a survey of the available air facilities in Siberia.
He asked General Somervell about the supply situation to Russia.
General Somervell replied that the Persian port is capable of handling 15 ships per month. The road and rail facilities are capable of handling about 10,000 tons per day which are sufficient to handle the freight from 40 ships per month, and efforts are now being made to expand the port facilities to make this possible. He then went on to describe to the President several overland routes to Russia, all of which are limited by the availability of truck transportation.
The President asked what might happen if Turkey remained neutral but permitted our transporting munitions and bombs through her territory.
General Somervell replied that certain routes could be made available by this means, but if they were used it would be necessary to establish a truck assembly plant in that area. He added that he thought this should be done, and that all available routes into Russia should be used.
The President asked General Somervell if truck bodies could be manufactured in the Near East, to which General Somervell replied that lumber would have to [be?] obtained from India.
Mr. Harriman stated that until a truck assembly plant could be constructed, the one now at Cairo could be used.
Admiral King stated that the last convoy to Murmansk arrived without loss of any of its 16 cargo ships, but that one destroyer had [Page 599] been sunk and another damaged. He stated that we could help Russia more if they would help us to do so.
The President asked if we were getting as much information from Southern Europe as are the British. General Marshall replied that he would have this investigated. (A message was sent to G–2, Allied Force Headquarters, asking for a report as to the amount of intelligence received out of Southern Europe by U.S. Intelligence Agencies and how our efforts in this regard compared with those of the British.)
General Marshall then informed the President that the British had agreed to transfer their Valentine tanks from the 6th Armored Division to the French as soon as the British had received our Sherman tanks. He also stated he thought it necessary to equip the best French divisions rapidly.
General Marshall then informed the President regarding a decision which had been made by General Eisenhower concerning the Tunisian operations. A drive towards Sfax which had been planned for January 24th has been called off. This was necessary because the British First Army on the north could not attack until March 15th and General Alexander could not attack Rommel’s forces on the south until February 15th. It was decided that the attack against Sfax might be premature and expose them to an attack from the north by German Tunisian forces and from the south by Rommel. Instead, General Eisenhower is to hold his First Armored Division in the vicinity of Tebessa prepared to assist either Alexander’s forces in the south or the First British Army in the north, and the attack against Sfax will be made by infantry units at a later date, to be coordinated by General Eisenhower and General Alexander.
The President then asked General Somervell about the general supply situation. General Somervell replied that the greatest shortages in North Africa were in road machinery and motor transportation. Both of these are now being sent to North Africa. The machinery is needed to improve the railroads and also for the construction and improvement of airfields. Efforts are also being made to bring in needed locomotives.
The President then asked about the civilian supply situation. General Somervell replied that it was being handled satisfactorily, except that valuable cargo space was being utilized by some of the civilian agencies in the United States in sending unnecessary and ridiculous items.
The President then informed the Chiefs of Staff that Admiral Robert in Martinique had received a message from Laval to sink his [Page 600] ships immediately upon receiving evidence that the United States intended action against Martinique.4 Laval required Robert to give him an answer at once. Robert informed Laval within four hours that he would comply with his orders. This definitely eliminates the possibility of our obtaining the use of French shipping now in Martinique.
Admiral Cooke then informed the President that the British were becoming conscious of the fact that the United States was engaged in a war in the Pacific and described his discussions with the British Staff Planners who recognized the necessity for adequate means being provided to handle the Pacific situation. He stated, however, that he did not feel that the British Chiefs of Staff were as yet convinced of this necessity. The Chiefs of Staff feel that we should maintain the status quo and simply hold, whereas the planners recognize that a constant pressure must be kept on the Japanese and that every effort must be made to keep China in the war. The Planners admit the possibility of the Chinese dropping out of the war.
The President then discussed the proposed operations in Burma. General Marshall informed him that just as he felt that we had convinced the British that Operation Ravenous should be undertaken, the Generalissimo had declined to participate.5 The reason given by the Generalissimo is that the British refuse to place a naval force in the Bay of Bengal to interrupt the Japanese line of communications. The Generalissimo feels that a definite commitment to this effect had been made by the Prime Minister in a talk last year before the Pacific Council.6 General Marshall said that the Prime Minister probably had the Anakim operation in mind.
Admiral Cooke stated that the British have no intention of undertaking an operation to recapture Burma in the present dry season.
General Marshall pointed out that the Chinese, particularly General Hsiung, had been loud in their complaints about failures to assist them, and now that we offer them assistance, they refuse our help.
- At the conclusion of their meeting on January 14, 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a report on the situation to be established in the Pacific and Burma in 1943; see ante, p. 556. For the partial report by the United States Joint Staff Planners (C.C.S. 153, January 17, 1943) prepared in pursuance of the directive, see post, p. 755. For the comment by the British Joint Planning Staff on the American paper, see C.C.S. 153/1, January 17, 1943, post, p. 757.↩
- For text of the Second Soviet Supply Protocol between the United States and the United Kingdom on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other, signed at Washington October 6, 1942, see Department of State, Soviet Supply Protocols, publication No. 2759 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, n.d.), p. 15. For a discussion of this protocol, see Leighton and Coakley, pp. 560–563. For documentation regarding the continuation and enlargement of wartime assistance from the United States to the Soviet Union in 1942 and 1943, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 684 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iii, pp. 737 ff.↩
- Reference here is presumably to the message from Laval to Robert, quoted in Admiral Georges Robert, La France aux Antilles de 1939 à 1943 (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1950), p. 163. For documentation regarding the efforts of the United States to reach agreement with Admiral Robert concerning the maintenance of neutrality by the French possessions in the Caribbean, see Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. ii, pp. 611 ff., and ibid., 1943, vol. iii, pp. 219 ff.↩
- For the text of Chiang’s message of January 8, 1943, to Roosevelt, explaining his formal withdrawal from the proposed operations in Burma, see Rom anus and Sunderland, pp. 259–260.↩
- Chiang’s view of the commitment made by Churchill was set forth in a message of December 28, 1942, to Roosevelt, which is summarized in Roosevelt’s telegram 254, January 7, 1943, to Churchill, ante, p. 514. See also footnote 3 to that document.↩