Memorandum of Conference Held at the White House, by Mr. Samuel H. Cross, Interpreter23
| Present: | The President, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Litvinov, Secretary Hull, Mr. Hopkins, Messrs. Pavlov25 and Cross. |
After the customary introductions and greetings, Mr. Molotov presented Mr. Stalin’s good wishes, which the President heartily reciprocated. To the President’s inquiry as to Mr. Stalin’s health, Mr. Molotov replied that, though his Chief had an exceptionally strong constitution, the events of the winter and spring had put him under heavy strain.
Mr. Molotov described his flight from Moscow to London and thence to Iceland, Labrador, and Washington as not especially unpleasant or wearing. His plane had flown from Moscow to London direct, over the front and Denmark, in about 10 hours, but this was not particularly good time, as the same trip has been made before in 7½ hrs. He explained that his military adviser had broken his kneecap in an automobile accident in London, and was, thus, detained in England. Mr. Molotov consequently regretted that he would have to act as both diplomat and soldier. The President remarked that none present were military specialists, but that Mr. Molotov would have an opportunity next day to talk with General Marshall and Admiral King.26
[Page 567]Mr. Molotov expressed his intention to discuss the military situation fully. He had covered it in detail with Mr. Churchill, who had not felt able to give any definite answer to the questions Mr. Molotov raised, but had suggested that Mr. Molotov should return through London after his conversations with the President, at which time a more concrete reply could be rendered in the light of the Washington discussions.
The President noted that we had information as to heavy Japanese naval concentration in the Fuchia and Mariana Islands, but that we could not tell as yet whether they were directed against Australia, Hawaii, Alaska, or perhaps Kamchatka. Mr. Molotov said he was not informed about this, but he had no doubt the Japanese would do anything in their power to intimidate the Soviets.
To Mr. Molotov’s remark that Hitler was the chief enemy, the President noted his agreement and mentioned his repeated statements to the Pacific Conference that we should remain on the defensive in the Paicific until the European front was cleared up. It had been difficult, he added, to put this view across, but, in his opinion it was now accepted.
The President remarked that he had one or two points to raise which had been brought up by the State Department, and could be discussed by Mr. Molotov or between Mr. Litvinov and Secretary Hull, as seemed expedient.
The President then inquired what information Mr. Molotov had as to the Nazi treatment of Soviet prisoners of war. The Commissar replied that from such data as Moscow received, not only from their own agents, but also from Polish and Czech sources, it was plain that the Russian prisoners were brutally and inhumanely handled. Direct reports to the effect had been received from some 25 Soviet prisoners who had escaped from Norway into Sweden. Mr. Molotov remarked that the Germans felt themselves bound by no rules, though the Soviets (he implied) were acting according to the Hague convention to the best of their ability.27
The President expressed the hope that at least softie arrangement might be made to exchange lists of names of prisoners of war. Mr. Molotov replied with emphasis that his government was not disposed to negotiate any arrangement with the Germans which would give the latter the slightest pretext for claiming that they (the Germans) were observing any rules whatever, because the fact was, they were not doing so. He showed no interest in the President’s original suggestion. The President remarked that we had a similar problem in connection [Page 568] with our own nationals in Japanese captivity. While there was, for the moment, no official confirmation of radio reports of positive maltreatment, these prisoners were being fed on the Japanese army ration, which was starvation fare for any white man.
The President then had a memorandum on the state of Soviet-Turkish relations, which had become considerably less cordial than was previously the case. The memorandum expressed the willingness of our government to cooperate in any way toward the improvement of these relations. Mr. Molotov replied succinctly that he was ready to discuss this matter.
The President also referred to the disturbances among the Kurds in Eastern [Western] Iran and expressed his hope that the trustful cooperation now existing between the Soviet and the Iranian authorities would continue and manifest itself hereafter as occasion might arise. Mr. Molotov said he was familiar with the situation and shared the President’s hope.
In the course of conversation the President asked Mr. Molotov whether he had noted any intensification of reports oil the deterioration of German domestic morale. Mr. Molotov admitted the increased frequency of such reports, but failed to comment on their significance.
The President described his plans for continuing the conversations and for receiving Mr. Molotov’s staff and the flyers who brought him over. Mr. Molotov decided to spend Friday night at the White House, and ostensibly withdrew to rest, though between adjournment and dinner he took a walk with Mr. Litvinov, whom it had been decided not to include in the next day’s conversations, to the Ambassador’s obvious annoyance.
II. Friday, May 29, 7:40 p.m.28
| Present: | The President, Mr. Molotov, Mr. Hopkins, Messrs. Pavlov and Cross. |
A. (before dinner)
While serving cocktails, the President discussed at length certain basic considerations on post-war organization. Mr. Churchill (he said) had expressed some idea of reestablishing a post-war international organization which was in effect a revived League of Nations. The President had given Mr. Churchill his own opinion that such an organization would be impractical, because too many nations would be involved. The President conceived it the duty of the four major United Nations (Britain, U. S., U. S. S. R., and China, provided the last achieves a unified central government, opposite which there was still a question-mark) to act as the policemen of the world. The first step was general disarmament. But the four major nations would [Page 569] maintain sufficient armed forces to impose peace, together with inspection privileges which would guard against the sort of clandestine rearmament in which Germany had notoriously engaged during the pre-war years. If any nation menaced the peace, it could be blockaded and then if still recalcitrant, bombed. The President added that which concerned him was the establishment of a peace which would last 25 years, at least the lifetime of the present generation. He and Mr. Stalin were over 60, Mr. Molotov 53; his aim was thus peace in our time. He the thought that all other nations save the Big Four should be disarmed (Germany, Japan, France, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Scandinavia, Turkey, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.).
Mr. Molotov remarked that this might be a bitter blow to the prestige of Poland and Turkey. “The Turks,” he added, “are an extremely pretentious people.” He also inquired about the reestablishment of France as a great power. The President replied that might perhaps be possible within 10 or 20 years. He added that other-nations might eventually be accepted progressively at various time among the guarantors of peace whenever the original guarantors were satisfied of their reliability. This might be peace by dictation, hut his hope was that it might be so administered that the peoples of the previous aggressor nations might eventually come to see that they have infinitely more to gain from permanent peace than from periodically recurrent wars.
Mr. Molotov observed warmly that the President’s ideas for the preservation of mutual peace would be sympathetically viewed by the Soviet government and people.
Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the President was familiar with the treaty he had negotiated with the British. The President replied in the affirmative, and said he thought it was all to the good. He was glad that the frontier problem had not been mentioned. Not that it would not present itself eventually, but he thought there might be a proper time for raising this question, though the present was not the moment. Mr. Molotov remarked that he and his government had very definite convictions in the opposite direction, but that he had deferred to British preference and to what he understood to be the attitude of the President.
B. (during dinner)
This period was largely devoted to Mr. Molotov’s exposition of his government’s views on the critical need for a second front.…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mr. Molotov, therefore, urged the view that it was in the interest of the Western Allies to do something now, when the U. S. S. R. was still strong, to draw off an appreciable share of Hitler’s forces from [Page 570] the Russian campaign, thus modifying the balance and making it possible for the Red Army to come in with a decisive blow which would either crush his forces now or make certain his defeat within a reasonably short period. He remarked that the Germans had employed no new weapons so far; the use of gas had not been confirmed, nor the employment of short-range shells with destructively heavy concussion effects. Sporadically, however, they had thrown in heavy tanks of the sort the Russians themselves use, as well as a new Messerschmitt with no heavier fire-power, but with a hopped-up engine and, thus, additional speed.
Mr. Molotov went on to say that, if an Anglo-American invasion of the continent in 1942 could draw off 40 German divisions from the Russian front, that would so weaken the striking and the resistery power of the Germans that decisive action would be possible to the general advantage.
Answering a query of the President, the Commissar said he did not ascribe any merit to British notions about an invasion of Norway. It would not go to the heart of the matter, which was (first and foremost): a continental blow to Hitler of sufficient force to embarrass and weaken him by causing vital changes in his military dispositions and local strength.
The President remarked that it was not so much a question of man power and matériel; it all came down to transportation. Troops could be landed on any beach, but tanks and other mechanized equipment were another story, since docks and cranes were necessary to debark them. We are, to be sure, building special tank-carriers of sufficient strength and displacement to cross the ocean under their own power. Two other smaller types would have to be freighted over on larger ships.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. (after dinner)
Upon the conclusion of dinner, the President and his guests withdrew to his study, where the President seated Mr. Molotov beside him on the sofa and began a slightly less formal conversation.…
Mr. Molotov inquired of the President as to the state of American public opinion toward the Soviet Union. The President replied that he had no doubt that the mass of the population was more friendly than Congress. Our population was, after all, a mixed one, and the presence of large Irish, German, and Italian elements rendered any known stage of public opinion fairly variegated.
Mr. Hopkins remarked that, while the American Communist Party had played ball one-hundred percent since December 7, the fact was that its composition of largely disgruntled, frustrated, ineffectual, and [Page 571] vociferous people—including a comparatively high proportion of distinctly unsympathetic Jews—misled the average American as to the aspect and character of the Communists in the Soviet Union itself. On this the President commented that he was far from anti-Semitic, as everyone knew, but there was a good deal in this point of view. Mr. Molotov admitted affably that there were Communists and Communists, and readily recognized the distinction between “Jews” and “Kikes” (for the latter the Russians have a word of similar connotation: Zhidy) as something that created inevitable difficulties.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The whole evening’s conversation, on Mr. Molotov’s part, was marked by a somewhat unexpected frankness and amiability, which leads, not unnaturally, to the supposition that, since the Soviets want something very seriously, the word had gone out from Mr. Stalin to be somewhat more agreeable than is Mr. Molotov’s custom.
(All recorded from memory; I took no notes during these talks and neither did Mr. Pavlov)
- Copy obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N. Y. Samuel H. Cross, who interpreted for President Roosevelt during these conferences, was Professor of Slavic Languages and Literature at Harvard University.↩
- For a memorandum of this conference by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, see p. 571.↩
- Vladimir Nikolayevich Pavlov, interpreter for Molotov.↩
- Adm. Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet.↩
- In 1941 the United States had attempted to persuade the Soviet Union to adhere to the Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929, relative to the treatment of prisoners of war. See Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, pp. 1005 ff. The text of this convention is in ibid., 1929, vol. i, p. 336. For text of the Hague convention of October 18, 1907, see ibid., 1907, pt. 2, p. 1204, or 36 Stat. (pt. 2) 2277.↩
- For a memorandum of this conference by Mr. Harry L. Hopkins, see p. 572.↩