611.4731/432
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Acheson)
| Participants: | The Right Honorable Robert G. Menzies, Prime Minister of Australia;37 The Right Honorable Richard G. Casey, Australian Minister; Mr. Acheson |
During the course of an evening at the Australian Legation with the Prime Minister I said to him that I hoped before he left Washington we would have an opportunity to discuss the improvement of trade relations between Australia and the United States. Pursuant to that conversation, Mr. Casey made an appointment, and he and the Prime Minister called upon me this afternoon.
I opened the talk by referring to a question which had been asked the Prime Minister at the Press Club luncheon as to whether or not he favored economic collaboration with the United States. The Prime Minister had answered that he not only favored such a policy but suggested that during the war we lay the foundation for closer trade relations by actual experiments.
I said to the Prime Minister that, as he had doubtless learned in conversations with the Secretary, it was the Secretary’s view that if nothing were done now there was a serious possibility of the degeneration of trade relations after the war and that only by earnest efforts [Page 115] at the present time and a wise handling of the lease-lend arrangements could we avoid a return to extreme nationalism. The Prime Minister stated that he shared this view and believed that the time to undertake discussions was now rather than to wait for the end of the war.
I said that the Department had given considerable thought to the possibility of informally exploring at once by discussions between Australia and the United States, as well as the other British dominions and the United States, whether specific items could be found upon which mutual concessions might be made. I said to him that these discussions ought to be undertaken with the view of having each arrangement stand upon its own feet and that later, and before any formal discussions were announced, the collateral effects upon other members of the British Commonwealth could and should be considered.
The Prime Minister said that he was most interested in this and most sympathetically inclined. He referred to the possibility that as a result of pending election in Australia his term of office might be limited and said that if it were not and he continued in power he would be willing to explore the possibilities immediately and would send to this country responsible people for this purpose, although they might ostensibly come on some other mission.
He asked whether the Department had sufficiently crystallized its ideas to make it possible to give him even the roughest memorandum indicating the direction of our thought, which he might study on the way home. I told him that I would discuss this with the Secretary and that if it were possible we would do so.
He again reiterated his conviction that now was the time to begin such discussions and, if possible, put something practicable into effect, as he shared the fear that at the end of the war it might be very difficult to do so.
- The Prime Minister had arrived in Washington on May 9 for a series of conferences with President Roosevelt and other high officials of the Government.↩