740.0011 European War 1939/17230: Telegram

The Chargé in Italy (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

1920. Opinion in well-informed Rome circles is divided on the crying question of the day whether Germany will declare war on the United States. Italy, it is assumed without question, will follow Germany’s lead whatever it be as a matter of course.

According to the cons, the Axis can assist Japan “with all political, economic and military means” as provided in article III of the Tripartite Pact2 without declaring war. If it comes to war, they argue, Hitler for obvious reasons, notably of internal propaganda import, wants us to declare it. This, however, they add, does not preclude rupture of relations as a measure of political aid to Japan and a means of curtailing our information sources in Europe.

According to the pros, Germany will hold that our Pacific policy has constituted “attack” in the sense of the same article, that consequently Japan’s action is one of legitimate defense and that the only reply is world war.

The following six items tend to support this view.

1.
Yesterday afternoon in course of conversation with Tittmann, Cardinal Secretary of State seemed surprised at a suggestion that the President in his message to Congress might recommend severance of relations with Axis. It seemed more likely to His Eminence that the initiative would come from Axis. He gave impression he expected something of the kind shortly.
2.
Last night the Queen of Spain sent me word her son Don Juan had received information which persuaded him Germany would declare war on United States in very immediate future.
3.
German press correspondents have been arguing strongly with their American colleagues that a break with United States is not intended, that Berlin had been taken unawares by and was displeased with Japan’s action and that, while the latter has a just cause, attack at this time was at best premature. Japanese correspondents say they do not expect an Axis declaration of war. Our correspondents gather the clear impression that all this is expressly designed “to pull the wool over their eyes”.
4.
A German Embassy source is reliably reported to have said yesterday that Ribbentrop had promised Japan that if it would declare war on United States Germany also would do so. It was explained that there are no longer any good reasons for “postponing” open war now that we are on a full war footing.
5.
This morning Durbrow3 called at the Foreign Ministry for an exit visa for our diplomatic courier (see my 1917, December 84). The competent official, a close friend, was despondent. “Things look”, he said, “very, very bad”. Categorical orders having been received from the Ministry of the Interior to refuse all such visas to Americans, even if bearers of diplomatic passports, he could take no action except to enquire whether an exception could be made for our courier. The decision “was not a temporary measure”. His usual “au revoir” was “farewell”.
6.
Yesterday’s confidential directives to the Italian press included: “Do not touch for the time being on the implications of the Tripartite Pact”; “Feature Japanese reply to Hull documenting responsibility of Rooseveltian war mongering”; and “Do not speak of the Americans being surprised”.
Wadsworth
  1. Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931–1941, vol. ii, p. 165.
  2. Elbridge Durbrow, Second Secretary of Embassy in Italy.
  3. Not printed.