740.0011 European War 1939/21036: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 16—7:14 p.m.]
1903. I called on Mr. Eden61 this afternoon to inquire his impressions with respect to the situation in France. He said that in general his views differed somewhat from those of most in that he regarded the German insistence on the reinstatement of Laval as a definite sign of German weakness. It must, he said, be considered as some confirmation of reports that the Germans were not satisfied with the trend at Vichy and were anxious over growing American influence. One fact seemed clear, however, namely that the Germans wished to be sure of a government in France completely subservient to their wishes prior to any surprise moves they may contemplate for this spring. He went on to say that most of the British General Staff people are convinced from the absence of signs of military preparations that no German operation is contemplated for this spring other than the expected Ukraine offensive toward the Caucasus (and possibly toward Murmansk). He feels however that in the light of the importance of the surprise factor in German successes in this war they may well repeat their recent history with a sudden attack in some other direction.
He finds it difficult to understand why the Germans are devoting so much attention to Malta—with some 400 bombers all told utilized in attacks on that island when they must be urgently needed elsewhere—and is unwilling to accept the obvious answer that it is solely to “neutralize” the island. He wonders whether these heavy attacks do not fit in with plans for some major campaign in the Mediterranean. If so, what role they expect France to play, or in the negative sense refrain from playing, it would be interesting to know.
As for Laval’s immediate plans—on the hypothesis that he has in fact acquired rather full powers—Eden is inclined to believe that he will be “rather quiet” with the thought of placating opinion both in France and in the United States; further, he will need some time to consolidate his position. He believes that Laval has never abandoned his hope of playing the role of “mediator” between Germany and the United States and of playing a sufficiently important part in the establishment of the new order to obtain a relatively favorable position therein for himself and France. He added: “I have good reason to know Laval very well indeed and regard him as a typical [Page 175] French deputy. He views the whole international political scene from the point of view of getting two politicians of opposite views into the same lobby.” (I am inclined to agree with this estimate of Laval. Certainly up to the time of his dismissal in December 1940 and for a period thereafter he held the confident belief that he could somehow or other bring United States and Germany together and his ignorance of our country was such that nothing could shake this belief.) On the important question of the French Fleet he does not believe Laval will attempt to make any immediate move or that he will either wish or expect to “turn it over to the Germans.” I advanced the thought that since one of Laval’s last statements on “collaboration” prior to his fall from power, if my memory is not at fault, was to the effect that collaboration should extend not only to the economic field but to the “colonial field” as well, he would probably endeavor to facilitate greater German exploitation of French African economic resources and probably permit greater German infiltration into that area. He agreed and likewise conceded the likelihood that the French Fleet might be utilized for the protection of French (German) colonial trade and thus be brought into action against the Allies. Certainly, he felt, Laval would facilitate Germany’s urgent efforts to increase her labor supply by encouraging in various ways migration of French labor to Germany. He said that de Gaulle62 believes, particularly in the light of Laval’s recent statement, that the latter may make some attempt to recapture Free French African territory, but he, Eden, seemed somewhat skeptical in view of the military and physical difficulties.
As to our policy in the light of new developments, he said he had no wish to inject his views and was quite content to let us handle the situation. He read me, however, a telegram he sent Lord Halifax63 night before last in which the latter was authorized, should Mr. Welles consult him, to say that the Foreign Office feels that Ambassador Leahy should be called home for consultation. This, Mr. Eden told me, he thinks might have the effect of bringing home to the Marshal the dangers of completely alienating the United States and would have a similar effect on French public opinion, to which in turn the Marshal is relatively sensitive. The Foreign Secretary feels that these advantages outweigh the loss of Ambassador Leahy’s great personal influence at Vichy. He hopes, however, that we will not sever relations with Vichy at this time and entertains the hope that if things improve, Leahy might sometime return. As to “further steps” which Mr. Eden thinks we might be considering, he mentioned (1) possible [Page 176] direct action definitely to immobilize in some manner the French naval vessels now at Martinique, (2) making certain that the gold there does not slip away, (3) taking such measures with respect to Guadalupe and French Guiana as may seem advisable, and (4) the desirability of blocking French Government funds in the United States now utilized for the maintenance of French diplomatic and consular offices in the Western Hemisphere. He added that he had just learned from Lord Halifax that this last is being done.
He said it would be interesting to know the nature of the threats the Germans used in forcing the return of Laval and what they have demanded of him but recognizes the difficulty in getting the full story. (I have just heard that Czech sources here say that utilization of Ajaccio is one concession demanded).