852.00/9916: Telegram
The Chargé in Spain (Beaulac) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 24—2:37 p.m.]
183. Department’s 104, February 18, 8 p.m. The Embassy’s efforts in the political field have been directed principally at influencing the [Page 276] attitude of the Spanish Government and people in favor of our cause. There are two principal ways of doing this: (1) by impressing upon the Spanish Government and people (a) our determination to defeat Hitlerism, and (b) the extent of our military effort; and (2) by judicious supply of commodities (in return for commodities of strategic importance to us and to Great Britain and of which we can deprive the Axis) which Spain cannot obtain from the Axis.
We have done the first in frequent conversations with Spaniards of all classes in and out of the Government and by means of a weekly news bulletin in Spanish which we have been distributing for more than 6 months. In addition the Embassy has consistently endeavored to encourage the local press to publish a larger amount of news of American origin. At present practically all communiqués of Allied countries except Russia are published in the Spanish press.
This is a comparatively new development. In addition the Spanish press now seldom criticizes the United States editorially although neither it nor the Spanish Government has abandoned its policy of friendliness to the Axis. Furthermore the Embassy is convinced that popular feeling and the feeling of many members of the Government toward the democracies has shown a steady improvement, numerous pro-Axis statements of Spanish Government leaders and of Spanish press to the contrary notwithstanding.
The Embassy has submitted in despatch form a number of basic reports on the political situation and the relation to that situation of our economic relations with Spain. It has endeavored to assist the Department in arriving at a definite policy toward Spain, the principal purpose of which would be to influence Spanish policy.
Although the Department stated in its 32, January 12, 8 p.m., that it does not regard the effect of its economic proposals upon the general policy of the Spanish Government as a major factor the Embassy continues to attach great importance to the political and strategic results which it believes it may be possible to obtain from judicious trade with Spain. That the Germans also are aware of the importance of this is indicated by their efforts to interfere with this trade (by spreading rumors calculated to arouse our Government’s fears and suspicions, for example) and by their efforts to impress upon the Spanish people their own feeble accomplishments along this line. As an indication of the importance the Germans attach to this when 57 air compressors were recently imported from Germany the Germans arranged for them to be exhibited a whole day on Madrid’s principal boulevard. Such stunts have little effect however so long as Spain continues to import principally from the democracies.
The weakness in Germany’s relationship to Spain is precisely that Germany is unable to furnish Spain with the materials Spain urgently [Page 277] needs for its continued existence. This is interpreted in Spain as a sign of German weakness and indicates further (so long as the democracies are able to furnish goods to Spain) that however lamentable Spain’s economic situation may be it can only be worsened by Spain’s entry into the war on the side of the Axis. This argument will not be valid to the same extent of course if we withhold supplies of petroleum principally of gas oil so important to Spanish agriculture, fishing, communications and industry.
Conversely our and Great Britain’s ability in the past to furnish supplies to Spain has been interpreted as a sign of our strength. It has also encouraged the Spanish Government especially those comments [elements?] in it not entirely sympathetic to the Axis to endeavor to improve Spanish-American relations and has strengthened their hands in their endeavor to counteract the efforts of the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs25 to bring about complete cooperation with the Axis.
In recommending continuance of a modicum of trade with Spain, the Embassy is quite aware that some risks would be entailed. It believes, however, that the political and military risks from stopping trade are greater and involve Spain’s possible entry into the war on the side of the Axis. Our Military and Naval Attachés26 concur in this opinion.
In its political reporting, the Embassy has tried to avoid burdening and confusing the Department with rumors and unconfirmed reports which circulate here very freely and are widely accepted until proven untrue as they usually are. Many of these are started by the Germans with the intention of spreading confusion.
As the Department is aware, despite many rumors of pending political change, some of which have been reported, there have been no political developments of importance in the Spanish situation for many months. Whenever there were strong indications of any developments, they were reported immediately. As several times reported and as indicated above, the principal political tendencies have been (1) the strengthening of Spain’s desire to keep out of the war and (2) increased friendliness toward the democracies in certain influential circles and on the part of the public. An evidence of these is that this Embassy’s formal relations with the Spanish Government have been restored to a dignified basis during this period.
The fundamental situation as set forth in despatches which the Embassy again commends to the Department’s attention has not changed in recent months except as Axis victories tend to embolden elements friendly to the Axis and democratic victories strengthen [Page 278] those elements opposed to cooperation with the Axis. The situation still has three important factors: (1) the Government’s determination to keep out of the war despite (2) its ideological, sentimental and political attachment to Germany and (3) its military weakness vis-à-vis Germany which forces it to use its wits in resisting German pressure and to endeavor to placate Germany principally by word rather than by deed. The Department will doubtless wish to bear these basic factors in mind in interpreting the Embassy’s future telegraphic reports of facts and rumors.
The Embassy appreciates the Department’s suggestions and will report more fully on the purely political aspects of Spanish situation. I have instructed Consulates also to increase their political reporting.
With reference to the Seville meeting see Embassy’s 182, February 20, 5 p.m.28 Little detail of meeting shown here. Suñer did not return to Madrid until Wednesday and others besides Franco who know about the meeting went directly to Lisbon and none has since come to Madrid.