881.00/2178: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 23—8:50 a.m.]
407. From Murphy. I have just concluded visits to French Morocco and Tunisia. The Department may be interested in the following observations:
In French Morocco I found on the part of officials and businessmen apprehension regarding Anglo-American military intentions in respect to that area. Resident General Noguès69 for example twice referred to what he described as the folly of an Allied military intervention in French Morocco. I inquired whether he had any reason to believe that the United States contemplated military intervention in French Morocco. He said that he did not but that he was positive the British contemplated military intervention and in fact that they so stated on their radio. He went on at considerable length to state that such action would be disastrous as it would not only ruin the French position in Morocco but it would provide no material advantage to the Allies. Only chaos and ruin would result. The native population, he said, could not be trusted and they would take advantage of the chaotic situation thus created to attack not only the French but the expeditionary forces as well. He volunteered several suggestions to the effect that it was to the interest of the United Nations to assist in maintaining the status quo in French Morocco. This provided a stable element he said which would be of great utility in the postwar period. Resident General Noguès failed to elucidate exactly how this negative condition of affairs would assist the United States in winning the war although I undertook tactfully to hint that at the moment this is our major objective.
Resident General Noguès also expressed his satisfaction over Laval’s appointment as Chief of Government70 stating that Laval is far better qualified and intelligent than Admiral Darlan71 and that he, Noguès, intends to give Laval his wholehearted and active cooperation. He said that Laval had promised him that there would be no changes in the administrative set up in French Morocco and I learned from Noguès entourage that Laval promised Noguès that the latter would remain undisturbed as Resident General of French Morocco. According to these informants the latter fact weighs heavily with the Resident General whose tenacious affection for [Page 320] his place as Resident General they state covers every phase of his conduct of Moroccan affairs. Noguès evinced no interest in the operation of the North African economic plan.
These same informants declare that they have noted during past months the growth of anti-British sentiment on the part of General Noguès. They said that there is a psychological reason for this state of mind which has its origin in the decision Noguès took in June 1940 as the General commanding French forces in North Africa to abide by the Armistice although he was greatly tempted to continue resistance. One of his assistants remarked that Noguès gambled then that the British would collapse and unconsciously he cannot forgive them for proving that he erred. Noguès’ military aide spent 20 minutes telling me why Great Britain would probably lose the war, that British air raids over Germany are ineffective and condemned the British for their “treachery and lies”.
This is the first time during my visit to Morocco that I have noted such distinct evidence of Anglophobia in Rabat. I attribute it to an effort on the part of General Noguès to please Laval plus the adverse news from Libya but of course it may represent the true sentiment of himself and some of his associates.
There was also evidence that our representatives are suspected of adverse propaganda among the Arab population. A member of Noguès entourage told me that the Resident General was furious over stories brought to him by several French Army officers of a growing anti-French sentiment manifest among the native troops. He said there were instances where the Arab soldiery did not hesitate to say to their commanding officers that they did not care what the French thought about it; that they knew that the Americans were coming to French Morocco and that they would be glad to serve the Americans who would bring with them everything that the Army needed. One official who mentioned this to me in Rabat agreed that there is no evidence that American representatives in French Morocco are carrying on any form of subversive propaganda among the Arabs and he attributed inspiration for such stories to German, Italian, Spanish and Japanese representatives who are waging an insidious campaign against us. (He mentioned especially the activity of the Spanish Consulate in Rabat which maintains a large organization.) He said that there is no doubt that these combined efforts succeeded in instilling doubts in the minds of French officials and especially the military regarding Allied plans and intentions for French Morocco.
I assured those French officials with whom I talked that the policy which our representatives have followed under instructions of my Government up to the present has been one of friendly cooperation with the French whom we have tried to support in every way possible [Page 321] and that we had conducted no active propaganda effort among the Arabs and particularly not among Arab troops.
In that connection Resident General Noguès stated to me apprehension regarding possible repercussions on the part of the Germans if we continued the use of the former British Consulate at Fez by our control officers. I told General Noguès that Childs had explained to the Department the French apprehensions in this regard and that of course we would not insist upon the use of these premises if the French authorities really objected. The premises have now been closed and sealed. In practically the same breath Noguès stated that he had been successful in excluding German and Italian influence in the Fez area but he asserted that German and Italian surveillance in Fez is very effective and that our slightest activity is immediately known to the Germans and Italians. It did not seem necessary to point out to General Noguès the inconsistency of this statement. From what our control officers have been able to learn of conditions Axis representatives aided by the Spanish have certainly conducted an active propaganda effort among the natives in the Fez area.
I also talked with a number of French Army officers including a top general sympathetic to our cause. I find also with them a new note of uneasiness regarding an eventual American “attack” against French Morocco. The General in question suggested that we should refrain from military intervention unless there is Axis provocation or a French invitation. I told these contacts that they were obviously laboring under the effects of Axis propaganda. The General paradoxically concluded our conversation by urging that we establish a program of military aid for French Morocco. I mention this because it illustrates the struggle going on in the minds of many French Army officers who are tormented by doubts as to where their duty lies.
In addition to contacting French officials in Morocco I also met a few of the Arab leaders in southern Morocco. I was amazed at their vigorous criticism of the French administration and their spontaneous insistence that the United States intervene in French Morocco where they state the United States would enjoy the effective support of the vast majority of the eight millions of persons included in the native population.
I was careful to explain that I had no reason to believe that my Government contemplated any such action; that we are engaged in this war in the defense of certain principles of conduct and have always condemned aggression. The Arab contacts expressed the opinion that we are engaged in a war with a ruthless and unscrupulous enemy and stated that they are convinced from what they have been able to learn from German and Italian representatives [Page 322] in Morocco that the Axis will seize the first opportunity to invade Morocco.
They said that they knew that the Germans and the Italians have studied every inch of the territory in southern Morocco of which German topographers have made careful surveys; that large sums of money had been offered to various Arab elements by Axis representatives and that they are convinced that if and when the Germans are able to free effectives from the Russian front they would not hesitate to seize French Morocco. They also expressed the opinion that we would be foolish if we did not anticipate such an Axis move while we have the time.
In Tunisia I interviewed a number of officials including Resident General Esteva, General Barré commanding all military forces in Tunisia, General Péquin in charge of aviation and a number of officials dealing with economic and financial matters. The news of the resumption of shipments from the United States evoked enthusiasm on the part of these French officials whose pro-Allied sympathies seem more pronounced than is the case in any part of French North Africa.
One explanation for this situation is that the daily irritation of close contact with Italian representatives brings home to the French in Tunisia a keener realization of French humiliation. Admiral Esteva who with the two Generals in question came to lunch with Doolittle72 and myself was particularly vigorous in his denunciation of the Germans and Italians whom he characterized as vermin. All of these officials stated that tension in Tunisia has declined, that only insignificant dribbles of foodstuffs are going to Libya, and that pro-Allied sympathy is on the upswing.
I found active interest in American armament production, the need for more information on this subject. Adverse events in Libya, however, register a most depressing effect throughout this area, particularly on the part of French Army officers.
Repeated to Vichy and Tangier.
Vichy please repeat to London and Tangier. [Murphy.]
- Gen. Albert Noguès, Resident General in the French Zone of Morocco.↩
- Pierre Laval was appointed French Chief of Government on April 18, 1942.↩
- Adm. Jean François Darlan, former Vice President of the French Council of Ministers, presently Commander in Chief of all French Armed Forces.↩
- Hooker Doolittle, Consul at Tunis.↩