711.51/266½: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 7—noon.]
1040. Beaulac83 has just returned from Vichy and reports the following opinions of Tuck and other Foreign Service officers there:
From the point of view of the situation in metropolitan France no advantage to us is perceived in breaking relations under present circumstances. (Your 609, July 21, 6 p.m.)
As fundamental background of a consideration of the problem it should be recalled that Pétain is immediately concerned with (1) preventing harm by the Germans to the more than a million French prisoners and (2) preventing the complete occupation of France and treatment similar to that being given Poland. The Germans assiduously exploit these two preoccupations, while Pétain in making concessions cleverly places responsibility for them on Darlan, Laval, et cetera.
The effect of a break on Laval’s relations with the Germans is problematic. There are indications that while the Germans were interested in the maintenance of relations between France and the United States, their interest has declined principally because of their concern over the activities of Murphy and our other representatives in French North Africa and their desire to put a stop to them.
It must be recalled that Laval has been the candidate only of the so-called Embassy groups (Abetz, Ribbentrop,84 De Brinon, et cetera), and has not been the candidate of the Wehrmacht or of the SS.85 It is [Page 191] not possible in Vichy to predict the course of the internal bickerings and struggles among those German groups or the effect on them of a break with Vichy. To date, however, the SS candidate for Laval’s job is Doriot.
In estimating Laval’s position vis-à-vis the Germans it should be recalled that Laval has not yet been able to deliver to the Germans anything they consider substantial.
The latter have expressed dissatisfaction over the results so far of Laval’s efforts to induce French workers to go to Germany and have asked for deeds instead of words. Furthermore, Laval has been unable so far to see anyone in the German Government higher than Abetz.
The effect on Laval’s position vis-à-vis the French people would depend somewhat on the circumstances under which we broke. Assuming we broke under circumstances which appeared reasonable to the French people, his prestige would be further lowered.
In this connection it is recalled that when Laval entered office his prestige was very low. His prestige was increased when he (a) was able to maintain relations with us (b) maintained bread rations (c) failed to make prompt concessions to Germany (d) skillfully handled Madagascar incident85a and said at the time he would not take the initiative in breaking with us and (e) skillfully handled Martinique incident, his moderate attitude contrasting with our strong attitude.
On the other hand, his prestige was lowered by his speech of June 22 in which he expressed a wish for German victory and referred in offensive manner to General Giraud. His prestige has been lowered further by his efforts to recruit French labor for Germany.
It is not believed that in event of a break under present circumstances the French people would take any violent action against Laval although the possibility of his being assassinated would not be lessened.
Neither is it possible to predict what effect our breaking would have on Laval’s position vis-à-vis Pétain and Darlan. There is no clear indication it would make any difference. If Laval should be forced out of office by either of those persons or otherwise the present probability is that Doriot would take his place. Doriot is much more of a Quisling86 than Laval and even our French friends who now urge continued maintenance of relations say we could not maintain them with Doriot. Despite Doriot’s apparent willingness to go along completely with the Germans, he probably would be unable to deliver the fleet to North African bases. Doriot’s entry into office would still further increase the resentment of the French people against Vichy.
[Page 192]It is not believed that the French Navy would be turned over to the Germans under any circumstances. This does not preclude its possible use against the democracies in the event of aggression in North Africa, for example, or against the Axis under similar circumstances. However, this has no apparent relation to the maintenance of diplomatic relations.
If there should be a chance the Navy would be turned over to the Axis that chance would not be lessened by our breaking. The Germans in that event would have a clear field to endeavor to lure or push France into the German camp. The personal contacts between our Embassy staff and French Naval officers are of some value and might become increasingly so.
Our breaking relations would not lessen the [apparent omission] French people for us nor their readiness to cooperate with us. However, the initial reaction would be one of further despair and possible disappointment, although the incentive to collaborate with Germany would probably not be increased. Intelligent informed friendly Frenchmen fail to see any possible gain to us from breaking under existing conditions.
Our failure to break up to now has not lowered the affection of the French people for us or the hope they have in us.
With reference to explaining a break under present circumstances there were two occasions when the French people genuinely feared we would break. They were when Laval took office and after his speech of June 22. We failed to break on those occasions. To explain a break at this time on the basis of those two incidents would not be entirely convincing particularly since Laval on his part has been careful not to break over Madagascar and Martinique and has indicated he would not take the initiative in breaking.
A detailed though not too lengthy explanation would be desirable if convincing details could be presented.
Under existing conditions the most plausible explanation probably would be a statement that it has become evident that Laval is totally subservient to our enemies and has endeavored to grant them concessions of military value.
However, any explanation at this time would be less convincing than the explanation we should be in a position to make if we should delay breaking until after Laval makes a further concession to Germany (which it is believed he will be forced to do eventually in order to maintain himself in power) sufficiently important that our severance immediately thereafter would appear more timely and, therefore, more reasonable than at present. The large scale requisitioning of French workers for Germany would be such a concession.
It is unlikely that in the event of a break American diplomatic couriers would be permitted to go in transit through France unless [Page 193] some means of pressure such as making it difficult for the French Government to communicate with its representatives in South America could successfully be used as a basis to establish a modus vivendi. There is at least a very good possibility we would be entirely cut off from mail communication with Bern.