740.00112 European War 1939/4798
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Villard)
Mr. Marchal and Mr. Guérin called to inquire as to the present state of the economic plan for North Africa. They said that they were unable to make any move whatever because the Treasury had not reinstated the North African license, and it was therefore impossible to proceed with the purchase of supplies for the next trip of the vessels to Casablanca. No explanation had been furnished, and without [Page 250] some definition of our attitude it was very difficult to explain the situation to the North African authorities.
I said that the machinery of the economic accord had been temporarily stopped pending further clarification and consideration of our relations with Vichy.66 This involved a number of questions, not all of which were related to North Africa, and until these matters had been cleared up it was not possible to proceed with the economic plan.
Mr. Guérin urged that the North African plan should once and for all be treated separately from political questions. He said that as long as the war lasts there will always be incidents which could be used as a reason to stop shipments to North Africa, such as the reports of supplies being sent to the Axis through Tunisia. While he deplored the action of the Vichy Government in permitting supplies thus to reach the Axis in Libya, Mr. Guérin maintained that it should not affect our general plan of sending urgently needed economic supplies to the French and native populations in the French North African territories. Other reasons of a political nature could always be found, if we so desired, to suspend or drop the economic plan, but in doing so we would be deliberately fulfilling the wishes of the Germans.
Mr. Marchal strongly supported the statements made by Mr. Guérin. He urged that once and for all this Government should make a clear-cut decision on the subject of the North African plan, rather than retarding it or holding it up pending clarification of political questions at frequent intervals. He said that the slowing down of purchases and the long drawn-out periods of inaction were having a most harmful effect on the purpose of the plan, if he understood it correctly.
Mr. Marchal said that he had always been under the impression that we were sending supplies to North Africa primarily to win the sympathy and attention of that area, and to hold out the hope of continued American interest. If this objective were to be attained there should be no hesitation in maintaining a steady flow of supplies which would reach the inhabitants and ameliorate their serious economic condition. Full advantage should be taken of the circumstances to publicize these American efforts, which would have the best possible effect in our favor.
Both Mr. Marchal and Mr. Guérin agreed that it would be better to drop the economic plan entirely than to maintain it on the present indefinite and hesitant basis. Under the present circumstances, French North Africa could only distrust our motives and doubt our sincerity, which, of course, played directly into the hands of the [Page 251] Germans. Mr. Marchal emphasized that even if one or more entire shiploads of cotton cloth, sugar or tea fell into the hands of the Axis it would make no difference in the prosecution of the war and the resultant publicity could only have a favorable effect for the American cause.
In conclusion they asked again that a clear-cut decision be made on the continuation of the plan, regardless of such incidents as would inevitably occur in our relations with the Vichy Government. They expressed themselves as in favor of sending American supplies to North Africa just as long as possible, as any curtailment or withdrawal of the program would be exactly what the Axis would desire.