741.6111/60½
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)
Sir Ronald Campbell47 called this afternoon to see me in the absence from Washington of Lord Halifax.
Sir Ronald handed me a copy of a telegram; from the British Foreign Office dealing with the treaty recently signed between the British and Soviet Governments. The text of this telegram reads as follows: [Page 584]
“It will be seen that it has been possible to avoid dealing in the Treaty with the whole subject of the Soviet claim to the Baltic States and their presumed designs in respect of Finland and Roumania. There is thus no question of the Treaty being in conflict with the Atlantic Charter. On the contrary, the preamble states the intention’ that post-war collaboration shall be on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, While the two principles enunciated in the Charter of not seeking territorial aggrandisement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States are reaffirmed in Article 5 of the Treaty.
“Collaboration with the United Nations is covered in paragraph 4 of the preamble, and in the second sentence of Article 5 of the Treaty.
“As regards provisions for mutual assistance, these are confined to the case of renewed aggression by Germany and her associates. It is to be observed that the desire of the two parties to unite with other like minded States in adopting a post-war security System is covered in Article 3, and that the mutual assistance proposal lapses on the, agreement of both parties that they are superseded by the adoption or such a system. It might conceivably he objected that under paragraph 2 of Article 4 the U. S. S. R. would be in a position to insist on the continuance of the mutual assistance provision after the general security system is agreed upon, by arguing that the latter does not supersede the former. The answer to this argument is that it is unlikely that any general security system in Europe would be of much practical value if the U. S. S. R. and the United Kingdom did not both participate and were not both satisfied that the system was adequate.
“It may be argued that the words in Article 5 to the effect that the two parties will have ‘regard to the interests of the security’ of each party could be used by the Soviet Government to reassert their claims to recover their 1941 frontiers and to control Finland and Roumania. It may be that the Soviet Government will in any case reassert their claims sooner or later, but it is important to note that these claims are not specified or recognised by implication in the present Treaty. The British Government are not pledged to do more than have regard to the Soviet Union’s security interests in general if these are put forward by the Soviet Government after the re-establishment of peace; and even so, this pledge must be read in relation to the other undertakings assumed by both parties in Article 5.
“In general, it can be claimed that this Treaty
- “(a) brings the U. S. S. R. closer to the United Kingdom in prosecuting the war in Europe up to the final victory,
- “(b) provides for collaboration of the most effective kind to prevent a repetition of aggression by Germany and her associates in Europe pending, the setting up of a more general security system. The Treaty thus provides for the establishment of the first conditions on which the effective economic reconstruction of Europe after the war depends.
- “(c) brings Russia finally into the circle of the United Nations not only in regard to the organisation of security but also in respect of economic reconstruction, and
- “(d) by the second sentence of Article 5, the interests of other States are not only [not?] affected but actually safeguarded.
“The British Government have tried in these negotiations to crease Soviet confidence in their sincerity and at the same time to dispel the suspicions of neutral and allied States in regard to their collaboration with the Soviet Union. If this aim is achieved, results which may be of importance not only during the war but in the post-war period should have been obtained.
“Please take appropriate steps to bring the foregoing points to the notice of the President and the State Department.”
Sir Ronald requested that I send a copy of this message to the President, which I said I would be glad to do.48 He added that the British Government had learned that the press in general now had knowledge that a treaty between the two Governments had been signed, and that the British Government consequently had urged the Soviet Government to agree to the publication of the text thereof. The latter, however, had proved adamant and had refused to consider any publication until after the return to Moscow of Mr. Molotov.