740.0011 European War 1939/18842: Telegram

The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

66. Your 23, January 21. I called on Foreign Minister Witting this afternoon and after saying that I had been pondering his statements to me January 20 regarding reported basic attitude of American public and press towards Finland I expressed concern lest I had not made clear my view that his advices were not in accord with my own knowledge of those matters. Accordingly I said I had tried to formulate my views in a personal note addressed to him which I read and which embodied the three points of your telegram omitting mention of Procopé personally. I left the letter with him.

Witting said he presumed I had gained impression from his statements that he felt attitude towards Finland in United States was more favorable than it really is and I answered in affirmative. He then said that Procopé had qualified his report regarding more friendly American attitude by adding that he had not changed his own opinion regarding long range outlook as to which he was not optimistic. I expressed regret that I had not previously understood him to say so as in fact he did not. I said I was relieved to learn this since I should not wish Finnish Government to be under any misapprehension that we no longer stood by our position as stated by you or under your instructions last fall.

He then launched again into exposition of necessity for achieving Finnish strategic aims saying for first time to me they included [Page 31] control of Karelian and Onega Isthmuses because of development of Murmansk railroad area for aggression. I asked whether on assumption Finland should control Isthmian areas mentioned and Russians should develop Archangel–Vologda railroad area in same way Finland would then consider it necessary for same reasons of defense to move further east and cover new areas. Witting said Finland would not be able to do that. I then suggested that it seemed futile to build Finland’s security only on so-called strategic lines adding that Americans believed in necessity of basing security on sound political foundations. I said we were optimists as to that possibility and this pointed to the great issue of present war. Witting answered that if German and British statements regarding rights and sovereignty of small nations were compared they would be found substantially identical and there was little to choose between them. I asked whether he thought German action in Norway, Holland and Belgium among other smaller countries was to be compared with action of Britain and he said Germans merely got there first.

I asked whether the “realism” of which President Ryti32 had often spoken as characteristic of Finns and which was also mentioned in Finnish answer of November 11, last,33 to our representations34 was to be understood as describing above reported views. Witting said Finnish realism was based on age old experience with Russians and that each generation of Finnish leaders tried to preserve this nation for their own time. They had succeeded thus far against hopeless odds and could only go on trying.

During conversation Witting mentioned that according to Procopé views expressed “privately” in State Department circles included thought that small nations of Europe must be put under Anglo-Russian control after war and their sovereignty correspondingly limited, and as to Germany that her industrial equipment must be purged of any facilities for waging war.

Manifest tendency of my statements today in pursuance of your number 23 was by no means lost upon Witting whose response was grave in tone but it was also clear that he was at loss to know what Finland could do in present circumstances. I should say Witting realizes as indeed he has doubtless done for some time that his Government is increasingly the toy of forces beyond its control.

Schoenfeld
  1. Risto H. Ryti had become President of Finland on December 19, 1941, following the resignation of Kyösti Kallio.
  2. See telegram No. 572, November 12, 1941, from the Minister in Finland, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 91.
  3. See telegrams No. 220 and No. 222, October 25 and 28, to the Minister in Finland, ibid., pp. 81 and 84, respectively.