740.0011 European War 1939/19512: Telegram
The Minister in Finland (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 17—4:18 a.m.]
128. My 94, February 4, and 127 today. When Foreign Minister Witting this afternoon handed me his memorandum I [read] it in his presence and after doing so I had two inquiries to make. First, with reference to statement in third paragraph from end of memorandum to effect that U. S. S. R. attacked Finland last June, inquired whether Finnish Government considered there was no connection between presence of Germans in Finland at that time and alleged Soviet attack. His answer was that Finland considered attack in June 1941 part of same aggression which had begun in November 1939 and had continued even following Moscow peace. Secondly, I asked whether penultimate paragraph of his memorandum in light of official statements including President Ryti’s latest speech that Finland was fighting for destruction of Bolshevism and would continue until common victory with Germany defined purpose of safeguarding Finnish existence and permanent security. Witting said destruction of Bolshevism was certainly Finnish war aim.
Witting then alluded to effort made by Finnish Government in summer of 1940 to secure agreement with Sweden for common defense and failure of that effort through Swedish timidity and later formal Soviet objection.54 He expressed view already expressed by Wasastjerna55 as previously reported that Soviet objection was very shortsighted for Finnish-Swedish agreement at that time would have made it possible for this country as well as Sweden to remain neutral.
Accumulation of Russian strength in Finnish area in summer of 1940 especially in tense crisis of August of that year had led directly to situation in which Finnish-German transit agreement in September was accepted here as great relief.
[Page 42]As early as November 1940 Witting again said Germans were aware of far-reaching Russian preparations including accumulation of men and matériel for attack not only on Germany, but incidentally on Finland which was confirmation of Finnish apprehensions in summer of 1940 when Finland knew Russians had every intention of attacking this country again.
I then turned to statement in penultimate paragraph of Witting’s memorandum to effect that Finland does not want to become involved in greater war and asked whether this signified that Finland had already attained her strategic aims and that continuance of hostilities against Russians was result only of Russian offensive tactics at the front. Witting said that in a democratic country like Finland where military and civil direction was in different hands it was not possible as in authoritarian states precisely to define strategic aims of military leadership. It was true, however, that for long time past activity on Finnish front was due to Soviet offensive tactics which incidentally had recently been very costly to Russians in Poventsa area where only some 60 prisoners had been taken in an operation which had cost Russians approximately 3,700 killed.
I intimated that what seemed to us to be of primary importance at this time was relation of Finnish military action to necessary passage of overseas supplies for Russia in our struggle against Germans. He asked how in practical terms Finland could control German action in this respect at a time when Finland was almost wholly dependent upon German good-will for imported supplies necessary to sustain life of Finnish people.
I asked whether this was not somewhat humiliating position for Finns to be in and whether they had given up all pretension of exercising their own free will. He countered by saying that free will of Finland was determined by its geographical position in precisely the same way as that of Sweden or of the United States which latter was protected by two oceans.
It seems perfectly clear that while Finns may still hope not to be forced to take aggressive action which will interfere with passage of our supplies for Russia they have very little confidence that this hope can be realized and are prepared if necessary to face consequences of enforced cooperation with Germany. I believe therefore it would be true to say Finns will not voluntarily take any action further to complicate their position with anti-Axis forces as suggested in your 85, February 13, to Stockholm, but that they rather expect that military necessity or events over which they have no control preclude possibility of their coming to peaceful understanding with U. S. S. R. at this time or even to arrange for cessation of fighting on Finnish front. I do not think it likely that Sweden can exert their influence [Page 43] successfully as desired by Department. The Finnish mind is made up.
Repeated to Stockholm.
- Information about the consideration of plans for the formation of a northern defensive alliance, and the note of March 27, 1940, from the Soviet Union to the interested Scandinavian countries warning against the creation of any such combination, is contained in telegrams No. 315 of March 20, 1940, and No. 330 of March 26, 1940, from the Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and in telegrams No. 152 of March 28, 1940, and No. 164 of April 4, 1940, from the Minister in Sweden. Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, pp. 318, 320, 323, and 325, respectively.↩
- Jarl Axel Wasastjerna, the Finnish Minister in Sweden.↩