740.0011 European War 1939/12617: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Steinhardt) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 29—6:30 p.m.]
1250. I was summoned to the Kremlin this afternoon by Molotov who began the conversation by referring to Umansky’s recent talk with the Under Secretary and by expressing appreciation for the statement made by Mr. Welles that material help would be given the Soviet Union in its conflict with Germany as quickly as possible. He stated that on Umansky’s first visit to Mr. Welles he had been instructed not to raise the question of aid but to inquire as to the attitude of the United States in the German-Russian conflict. At this point I stated that the attitude of the United States had been made quite clear in public statements by the President and Under Secretary that it probably could be briefly summarized by stating that the United States Government was prepared to render assistance to the Soviet Union in its effort to defend itself against German aggression if and when the Soviet Government requested such assistance.
Molotov [declared?] that the attitude of the United States was understood and appreciated but that there had been some doubt in his mind as to the extent of the aid which could be expected but that nevertheless he had instructed Umansky that Molotov [Soviet] Government was, as I have just described, to make a concrete request for aid and to ask specifically for the speedy delivery of anti-aircraft guns, fighter planes, short range bombers, anti-tank guns, equipment for airplane factories, cracking plants for aviation gas, factory equipment for tires, rolling mills for light alloys, factory equipment for the manufacture of toluol, and toluol itself, as well as artillery and [Page 775] other military equipment. Molotov suggested that supplies could be shipped via the Persian Gulf and Iran.
I pointed out to Molotov that it might be preferable to ask for gasoline, tires and other finished products which presumably could be delivered much more quickly than could plant equipment and which moreover would occupy less space and thereby insure quicker delivery. To this Molotov replied that all of the articles enumerated above which the Soviet desires to receive from the United States are at present manufactured in the Soviet Union but that in view of the danger [of] destruction of present plant facilities as a result of German bombing attacks it was considered prudent to prepare substitute factories and he therefore reiterated his desire for the delivery of factory equipment in addition to finished products.
I assume that Umansky has received explicit instructions on these points and that the Department will inform him of the possibilities of meeting the Soviet requests.
I interrogated Molotov at some length as to the present military position. His replies indicated that the Soviet armies and air force had been caught unawares and rather roughly handled for the first few days, but that during the past 2 days the situation had improved somewhat.
At the conclusion of the interview I attempted to elicit from Molotov some assurance that should the Soviet Government find it necessary to abandon Moscow I would be given notification of its intention or that at least provision would be made for me to join the Government at its new place of residence. While Molotov evaded a reply to my question he gave me a general assurance that “all of your requests will be met in the most friendly manner”.