740.00112 European War 1939/6190: Telegram
The Consul General at Algiers (Cole) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:06 p.m.]
495. From Murphy. Your 219, July 24, 9 [8] p.m. It is difficult to comprehend the doubts entertained by the Board of Economic Warfare and the British Embassy regarding the advisability of the Ile de Noirmoutier and the Ile d’Ouessant, vessels of French registry, proceeding to Algiers. It is obvious that there must be elements in the political situation known to them of which we here are ignorant. Replying to the Department’s question, as far as I am [Page 346] aware there is no change in governing conditions since the recommendations made in my 419, June 26, 3 p.m.
Viewed from here, authorization for these French vessels to proceed to Casablanca is difficult to distinguish from permission to proceed to Algiers. These ships make no movement without the prior authorization of the Axis Armistice Commissions. Upon arrival at Casablanca, they are subject to the control of the German Armistice Commission; upon arrival in Algiers to the control of the Italian Armistice Commission. In fact, they do not leave an American port without the prior consent of the German Armistice Commission and they must follow a given course which receives the prior approval of that Commission.
The general political situation in the western Mediterranean seems to have eased since my telegram under reference. The Axis advance into Egypt has, if anything, relieved the tension in this area. The situation in Algeria and Tunisia and, in fact, the western Mediterranean has not been more calm to the best of my recollection in the past 20 months.
The officials and other competent observers in this area seem to contemplate no change during the immediate weeks.
I believe the Department will appreciate without much comment from me the propaganda value of the arrival of these ships in Algiers from New York loaded with American goods for the benefit of this area. As the Department is aware, we are deprived by French censorship under German restraint from the benefit of press and local radio publicity. The public has heard talk of economic cooperation but during the past 8 months there has been no visible evidence of it. News travels fast by informal channels in North Africa and the arrival of these ships and goods from the United States will be no exception to the rule. The ships’ arrival here will also afford our control officers in Algeria justification for port visits and more contact with French naval authorities. In the absence of military successes on this side of the water, I know of no more effective manner at present of bolstering our prestige and spreading our influence than the way suggested. I do not see that we encounter the slightest risk in adopting such a line. The total amount of goods is small and without direct military value and will be quickly absorbed by the local population. The goods have been paid for and the vessel, in any event, would be on this side of the water subject to Armistice Commission authorization.
I have noted most carefully the objections of the Board of Economic Warfare to sending fuel oil for the Coastwise Service and the possibility of obtaining sufficient cork in Morocco. That of course is a matter of policy which the Department will know best to determine. I respectfully suggest that it has always seemed to [Page 347] me that we should regard French Africa as a unit in the matter of our current economic policy. In North Africa, Algeria is the most important unit politically, economically and militarily with the largest population of the three territories. It enjoys the closest ties with metropolitan France. Algiers is the seat of the High Command for French Africa.
Therefore it might be appropriate to inquire what objective the Department has in mind. Is it restricted to an exchange of merchandise to function with the minimum risk and inconvenience or does the Department contemplate other objectives of a political and eventually military nature? I am convinced that it is the latter. If that is true our influence should extend and it does extend to include Tunisia. In fact some of the strongest sentiment in our favor exists in Tunisia where resentment against Italy is a distinct element in our favor. In addition to those considerations there is the economic factor. In the present west bound shipments the bulk of the cargoes has been provided by Algiers, [for?] the reason that Morocco would release no olive oil or wool and Armstrong shipped most of the cork from Algeria.
I gain the belief from the contention of the Board of Economic Warfare that it may be believed that the North African railroad facilities are absorbed in servicing the Axis. This of course is not true. The present limited service which is far below normal due to lack of coal and lubricants is of small assistance to the Axis at present and barely answers transport for the needs of the 20 million of French North Africans. Most shipments in which the Axis are interested have gone forward by coal burning vessels from the ports of Dakar, Casablanca, Nemours and Oran. The Armstrong Cork Company is the owner of most of the cork in Tunisia and Algeria and it is principally this commodity for which fuel oil is desired in addition to the delivery of American products. The cork must be shipped from ports in Tunisia and Algeria assembled in Algiers and shipped to Casablanca. I believe we should if practicable have regard also for the American interest involved. I repeat my previous recommendations (my 402, June 21, 11 [10] a.m., and 419, June 26, 3 p.m.) with the amendment that only 100 tons of fuel oil be retained in Casablanca from the tank of the steamer Aldebaran due to the fact that vessel and the Ile de Ré are proceeding to Gulf ports and will require more fuel for the west bound trip. Four hundred tons should be granted in addition for coastwise shipping. [Murphy.]