740.0011 European War 1939/10201: Telegram
The Consul General at Beirut (Engert) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 23—9:50 a.m.]
112. The delegate of the High Commissioner at Damascus Monsieur Lavastre—see my 105, April 9, especially paragraph 6—came to see me this morning. He is friendly disposed toward Great Britain and the United States and spoke with apparent frankness. He said the arrival of British troops in Iraq had a steadying effect in Syria because the Arabs admired nothing more than force, and this was evidence that the British were prepared to use force although German propagandists in Baghdad and Damascus had told everybody that Britain could now be flouted with impunity. He added that the natives were distinctly frightened by German successes in the Balkans and by Turkey’s obvious inability or unwillingness to help stem the Nazi tide which is moving further and further east. He thought the situation was most critical as there were indications that the Axis Powers were making all preparations for an open attack. I told him I agreed the situation was critical but it was by no means hopeless. Of course if all parts of the world which could still offer resistance allowed to be demoralized by an atmosphere of alarm created by Germany, they would naturally one by one have their throats cut as was the case in Southeastern Europe. But he should remember Hitler had already roused against himself and his new order the most powerful spiritual forces the world had ever mustered against any individual or doctrine and they would surely prove his undoing in the end.
I have advised them [?] of the substance of this conversation to my British colleague63 but I feel that the presence of British forces in Iraq should be immediately taken advantage of to stiffen French morale and to counter Nazi activities in Syria before they become dangerous and cause the disintegration from within with which we have become so familiar in other countries. To accomplish this it would not be necessary for the French authorities to join the Free France movement or even to disobey the Vichy Government. On the [Page 698] contrary the Department will recall (see my telegram 14, January 18) that the High Commissioner told me at our first interview that his instructions were to defend Syria against all aggression. But it seems to me the time is past when we can take it for granted that this includes defense against the Axis. As the Nazi military colossus is watching from one victim to another we must be prepared for violent surprises. Thus I do not exclude the possibility that German troop carrying planes may some day arrive in Syria and I should like to make sure that General Dentz would not feel he had to consult Marshal Pétain before he took decisive action against them for by then it would be too late.
I believe our enormous cultural and material interests in Turkey and Syria entitle us to know what their attitude would be in case of German aggression. The Middle East still forms a well nigh impregnable bloc stretching from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf and from the Caucasus to Libya. It would be folly to permit portions of it to submit tamely to Axis blackmail, flattery or coercion and thereby endanger the safety of the whole. A form of tacit informal and purely local Anglo-French understanding in the event of an attack on Syria is therefore imperative if the Axis is to be kept out of the Middle East. Thoughtful Frenchmen admit it but they would rather do it with Pétain’s or at least Weygand’s64 blessing than without it.
Repeated to Vichy.