The memorandum is so comprehensive that I believe it requires no
explanation from me. The real question, as I stated to General Marshall,
is whether in your opinion the ends sought will be achieved through your
speaking personally with President Vargas along the lines set forth in
this memorandum. That, I feel, can only be left to your own
determination. If you feel that it is desirable for you to see President
Vargas and submit the problem to him as it is set forth in this
memorandum, you are authorized to do so immediately.
Please telegraph me what your decision may be and, of course, should you
see President Vargas, what reply may be made.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff of the United
States Army (Marshall) to the Under
Secretary of State (Welles)
Washington, June 17, 1941.
Subject: Military Cooperation of Brazil.
1. In the Liaison Committee18 meeting of June
10, you requested a memorandum setting forth just what the War
Department desires in Northeast Brazil. It is my understanding that
you wish to transmit these desires to Ambassador Caffery with
instructions that he is to present them in person to President
Vargas and request of him that they be granted.
2. With respect to Brazil, the War and Navy Departments have a single
objective, the attainment of which at the earliest possible moment
is of great concern to this country. Both Departments are in
complete accord, both as to the objective and as to the time within
which it should be secured. That objective is to insure the security
of Northeast Brazil against every Axis effort, within Axis
capabilities,
[Page 499]
to obtain a
lodgment there. The War and Navy Departments believe that the
Brazilian forces now in that area do not and cannot provide such
security. They further believe that such forces as Brazil can and
may transfer to that region will still fail to provide timely
security to the extent deemed essential for our interests.
3. The question of sovereignty presents a problem to Brazil. Short of
war, this problem may prove insolvable. But until we have made every
effort to solve it and failed, we have not established this
fact.
4. It may seem trite to repeat the strategic reasons why the War and
Navy Departments consider this matter of such vital import and
urgency to our safety. The basic geographic facts are well
illustrated on the attached map.19 It is within the capabilities of the Axis
powers to establish small forces in Northeast Brazil before
effective armed resistance could be interposed by United States
forces. On June 10 this Government had no naval craft, surface,
sub-surface or air, within 1,000 miles of the tip of Brazil and the
nearest Army force was nearly twice that distance. Our line of
communications to that area today would be almost wholly sea-borne.
While our long and medium range aircraft could readily reach it by
air, our short range aircraft could do so only at great hazard.
5. The military problem presented, both from the Axis point of view
and ours, is characterized by one outstanding fact. A small force in
initial occupation will compel a major effort to expel it. Such an
effort in that theater is highly undesirable and the risk of being
compelled to make it should not be accepted. That risk exists today.
It will continue so long as we fail to provide the security forces
essential for that area.
6. a. “It is time for us to realize that the
safety of American homes, even in the center of our country, has a
definite relationship to the continued safety of homes in Nova
Scotia or Trinidad or Brazil.”
b. “We are placing our armed forces in
strategic military position.”
c. These are quotations from the May 27
address of President Roosevelt.20
7. Time is the essential factor. Germany cannot today move in strength in the one manner in which she must
move in order to secure and hold a lodgment in Brazil, namely, by
sea. But step by step, the range of German armed force has been
extended in that direction. German submarines are operating off the
West African coast, presumably supplied either from the Canary
Islands or from French or Spanish West African colonies. Dakar,
former terminus of the
[Page 500]
German trans-Atlantic air route, is ruled from Vichy and Vichy
collaborates with Germany. German four-motored planes, capable of
flying the South Atlantic, are now in service. Germany has pilots
and navigators familiar with the South Atlantic crossing. On three
occasions within the past six months, German surface merchant
vessels have run the British blockade from Europe to Brazilian
ports. In view of these known facts and the rapidity with which
Germany develops operations once her preparations are complete, we
now face the distinct possibility of a lodgment by small German
forces in Northeast Brazil which would require a very strong effort
on our part to dislodge. Once our security forces are there, that
possibility will be eliminated. It will then require a strong German
effort to dislodge us, and the probability of such an effort being
made will be relatively small.
8. Admiral Stark and I are in full accord in this matter. We believe
that the objectives of this Government should be as stated in the
report of The Joint Planning Committee of June 4, 1941,21 namely that this Government should
secure immediately the consent of the Government of Brazil to the
movement of United States Army and Navy security forces to Northeast
Brazil, and that concurrently Colombia and Venezuela should be asked
to cooperate by permitting the transit of their territory and the
use of their airfields by our armed aircraft.
We further believe that such evidence of our vigorous leadership in
the defense of this Hemisphere will be very heartening to friendly
Latin American Governments and will strengthen them in their support
of our policies.
9. a. The Army forces recommended for use
under the present military situation include aviation, anti-aircraft
artillery, infantry, field artillery, and service elements totalling
approximately 9,300 troops and 43 planes.
b. The bulk of these forces should be sent
initially to Natal. Eventually detachments may be sent to Recife and
possibly to the Island of Fernando Noronha.
c. The War and Navy Departments have the
forces available, together with necessary shipping to transport
them, and can commence the movement from our Atlantic seaboard on
twenty (20) days’ notice, provided no large scale overseas movements
are then underway to other points.
10. I am of the opinion that our best chance of securing the desired
consent of the Brazilian Government would be through a personal
request from President Roosevelt to President Vargas.
[Page 501]
Participation in its maneuvers can be publicly announced by Brazil as
the reason for permitting entry of our forces, but the reasons given
above should be frankly stated to President Vargas.
The real hazard, however, which probably should not be mentioned to
President Vargas, lies not in the danger of an unsupported attack by
German forces. The greatest peril in this situation lies in the
possibility of a sudden seizure of airfields and ports in Northeast
Brazil by forces already in the country and acting in collusion with
small German forces. The latter, arriving by air and perhaps by sea,
would so time their movement as to arrive at these points
immediately after their seizure. They would at once take over and
organize these points for defense.
Admiral Stark shares these opinions.
