740.0011 European War 1939/25290: Telegram
The Ambassador in Spain (Hayes) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 7—6:27 p.m.]
1705. Your 1161, November 4, 6 p.m. In a conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs this morning I reminded him that on [Page 304] Monday64 I had left with him a formal declaration of my Government solemnly engaging it to respect Spanish sovereignty and the integrity of all Spanish territory in connection with any future military operations by the United States in Europe or Africa. The declaration contained a statement that it is my Government’s purpose to do everything possible to prevent Spain’s being brought into the war and that Spain’s desire to remain out of the war is fully recognized by the United States. I said I understood that the British Ambassador had given similar assurances on behalf of his Government. It is obvious, therefore, that any threat to Spain’s neutrality could come only from the Axis.
Since last Monday reports had reached me that Germany had requested the Spanish Government[’s] consent to the passage of German troops through Spain in the event of United Nations military operations in northwest Africa. I did not ask him to confirm the reports, but said I wanted to make clear on behalf of my Government the simple fact that compliance by Spain with any such request on the part of Germany now or in the future would instantly bring Spain into the war, a contingency which my Government believes is precisely what Spain desires to avoid.
I said it seemed obvious that in the face of any Axis threat to bring Spain into the war Spain’s hope of staying out could be realized only if Spain made it perfectly clear in advance that it is determined to defend its neutrality against the Axis as well as against the United Nations and thus discourage German efforts to force Spain into the war.
I said I was troubled in this connection by two existing circumstances which raised a doubt that Spain would in fact effectively resist German pressure to draw it into the war. The first was the present disposition of Spanish armed forces which seemed to be arranged to permit resistance to possible attack by the United Nations in the south but not to permit resistance to possible attack by Germany in the north. The second was the pro-Axis attitude of the Spanish press censorship which has converted the Spanish press, and especially the official Falange press, into an instrument of Axis political warfare.
I said I was authorized by the President to say that if Spain decides to make clear its determination to resist possible Axis aggression and if the necessity for such resistance should arise, and if Spain should so desire, my Government will be prepared to extend immediately to Spain all possible assistance of every description.
I told him that what I had said was for his information and that of the Chief of State.
General Jordana denied emphatically that Germany had requested Spanish Government’s consent to the passage of German troops [Page 305] through Spain. He said Germany and Italy appreciated the role Spain had played during the Civil War and had not made any demands on Spain since the outbreak of the World War. Spain on its part appreciated the noble assistance of those two countries during her tragic trials.
Spain had no fear of German entry or of being forced into the war by the Axis—unless the United Nations invaded French Morocco or Oran, the European population of which was principally Spanish.
From the Spanish point of view Morocco must be treated as a whole. There is a homogeneous Moslem population in both Spanish and French zones. There are common problems in both zones. Much Spanish blood has been shed in Morocco. Entry by any outside nation would disturb the situation in all Morocco. Any military activity in French Morocco would have its inevitable repercussions in Spanish Morocco and Spain would be obliged immediately to adopt precautionary military measures. It might not be in a position to refuse assistance from Germany.
I made clear that this would involve Spain in war against the United Nations.
The Minister endeavored to intimate that the passage of German troops through Spain would not involve Spain in war against the United Nations unless we came into Spain. I said we would be obliged to come into Spain in that case and made clear again it would involve Spain in war against us.
He said that if the United Nations desired to respect Spanish Morocco they must also respect French Morocco since the two should be treated as a whole.
I said I could not agree and that there was no difference between our entering French Morocco and our landing in metropolitan France.
I said that if Spain permitted itself to be used by the Axis it would bear the responsibility of having attacked us since we had already given a solemn pledge not to violate Spanish sovereignty, and I was not informed that the Axis had given similar guarantees. The Minister made a special plea that whatever we consider to be our rights we stay out of French Morocco and Oran because if we enter those places he fears Spain will be drawn into the war. If we stay out then he believes Spain will be able to remain out of the war as it ardently desires.
I interpret the conversation as a threat that Spain will enter the war on the side of the Axis if we enter French Morocco or Oran.
Following my previous conversation with the Mink in which he expressed gratitude for the assurances I gave him on behalf of our Government, Jordana spent the entire day of Tuesday with General Franco and I consider that today he was interpreting Franco’s attitude.
[Page 306]I believe that recognizing the risk to Spain of military activities by us in northwest Africa, Franco is endeavoring to dissuade us by this means from entering that territory and that he is not necessarily prepared to carry out the implied threat contained in Jordana’s statement to me. Nevertheless I believe that under present conditions we have to reckon with the possibility that Spain would oppose with force any attempt by us to invade French Morocco or Oran.
Jordana told me he had talked to the British Ambassador in a similar view [vein?] yesterday morning; the British Ambassador has not informed me of his conversation and declined to see me this afternoon on the grounds of several previous appointments.
I have not therefore had an opportunity to discuss this new development with him.
- November 2↩