740.0011 European War 1939/26046
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
The Spanish Ambassador called to see me this morning at his request. The Ambassador handed me the official communication attached herewith.68 I told the Ambassador that this communication was, of course, most gratifying to this Government as a reiteration of the official statements already made by the Spanish Government.
The Ambassador asked me if this Government had any information as to the reasons for the mobilization decree promulgated by the Spanish Government. I said that the information which I had received [Page 310] had indicated that reports were current that the German Government intended to present the Spanish Government with a demand for the right to send troops through Spain and that the Spanish Government was determined to refuse such demands and that the mobilization undertaken had been responsive to the needs arising from this situation.
The Ambassador spoke with a great deal of emphasis about his fear that public and press campaigns were again under way in the United States against the Spanish Government alleging that the mobilization undertaken should be regarded as a sign that Spain was about to give open and overt assistance to the Axis powers. The Ambassador remarked that there was nothing that he personally desired more than that his country should stay, out of the war, but that if she was forced into the war, it must be on the side of the United Nations and not on the side of the Axis, and he urged that every step be undertaken by this Government to prevent the raising of the kind of a public clamor in the United States destined to create bad feeling on the part of the Spanish Government and people towards the United States in these critical times.
I told the Ambassador that I was somewhat surprised by the emotion with which he spoke since it had been my belief that during the past two weeks as a result of the messages exchanged between the President and General Franco the atmosphere had been better and that public opinion in general in the United States was inclined to the belief that Spain was not intending to assist the Axis and was not intending to undertake any steps detrimental to the Allied cause.
The Ambassador replied that as he had stated to me in a previous conversation, Axis propagandists could very rapidly stir up public opinion in Spain into the belief that inasmuch as the United States had occupied French territory, the United States’ professions of friendship now made towards Spain were intended only to cover up the intention of the United States later on likewise to occupy Spanish territory and Spanish colonies. He said he thought that if I would write a reply to the letter which he had written me under date of November 17 and which he now handed me, and which is likewise attached herewith,69 and if he could transmit my reply by cable to his Government, a very useful purpose would be served.
I stated that it seemed to me that there was nothing more categorical than the text of the President’s message to General Franco and that any reply by me would have to be based solely on the assurances given by the President, as otherwise the implication would immediately be apparent that some other assurances were needed in addition to and beyond the assurances already made by the President.
[Page 311]The Ambassador seemed to feel that if I would merely reiterate in reply to his letter the text of the assurances given by the President, a useful purpose would be served which would be of value at the present somewhat critical moment.
I told him I would, of course, be glad to give any consideration to friendly suggestions of this character destined to maintain good relations between our two countries and the position of neutrality adopted by the Spanish Government. I told him I would let him know what decision I might reach.