841.24/898
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)
The British Ambassador called at his request after his conversation with the Secretary. He referred to the draft temporary Lease-Lend Agreement which had been given to Mr. Keynes in July and to the conversation which I had had with the Ambassador just before he left for England.
He told me that immediately upon his arrival in England he had spent the weekend with the Prime Minister and had discussed the draft agreement with him. He reported that the Prime Minister had stated that, second only to the winning of the war, the most important thing for the British Empire was to reach a satisfactory economic accord with the United States and that all its other arrangements should fall in line with this paramount matter.
The Ambassador then stated that he had then talked to Treasury Officials. He mentioned Mr. Kingsley Wood, Mr. Keynes, and “others”. He stated that they were also sympathetic with the objectives of the agreement and appreciated its generosity. They felt, however, that the clause in Article VII relating to the provisions against discrimination should be clarified in order that there should [Page 39] be no possibility of charges of bad faith or grounds for misunderstanding. He said that the Treasury officials had been working on a suggested clarification which the Ambassador had hoped to bring with him. However, it had not been completed before he left and it will be brought over by Mr. Opie,45 who would be coming sometime this week. This suggestion he said was along the lines of the suggestion which Mr. Eden had made to Mr. Winant when Mr. Winant had proposed a clarification of Article IV of the Atlantic statement. (The matter to which the Prime Minister referred was as follows: By cable of August 25,46 the Secretary had suggested the following as part of a joint statement—“The fourth point in the statement by the President and Mr. Churchill is a forthright declaration of intention by the British and American Governments to do everything in their power, now and in the post-war period, by means of the reduction of trade barriers and the reduction or elimination of preferences and discriminations, ‘to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.’” The British suggested that the words immediately preceding the inner quotes be changed to read “by means of the reduction or elimination of harmful restrictions as part of a general scheme.”) The Ambassador went on to say that he earnestly hoped that we could accept the suggested change, but that before presenting the draft formally he would like to present it to the appropriate officials informally so that he might have their views in such a discussion rather than through the medium of the formal exchange of notes. I replied that I was sure that this could be accomplished, but added that I was doubtful about the language used on account of its vagueness; that a “harmful restriction” was usually a restriction which somebody else proposed and that the reference to a general scheme seemed to contemplate an international conference, the acceptance of which might be very far away. He said that the latter was not the intention, but that the general scheme referred to was a general scheme between the United States and the British Empire.
The Ambassador then went on to say that the draft which the British proposed would contain an additional provision, by which it would be agreed that conversations would immediately ensue in order to amplify the economic provisions of the tentative draft. He said that in the event such discussions occurred the question would arise as to who should conduct them for the British and that, since the Treasury was deeply concerned and as Mr. Keynes carried very considerable weight with the Treasury, it might be desirable for him to return, possibly accompanied by another official. He asked whether Mr. Opie or Sir [Page 40] Frederick Leith-Ross47 or Sir Frederick Phillips would in my judgment be helpful. I replied that they were all persons for whom we had the highest regard and suggested that it might be worth his consideration having someone who was not also a Treasury official since the considerations involved were not purely financial, but went deeply into the field of commercial policy and political relations.
The Ambassador concluded by saying that as soon as Mr. Opie arrived with the draft he would again get in touch with me.
- Redvers Opie, First Secretary of the British Embassy.↩
- Vol. i, p. 369.↩
- Chairman of the Inter-Allied Committee on Post-War Requirements.↩