740.0011 European War 1939/10144: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier (Childs) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 21—8:10 p.m.]
106. Noguès in stating he wished to be perfectly frank with us, and to place himself in our confidence, informed me in Rabat he had received word from Weygand within the last few days that notwithstanding the most energetic protests on the latter’s part the additional German members of the Armistice Commission who had been slated to come to Morocco were expected to arrive in two or three planes very shortly.
Noguès explained that when there had been a short while ago [indication?] of possible additions to the Commission he and Weygand had gone to Vichy to protest. Darlan and Pétain had both protested to the German Armistice Commission he said and he and Weygand had returned to North Africa under the impression Germans would be permitted to come.
It is Noguès’ understanding that the Germans are coming to replace the members of the Italian Commission. I asked him if the Italians [Page 299] did not number about 100 and lie replied that there were something more than that number (from another source I was told there are some 75 officers plus a clerical personnel bringing the number to slightly over 100). I asked him if this meant that 100 additional members of the German Armistice Commission might be expected. He replied this was his understanding adding that some might also be sent to Algeria.
I remarked I thought this possibility most unfortunate from the point of view of our economic aid to French North Africa, pointing out that as he knew, the subject of German infiltration had caused particular uneasiness to the British and that I felt sure Washington would be, to say the least, concerned. I added that as he no doubt was aware anything that related to the use of Northwest Africa as a possible military or naval base was of particular concern to the defense branches of the United States Government. He replied that as a military man he understood this perfectly.
I asked him if he could furnish me with any more specific information. He replied he could not because he did not know more, that the last communication from Weygand on the subject was that he would shortly receive instructions from him.
During our extended conversation Noguès did say he had been officially informed the German Armistice Commission at Wiesbaden had issued strict instructions to the German Armistice Commission in Morocco not to engage in propaganda. This was in answer to a protest of Noguès.
I asked him what he thought the immediate aims of the Commission in Morocco were. He said he did not think they were to prepare for a German landing as in Norway as the Germans had not sent as far as could be determined anyone to speak of outside the Commission. He said he had refused, on the score that France was still at war with Germany, several requests of the Commission to permit German merchants to enter Morocco. Noguès said that the only other Germans in French Morocco apart from the Commission as far as he knew were former members of the Foreign Legion and Jewish refugees. Some may have passed over the Spanish Zone frontier unobserved but these could not have numbered many in his opinion.
I asked Noguès for his opinion concerning the Spanish threat to Morocco. He said the Spanish would only act if pushed by Germany. He considers the possibility still “a danger”.
I said I had heard French North Africa was very short of war matériel. He confirmed this, adding “the British must not be impatient”. A Moroccan friend he said had spoken to him the day previous and had said very pertinently “we must not become a second Yugoslavia”.
[Page 300]Noguès said there were two currents of opinion in the German Wiesbaden Commission:22a The Economic Section was not opposed to American aid to North Africa but the Military was suspicious of it for the added prestige it would give the United States there.
The German Commission in Morocco in Noguès’ opinion is extremely nervous and exercised over a possible British landing in Morocco. He asserted with great positiveness that there had been no demand by the Germans for bases or ports in Morocco. He thought all the Commission wanted was to survey thoroughly the military ground and to know what was going on.
Noguès said of course these months would be the most critical for Britain. He was not sure whether Hitler would make an all-out attempt against England or not as it might represent too much of a gamble for him: It would be all or nothing. If North Africa could be kept going through this year, the time might come when it could play a role but it was folly for the British to think that in its present state anything could be attempted now.
In my conversations with Noguès and other high protectorate officials, I was impressed by a more favorable feeling toward the United States and Britain and by their heightened morale in comparison with 6 weeks previous. Our willingness to give them economic aid has greatly encouraged them.
Noguès did not so state but Monick informed me Weygand is still fighting against the substitution of Germans for the Italian Commission or at least to minimize it.
Repeated to Vichy.
- German Armistice Commission set up to supervise carrying out of the terms of the German-French Armistice Treaty of June 22, 1940; for text of treaty, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945, series D, vol. ix, p. 671.↩