740.0011 European War 1939/9167: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Leahy) to the Secretary of State

314. Department’s 229, March 15, 3 p.m. I called on Marshal Petain this afternoon and explained to him the unfortunate effect, as set forth in the Department’s telegram, of the recent statements attributed to De Brinon and Admiral Darlan by the press. The Marshal replied immediately that, while he had permitted Admiral Darlan to announce his intention to convoy ships if British seizures of French ships continued, he had never favored such a policy and had told Admiral Darlan that it was dangerous. He had said that French ships could hardly be convoyed with safety unless they had a place to flee to and unless they had sufficient strength. He is leaving tonight for Thiers, to be gone until Friday, but he will leave a memorandum for Admiral Darlan telling him of Department’s views and instructing him to say nothing more about convoying. He went on to say: “Admiral Darlan seems to be getting closer to the Germans and to be playing more with them. I must watch him and I will restrain him as much as possible.” The Germans, he said, are accusing him, the Marshal, “of swimming with both currents” but he had told them that he was only trying to float peacefully and keep out of the swamp. He had decided that France must “at least for the [Page 130] present”, he said significantly, keep out of the struggle. He is trying to unify his people behind him on that policy. De Gaulle,41 Catroux,42 and Larminat43 are making it extremely difficult. Catroux has threatened to invade Syria and is stirring up De Gaullist sentiment in that area. French forces there are not as strong as in Algeria and Morocco, although they are capable of defending Syria against an attack by De Gaullist elements if they are not too strong. This furnishes a pretext for German activities in Syria and German pressure on his Government. Similarly, De Gaullist sentiment has been rising in the occupied zone of France where, realizing the Marshal’s prestige, the De Gaullist elements, he said, in their propaganda claim that the Marshal is privately allied to De Gaulle. He reiterated what he had said so often before, that De Gaulle “is a traitor to his country, condemned to death”, and that the movement is causing great difficulties for him with the ever-suspicious Germans. Churchill, he said, had sent him word privately that he is finding De Gaulle a problem himself. If that is the case, went on the Marshal, why could not they drop the movement which is merely arousing greater German suspicions and threats of forcing further reductions in French forces in Africa. He hoped I could bring this matter to the attention of my Government. I have no doubt whatsoever that the Marshal feels personally very strongly about De Gaulle and that his elimination from the picture would go far in swinging the old soldier more toward the British camp.

I asked the Marshal whether he was aware that we had arranged to send two ships of petroleum to Morocco for North Africa and that one of them was already en route. He said that he had not been so informed and that he was delighted to hear it: without it North Africa could not make its crop. He hoped that we would also send the wheat which is so badly needed in the unoccupied zone here.

I asked whether any additional Germans had been sent to Morocco and he replied that only the 54 were still there. He said that the Germans are, however, endeavoring to send some more, though he is firmly opposing it.

I told him that I was pleased to say that following the arrival of the Cold Harbor, the Exmouth had sailed from New York yesterday.

I had been informed, I said, that the delay in its departure had been due to the refusal of the Italians and the Germans to grant safe conduct and not, as had been indicated here in the press, to the British. He was interested to learn this as he had not been previously so informed.

[Page 131]

I said in conclusion that I would like to know whether he had read the President’s speech44 and in view of his indication that he had only seen extracts from it I presented him both an English and a French text. I went on to say that in my opinion the President’s address meant clearly one thing: That the defeat of Germany is certain and that I thought therefore it was good news for France.

The Marshal thanked me for the copy and said that the address would certainly cause the Germans to think. Since it meant to them, however, that there is now no possibility of negotiating a peace with England, they would probably be forced to an early attempt at invasion. Whether they could succeed or not he did not know but they must make the attempt or give up their hope of victory. I replied that even if they succeed in invading England, the war will go on and that Axis final defeat is now inevitable.

The Marshal was in excellent form, alert, particularly agreeable, and very appreciative of our efforts to help support him by the provision of food for his people in unoccupied France.

Leahy
  1. Gen. Charles de Gaulle, Leader of the Free French Forces.
  2. Gen. Georges Catroux, Free French Delegate at Cairo.
  3. Gen. René Marie de Larminat.
  4. Apparently reference is to speech made on March 15, 1941, to White House Correspondents Association; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 15, 1941, p. 277.