851.00/2760: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Matthews) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 23—6:35 p.m.]
2102. In the course of an interview which I requested this morning with Mr. Eden we again discussed the French situation (my telegram number 1903, April 16, 9 p.m.) and I found that in general his estimate of the present atmosphere and probable future developments agrees largely with that reported in Ambassador Leahy’s telegram number [Page 177] 587, April 21, 5 p.m.66 Mr. Eden too is of the impression that popular reaction in France to the return of Laval to power is one of increasing apathy; that Laval will proceed slowly and endeavor to avoid any action likely to cause a break with the United States; and that Germany wants the French to avoid such a break. In answer to my question, Mr. Eden said that the simple fact that the Germans wish to avoid a complete severance of United States–Vichy relations is not in his opinion a sound reason why the Allies should consider a break desirable; on the contrary he hoped we would continue diplomatic relations with Vichy. As to Martinique, he made no further suggestion for any additional action on our part. He told me that Halifax had reported that we are exerting increasing vigilance over that area and have stationed heavy bombers in appropriate nearby spots. Halifax added that we are loathe to take any measures of force in the absence of the need for a total break. Mr. Eden went on to say that he saw nothing in the way of a hopeful reaction in North Africa among either the public or the military and did not feel that we could under present circumstances expect any resistance to Laval in that area.
He told me that de Gaulle believes that Laval, while endeavoring to help the Germans in many minor ways, will try to keep the situation as quiet as possible for the time being with the thought of lulling the people into a sense of relative calm and security and with the hope of undermining such spirit of resistance as exists—and de Gaulle fears Laval may be all too successful in this. As for the French Fleet, Eden went on, de Gaulle does not think that Laval will try to use it for direct aid to Germany though he may endeavor to employ it indirectly against the British and possibly in some engagement against Syria.
Mr. Eden said there was one point which is causing him some anxiety, namely Laval’s obvious endeavors to “drive a wedge,” as far as the French public is concerned, between the United States and Great Britain. He referred to Laval’s studied avoidance of any criticism of the United States in his attacks on the British as well as Laval’s reputed desire to serve as mediator between the United States and Germany in the negotiated peace for which he is so eager. Mr. Eden told me that he sent a telegram to Lord Halifax last evening asking him to urge you to make some public statement unmasking this attempt to get the French people to differentiate between the United States and Great Britain. He suggested for instance that in view of Laval’s unfriendly references to the return of English bombers over French territory after having “deserted” France in her hour of need it might be helpful if we could indicate that American bombers [Page 178] would soon be with them. (Mr. Eden of course realizes that American prestige in France is far higher than that of his own country and he probably feels that if Laval succeeds in convincing the French people that we are not wholeheartedly identified with various British moves with respect to France both British prestige and the cause of French resistance will suffer further. It is a subject on which the British are, not unnaturally, touchy.)
He mentioned with approval the leaflets bearing the text of Mr. Welles’ note of April 1367—with an explanatory British foreword—which the Royal Air Force is now dropping over both occupied and unoccupied France. He likewise seemed quite encouraged at the success of last night’s Commando raid in the Boulogne area; there were practically no British casualties. The object of the raid, he said, was to test the strength of German defenses in that area and while the British would not of course advertise the fact they were impressed by the lack of spirit in the German resistance. I asked him what he thought Rundstedt68 is doing in France and he replied that he thought he was there solely to inspect defenses with a view to strengthening them where necessary. He attached no offensive significance to the presence there of this able German general.